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ABSTRACT
MANAGING PERFORMANCE IN RETAIL OPERATIONS:
THE STORE MANAGER VIEW 
by James R Bell
Performance In retail operations is about delivering service to customers 
efficiently and effectively. In a competitive world, there is a constant pressure to 
improve performance. Retailers are not alone in believing that it is not possible to 
manage performance without trying to measure it. Supplied with indications of 
performance, retail managers will be influenced and their behaviours will change 
in pursuit of improvement. Whilst much academic attention has been devoted to 
performance "management", most of it is focused on measuring performance 
rather than how performance information is actually used. Comparatively little is 
known about how retail operations managers draw on performance information 
and then what they do with it.
This study uses a qualitative methodology to explore retail store manager 
perceptions of performance management. The approach is careful not to 
assume that this population relies upon corporate systems and measures. It is 
possible that store managers have their own informal measures. Critical Incident 
Technique is adopted as a protocol to interview twelve store managers from a 
single retail organisation. This generates fifty-one examples of strong and weak 
performance, and captures how store managers first became aware of the 
situation and the actions or decisions that they took in response. The findings are 
evaluated using thematic content analysis to provide insight to performance 
management from the perspective of these front-line managers.
In this study, financial performance indicators and particularly sales, dominate the 
corporate measurement system. The limited corporate use of more qualitative 
measures has weak influence on performance management in the view of store 
level respondents. There is a frustration that the corporate system provides only
a partial view of the realities of managing retail operations. The study finds that 
there are useful non-corporate sources of performance information. Staff 
disposition is seen as linked to productivity, availability, customer satisfaction, 
customer loyalty and financial performance. There is potentially a cyclical effect 
that can be positive or negatively directed. The store manager in turn, can affect 
staff disposition. This has particular implications during periods of poor 
performance.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
CONTEXT FOR THIS STUDY
This research project has been conducted in the UK food retail sector during 
2010. The grocery market in the UK was valued at £146.3 billion in 2009 and can 
be regarded as mature on the basis that year-on-year growth has remained 
below 5% in recent years (IGD, 2009). The market exhibits concentration on the 
basis of format type where larger supermarkets are dominant in terms of turnover 
and retailer type with ‘multiples’ representing the largest share of business (IGD,
2009). The largest four grocery retailers currently represent over 70% of the total 
market (Kantar Worldpanel, 2010). Large retail organisations are interesting in 
structural terms, for the spread of their stores from each other and from the 
central location of head office. The study relates to operations management, 
which is organised locally and overseen remotely by a field team.
The host organisation in this study is a large consumer co-operative (hereafter 
referred to as “0 0 ”) with interests including food retailing. There are currently 
twenty-seven consumer co-operatives in the UK with a combined membership of 
approximately 9.5 million and turnover exceeding £16 billion (Oo-operatives UK,
2010).
RATIONALE
The motivation for this study stems from my professional interests. Before joining 
academia, I spent several years working in food retail operations management 
and the U.K.'s co-operative sector (1975-1986). I am now the longest standing 
member of the retail management team at the University of Surrey, where my 
expertise has been in retail operations and supply chain management from a 
retail perspective.
Operations management is a key management discipline. Services and hence 
service operations management have become increasingly significant (Johnston, 
1999), both in terms of the economic activity that they represent and the 
academic interest that they attract. What is now recognised as the retail sector
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has become very substantial and leaders in the industry are amongst the world's 
largest business organisations. Retail activities and retail operations now extend 
across national boundaries and in many cases have a truly global reach, either in 
terms of serving their customers or because the right goods for their customers 
are sourced from across the world. Nor are retail operations limited to the retail 
sector. Many other sectors and the organisations within them, incorporate very 
significant retail operations. Examples of this would include the hospitality, 
tourism, leisure and travel industries. In many cases retailing is vital to the 
viability of the business model, even if it is not regarded as a core activity.
To fulfil the requirements of the DBA. the primary objective here, the research 
project needs to be of an applied nature. Typically a DBA candidate would select 
a topic from their own employment context. In my own case, a focus on retail 
operations management and more specifically performance in that context is a 
most suitable choice from the perspective of developing a professional interest. 
However, this has introduced greater distance between the researcher and the 
focus of interest. This can be very positive if the co-operation of an industry 
partner can be relied upon for the purpose of data collection. Such co-operation 
requires a level of trust and confidence between the researcher and the retailers 
in question. Organisations may be wary of investigation into their performance 
even if the outcome was of practical benefit.
The planned outcomes for this research project on a personal level are the 
achievement of a recognised academic credential, along with the profile that this 
would bring. The process will also extend personal knowledge and 
understanding, whilst developing research skills and providing a foundation upon 
which further academic studies can be pursued. More tangibly, it is envisaged 
that this project will generate academic papers of a publishable quality.
The University of Surrey has invested substantial resource into this project and 
similarly will enjoy the benefits of a strengthened academic profile. It is 
anticipated that the research will contribute in a wider sense to ongoing 
developments in this field and will be of interest to current and future industry 
partners.
RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
The aim of this project is to explore the use of performance information by store 
managers in the food retailing industry. There is a substantial literature on the 
measurement of performance generally, but much less on performance 
management (Radnor and Barnes, 2007). There are some practical explanations 
for this emphasis. Firstly, performance practice is potentially sensitive and 
commercial organisations may be reluctant to permit access for the purpose of 
data collection. If this can be resolved there remains the very real problem of 
capturing “management” activity data for the purpose of study. Part of the 
rationale for adopting corporate performance measures is that they should 
encourage positive changes in manager behaviour (Neely et al 1995, Waal 2003, 
Franco-Santos and Bourne, 2005). To develop a stronger understanding of the 
use of performance information is therefore of both academic interest and 
practical relevance.
This study will explore the use of performance information from the perspective of 
the store managers themselves. Qualitative data from interviews will be analysed 
to address the following specific research objectives:
o To explore where retail store managers draw performance information from 
o To explore what retail store managers actually do with performance 
information
The first of these objectives refrains from assuming that these managers are 
entirely reliant on the corporate system. It is possible that a store manager 
makes use of their own informal or unofficial indicators of performance. This is 
plausible if hard, quantitative measures dominate the corporate system.
OUTLINE STRUCTURE
To achieve the above research objectives, this dissertation will first review the 
literature relating to the measurement and management of performance 
generally, but with emphasis on the perspective of the operations management
discipline. This will be followed by a brief account of the generic role of retail 
store managers in the food sector.
The literature review will be followed by the methodology chapter. This will start 
by establishing the philosophical assumptions that underpin the interpretive 
research approach adopted for this study. The specific research objectives 
stated above, will then be explored in greater depth along with an account of the 
research design adopted. The methodology chapter will be concluded with a 
treatment of the specific methods applied in this study and of the process of data 
collection and analysis.
Chapter four will present the findings. In summary these are the analysis of the 
fourteen interviews conducted for this research. It will start with the two senior 
manager interviews, which will provide context for the main study. It will then 
present the findings from the store manager interviews, from which over fifty 
critical incidents were isolated.
In the following chapter, the research findings will be further analysed in the light 
of the existing literature, to establish and explore principal areas of convergence 
and divergence. A full discussion of the substantive findings of this study will be 
presented, along with conclusions and practical implications. Limitations will be 
considered and avenues for further research identified.
The dissertation will conclude with a reflection on the entire DBA project as a 
learning experience.
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PERFORMANCE INDICATORS AND 
PERFORMANCE
Introduction
Retail operations are processes that combine resources and deliver outputs. In 
this context performance is relative to the capability of the operation. A strong 
performance by implication is one that realises most or all of the operations 
capability, efficiently and effectively. A weak performance is one that falls short in 
some respect. A performance indicator (PI) is an individual measure or metric, 
designed to capture the state of the process at a particular moment in time. Most 
business enterprises use performance indicators as management tools. These 
performance indicators serve a number of purposes, but this research is 
concerned with how they influence the behaviour (Neely et ai 1995, Waal 2003, 
Franco-Santos and Bourne, 2005) in this case, of retail operations managers.
The underpinning logic is that managers receive either an early confirmation that 
business is progressing satisfactorily towards a desired outcome, or conversely 
an early warning that there is some problem and that without intervention the 
desired outcome will not be realised. In the absence of performance indicators it 
would be possible to be unaware of an impending unsatisfactory outcome, until it 
was too late to remedy the situation. Beyond company-selected key performance 
indicators (KPIs), it is also possible that retail operations managers make some 
use of their own unofficial performance indicators (MPIs). Indeed, there is some 
indication in the literature that this is the case. This research is further concerned 
with the adoption of MPIs. Beyond the performance indicators provided by the 
company, what do retail operations managers use? In what circumstances are 
these MPIs used? How do MPIs function in practice?
In order to answer these questions it is necessary to understand how business 
enterprises generally and retailers specifically, seek to measure and manage 
performance. It is important to understand why companies measure 
performance, to see what gets measured and how it gets measured. There is
extensive academic work that looks at measuring performance. It is not a new 
area of academic study, but has received substantial attention over the last 20 
years (Radnor and Barnes, 2007). That operations managers might use their 
own performance indicators may reflect perceived inadequacies in the corporate 
performance indicators (CPIs). A review of the literature follows, starting with the 
rationale behind measuring performance from the organisation's perspective.
This will be followed by exploring what is measured. Having established the 
formal view of measuring performance, the review will develop the context in 
managers might develop their own performance indicators.
Why do companies measure performance?
This research project is concerned with the relationship between the information 
available to operations managers with regard to performance, its influence on 
behaviour and subsequent performance. According to Franco-Santos and 
Bourne (2005, p. 114) in their comprehensive and systematic review of the 
literature, “Performance measurement is a fundamental cornerstone of modern 
management.” It is common practice for business organisations to adopt formal 
measures of performance or performance indicators (Pis). To an extent the 
chosen formal measures will reflect performance and the view presented here 
recognises that managers may from experience, also have their own informal 
performance indicators. There are other benefits that accrue from the adoption of 
formal performance measures (Johnston and Clarke, 2005), but a significant part 
of the rationale stems from the potential to influence the behaviour of managers. 
The logic of having company performance indicators in this context, is that 
managers can use the information to guide decision-making and actions in 
pursuit of stronger performance outcomes in the future (Neely et al 1995, Waal 
2003, Franco-Santos and Bourne, 2005). Byway of introduction. Figure 1 
presents a view of performance indicators, whether formally adopted by the 
company or not, and how they link to operations manager behaviours and 
decisions, within the context of ongoing performance. This link is contingent on 
manager perceptions and interpretations. Further, the model recognises the 
potential for other extraneous factors that the link between performance 
indicators and behaviours may also be contingent upon. March and Sutton
(1997) from an organisational behaviour perspective, reflect on the many 
problems with “identifying the true causal structure of organisational 
performance” and caution against “simple models of complex worlds.” There is 
indeed ample complexity and this diagram is too simple. The following sections 
will seek to explore the many dimensions involved, as a foundation for this 
research project.
Past Performance
‘Scorecard’
&
MPM MPI 2 MPI 3
ExtS
Retail manager 
perceptions / interpretations +/
Retail Manager 
Behaviours / Decisions
Future performance
Figure 1: Measuring and managing performance (JRB/DBA Revised 25/08/2010)
What gets measured?
(Performance measurement and management) PMM is a 
tool and means and not an end in itself and although 
understanding effectiveness and efficiency are important, 
the extent at which they are measured, analysed and 
reported should be balanced with the need to manage and 
deliver improved goods and services.
Radnor and Barnes 2007, p.394
Operations managers have responsibility for controlling resources and processes 
in pursuit of objectives. According to Laitinen (2002), “performance can be 
defined as the ability of an object to produce results in a dimension determined a 
priori, in relation to a target." An operation can be viewed as combining a number 
of inputs via a process and yielding an output. Performance can therefore be 
described in terms of efficiency. Wasted resources (for example, stock losses in 
retailing) are exarriples of poor efficiency. Innovations, or better ways of doing 
things, or achieving the same output whilst using fewer resources, are examples 
of good performance. Traditionally, accountants have been very good at 
providing a basis for evaluating performance. Accounting records of inputs and 
outputs facilitate this. However, performance has another dimension that is less 
easy to capture and quantify: namely effectiveness. Neely et al (1995), review a 
“revolution" in the field. They define performance measurement as the process of 
quantifying the efficiency and effectiveness of action; a performance measure as 
a single metric used for this purpose, and a performance measurement system 
as a set of metrics used for this purpose. To use retail operations examples, the 
rate of stock-turn is an efficiency measure using stockholding (the input) and the 
sales level (the output). The greater the sales level in proportion to the 
stockholding, the more efficient the operation. Moving to effectiveness, an 
important measure in retailing is that of customer satisfaction. These are 
pertinent examples to use as in this example the retail operations manager would 
find low stockholding would flatter the rate of stock-turn and make the business 
look very efficient, whilst increasing the risk of poor availability damaging the
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shopping experience and in turn, generating poor customer satisfaction. It is 
precisely this type of interrelationship that performance measurement systems 
are designed to address.
There is a burgeoning literature, both academic and professional, addressing the 
design of performance measurement systems. Neely (1999) writes that a key 
question is “what are the determinants of business performance?” and notes that 
the answer has “Holy Grail” status. As dissatisfaction grew with having to rely on 
financial indicators, Fitzgerald et al (1991) recognised that “to be of use, feedback 
control must be a stimulus to appropriate action at the appropriate level of the 
organisation and stage of decision-making process.” Fitzgerald et al (1991) 
categorised performance dimensions in terms of results and determinants.
Kaplan and Norton (1992, 1996, 2001) have attracted more attention than 
anyone else in the field (Neely, 2005) with their balanced scorecard which “keeps 
companies looking and moving, forward instead of backward”; a fundamental 
shift, in the modest opinion of the authors. Kaplan and Norton’s (1992) balanced 
scorecard incorporated non-financial measures with, it was claimed, greater 
capacity for predicting future performance. The balanced scorecard has been 
widely adopted but there remains little evidence of its impact on performance 
(Neely, 2005). There have been other similar tools proposed (e.g. Heskett et al 
1997, Laitinen, 2002). In turn, there have been some tests of whether indicators 
really have “lead” properties and of causal relationships within these models.
The results have been mixed. Ittner and Larcker (1998) conducted rigorous and 
substantial hypotheses testing. They found some support for the claim that 
measures of customer satisfaction were leading indicators i.e. that there was a 
positive relationship between customer satisfaction and subsequent financial 
performance. Ittner and Larcker (1998) deserve credit for explicit recognition of 
the limitations of their study; including endogeneity concerns, the somewhat 
arbitrary properties of some measures, a potential error component and the low 
explanatory power of customer satisfaction measures. Whilst adopting a 
rigorous, quantitative technique their study is a good example of measuring 
inputs and outputs, with relatively little regard for what is happening in the “black- 
box” between (Figure 2). Davis and Albright (2004) provide empirical support 
from the banking sector that implementing a balanced scorecard had a positive
9
impact on financial performance. The authors recognise the possibility that a 
"Hawthorne” effect could explain this outcome, but on the basis that performance 
improvements persisted for at least two years, they did not believe this could be 
the case (Silvestro and Cross, 2000).
The service profit chain proposed by Heskett et al (1997) included the concept of 
a satisfaction "mirror”. Concisely, their model identified that satisfied, productive 
employees encouraged satisfied customers and vice versa. Satisfied customers 
were more loyal. Loyal customers would increase sales revenue and profitability. 
Silvestro and Cross (2000) attempted to test these links in a UK grocery store 
setting and had problems supporting the mirror concept. However, Silvestro and 
Cross (2000) recognised concerns over the suitability of some of the performance 
measures that they adopted and that theirs was another ‘simple correlation 
analysis.' Empirical testing of the service profit chain remains fragmented. The 
study produced mixed results.
Performance
Indicators
--------^
Performance
Management
--------►
Performance
Outcome
Figure 2: View of performance measurement and performance management, 
with emphasis on the measurement
How is performance measured?
Making use of performance measures in this context, takes this discussion into 
performance management as an activity. Waal (2003) defines a performance 
management system as “the formal, information-based routines and procedures 
managers used to maintain all patterns in organisational activities (adapted from 
Simons, 2000)” and identifies significant behavioural factors that impact on their 
use. Such systems should create value by encouraging particular behaviours 
which in turn improve performance outcomes (Franco-Santos and Bourne, 2005). 
There remain relatively few studies of the use of performance measures (as
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observed by Kaplan and Norton 2001, Bourne et al 2005, Franco-Santos and 
Bourne 2005, Ukko et al, 2007), but this may be improving (Bourne et al, 2007). 
Cohen (1998) perceived a “performance paradox” where managers can know 
what the problem is and how to make improvements, but still not actually do 
anything. Pfeffer and Sutton (1999) in a similar vein, identify a “knowing/doing” 
gap which they perceive as a bigger problem than not knowing in the first place. 
Franco and Bourne (2003) assert that “many organisations struggle to transform 
their information into accurate understanding that helps to inform effective 
actions.” Waal and Counet (2009) observe that the literature lacks a rigorous 
consideration of the issues surrounding the implementation and use of 
performance measurement systems. However, it is perhaps difficult to envisage 
performance management without using performance measures. Indeed, there 
is little in the academic literature to challenge the prevailing view of Kaplan and 
Norton (2001) and others, that if you cannot measure, then you cannot manage.
Summary
This overview provided a brief introduction to some of the complexity behind the 
simple presentation of the role of performance measures in managing 
performance (Figure 1). It has recognised that most companies make use of 
performance indicators on a regular basis and that a key part of the rationale for 
this is to influence the behaviour of managers in pursuit of desired performance 
outcomes. The managers may adopt the company performance indicators or 
may have their own which they prefer to use, or indeed may use a combination of 
the two. This review will now go on to explore this particular aspect of 
performance measurement and management in greater detail.
This introduction is not comprehensive. For example it has not addressed the 
use of performance measures at different levels of the organisation and for 
different purposes. Neither has it explored performance measurement at the 
individual level. These considerations will be included at a later stage. The 
following sections will adopt the structure of the diagram (Figure 1). Firstly, the 
impact of performance information and performance indicators, on performance 
will be developed further. The focus here will be on measures of performance
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formally adopted by the business. This will be followed by a presentation of the 
treatment in the literature of informal performance measures; those measures 
that a manager might adopt for themselves based on experience, that are not 
explicitly recognised by the business. As noted above, there is only limited 
treatment in the literature of what managers actually do with performance 
information, but this will be reviewed in the following section. Next there will be a 
review of existing work on manager perceptions of performance indicators. It 
might be anticipated that the effect of performance measures on performance 
would be contingent on these perceptions. This will be followed by an account of 
“gaming” and unintended behaviours arising from the use of performance 
information. Finally, the diagram recognises the potential for extraneous factors 
that may mitigate the effect of using performance information on performance. 
Such factors are an important dimension of this study. They add significant 
complexity to the context and may account for the diversity of findings in existing 
studies.
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PERFORMANCE INDICATORS 
AND PERFORMANCE
An emphasis on studying performance measurement rather than 
performance management?
The previous section defined performance, performance measurement and 
performance management. These concepts are significant, not least for the 
review of academic work in this area. As noted by leading writers in the field 
attention in the literature is biased towards the relationship between 
measurement and performance, as noted by Neely (2005) in his extremely 
comprehensive review of the research over the previous ten years. There has 
been very little focus on management practice using performance measures. A 
number of studies seek to capture the measurement of performance and 
subsequent performance for a business enterprise, and then using quantitative 
techniques, test for a relationship between the two (see for example, Ittner and 
Larcker 1998, Silvestro and Cross, 2000). That the results of these studies have 
been mixed is perhaps not surprising. As Figure 1 illustrates, there are a number
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of phenomena with the potential to influence the management of performance, 
including the use of performance information, which might also explain some 
diversity in findings. These include management perceptions of performance 
indicators, managers’ powers of interpretation, management behaviours including 
decision-making, and other extraneous factors. In a retail study, Ghosh and 
Lusch (2000) write of a ‘plethora of variables' to contend with. Further, some 
variety in the quality of individual research projects would seem likely. Indeed, 
there has been a suggestion that the more rigorous the study the less likely a 
positive relationship between measurement systems and performance (Franco 
and Bourne 2004, cited in Bourne et al, 2005). Further complexity will come from 
variety in chosen performance measures selected and how appropriate the 
chosen measures are at capturing performance. There is a substantial literature 
on the design of performance measurement systems, much of which emphasises 
the need for alignment with strategy (for example Kaplan and Norton 1992,
1996,). There is further academic work on the maintenance of performance 
measurement systems, drawing attention to the fact that nobody operates in a 
static environment; strategies change and measures need updating (Neely 1999, 
Kenneriey and Neely, 2002, 2003). Finally, most studies measure performance 
as an outcome in purely financial terms, which has advantages but might seem 
rather narrow. As has already been noted, performance outcomes included 
dimensions that are less easily quantified. Further, there is an endogeneity issue 
to contend with. The cause and effect links in the chain may well extend across 
more than one accounting period. For example. It is well recognised that exerting 
too great a pressure on efficiency can be at the expense of the customer 
experience. In such a case, a financial target might be reached in the short term, 
but this might be at the expense of customer loyalty in the longer-term. 
Conversely, with different actions it would be possible to generate short-term 
and/or long-term benefits in terms of performance outcomes. A number of 
studies recognise this issue (see for example, Ittner and Larcker, 1998). 
Essentially, this is the concept of a “leading” indicator.
The paucity of academic research into the management of performance in the 
wider sense can be partially explained by practical issues. The subject matter by 
its very nature is commercially sensitive and this will present difficulties gaining
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access for data collection. Assuming that an industry partner is prepared to co­
operate, capturing management action in itself is very challenging. Many studies 
rely on recall and perceptions, which depending on the philosophical view of the 
researcher could be seen as a strength or a weakness.
Performance measurement has evolved over time. In their comprehensive 
account of the development of performance measurement and management 
practice in operations, Radnor and Barnes (2007) note that measurement was 
key to the work of Frederick Taylor in the early 20th century with his emphasis on 
efficiency as key to success in Scientific Management These authors identify a 
shift away from a narrow focus on efficiency towards a broader definition of 
performance and explicitly to include measuring effectiveness, in the intervening 
100 years. More recently this broadening trend manifests itself in scorecards, of 
which Kaplan and Norton's visionary Balanced Scorecard (1992) has the highest 
profile. These scorecards also reflect a perceived limitation in the traditional use 
of financial measures, seen as having relatively weak determinant properties. In 
a balanced scorecard, financial measures are augmented by non-financial 
measures, sometimes referred to as the lead indicators. This is not to suggest 
that efficiency is no longer relevant (Radnor and Barnes, 2007); rather that 
performance is not adequately captured using financial measures alone.
Hawthorne effect
As noted above, it is a weakness of quantitative techniques that seek to establish 
statistical correlations, that alternative phenomena may provide the genuine 
explanation for an apparent link. In this context it is appropriate to acknowledge 
the Hawthorne experiments of Elton Mayo (cited in Radnor and Barnes, 2007). 
These were the origin of the so-called “Hawthorne effect.” Could it be that a focus 
on improving performance, either by management or by academic researchers or 
both and articulated by some use of performance indicators, was the driver of 
future performance outcomes? The presence of a Hawthorne effect would 
suggest that similar results could be generated with different performance 
indicators. So for example, a performance measurement system could be 
revised, new indicators introduced, old indicators dropped and this might
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generate better future performance. One explanation for this could be that the 
old indicators were now redundant because the competitive environment had 
moved on, and that the new ones are more appropriate. Alternatively, the 
improvement could be explained by a Hawthorne effect. In this scenario it is not 
the performance indicators themselves that have driven the improvement.
Rather, the change to the measures has signalled a focus of attention on future 
performance and it is this that has generated stronger outcomes. A number of 
academic studies in this field have acknowledged the potential for a Hawthorne 
effect (e.g. Ittner and Larcker, 1998, Davis and Albright, 2004).
Pay for performance
Many organisations link measuring performance to rewards for their employees. 
Rynes et al (2005), note that this practice appears to be growing, can produce 
‘serious, unintended negative results,’ but crucially, can generate powerful 
improvements in performance. Pay for performance (PFP) will be explored more 
fully in a later section. However, it is worth noting at this stage as PFP systems 
often include a mix of objective and subjective measures. Objective or results 
based measures are often seen as fairer by employees, but if relied upon 
exclusively tend to have a relatively narrow view of performance, which in turn 
can encourage strange behavioural effects. It is therefore common to include 
subjective measures, typically evaluations conducted by senior managers. 
Unsurprisingly, these can be perceived as having less credibility than objective 
measures, which in turn can compromise the incentive power intended.
Academic studies have confirmed the existence of an “outcome effect” in this 
context. Subjective evaluations tend to be biased by knowledge of results based 
measures. This hypothesis was confirmed in a study by Ittner et al (2003), who 
on this basis suggest that psychology based studies may be more useful in 
offering an explanation, than those based on economics. However, some caution 
is appropriate as this research was based within a single US retail banking 
business who abandoned the balanced scorecard model under scrutiny, shortly 
afterwards. Further support for an outcome effect comes from Ghosh and Lusch 
(2000), in another quantitative study of significant size. Again the research is 
based in a single organisation; a US retail chain store. The findings showed that
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failure for a store to hit target results negatively biased the subsequent 
performance evaluation of the store manager. Ghosh and Lusch (2000) explicitly 
recognise the ‘plethora of variables’ present, which it is not possible to adequately 
control for, and that management decisions are ‘rarely context-free’. Care should 
therefore be exercised in generalising this finding, particularly beyond the retail 
sector.
The balanced scorecard
Balanced scorecards as exemplified by Kaplan and Norton (1992) have been in 
vogue for the last twenty years. They were developed in this most recent 
incarnation in response to the perceived limitations of financial outcomes in the 
context of managing performance (Eccles, 1991). Financial measures were 
historic by nature and offered poor indications of future outcomes. Scorecards 
typically include hard measures, but also qualitative indications to redress this 
balance and make explicit the contribution of softer dimensions such as service 
quality and customer satisfaction, to on-going financial outcomes.
Kaplan and Norton's (1992) balanced scorecard is not the only performance 
measurement system developed in the last 20 years, but by some margin enjoys 
the highest profile; both in terms of adoption by industry and by academic 
attention (Marr and Schiuma 2003, Neely, 2005). Kaplan and Norton's (1992) 
paper and others that have followed (Kaplan and Norton, 1996, 2001), lack 
formal substantiation but have credibility as informed pitches to a professional 
audience under the auspices of the Harvard Business Review. Organisations 
across the world have been willing to implement the balanced scorecard. Given 
the diversity in the performance management field, the balanced scorecard is 
alone in having such a significant influence. Marr and Schiuma (2003) conduct a 
citation analysis with over 4000 references included at intervals between 1998 
and 2002, to review development of the Business Performance Measurement 
literature. Whilst these authors recognise the general criticisms of this method, 
such as authors having ulterior motives for citations and that citations are much 
less likely to be for the purpose of criticism, they believe the scale of their 
analysis offsets these flaws. They reflect that the Balanced Scorecard whilst
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dominant, may not strictly have been a late twentieth century innovation. It has 
strong similarity with the Tableau de Bord, which originated in France at least a 
hundred years previously. Marr and Schiuma (2003) note the evolution of the 
BSC from measurement (1992) through management (1996) and on to 
‘organisation and change’ (2000), and that this broadening has inevitably 
widened its appeal.
Academics have sought to empirically test the claims of the originators, Kaplan 
and Norton for their balanced scorecard. The results are inconclusive. Hoque 
and James (2000) tested hypotheses in a postal survey of Australian 
manufacturing companies. The survey enjoyed a 35% response rate, but as the 
authors note, the study offers no explanation of how scorecards are used. 
Furthermore, as the respondents were all finance bosses, some bias may be 
present. The Hoque and James (2000) study found that greater scorecard usage 
is associated with increased organisational performance. The same study found 
support for greater scorecard usage being associated with larger organisation 
size and with businesses where products are at the early/growth stage of the 
product life cycle. In another study, Braam and Nijssen (2004) tested hypotheses 
with a sample of 100 Dutch business-to-business companies; a response rate of 
over 40%. They drew a distinction between measurement-focused and strategy- 
focused use of the scorecard. This distinction represents a tentative recognition 
that “use of scorecards” in such a research approach has limited explanatory 
value. Their tests found support for a positive relationship between strategy- 
focused use and company performance, but the same was not true for 
measurement-focused use of the scorecard. A study based on regression 
analysis and with limited explanatory power, found some support for financial 
measures being poor indicators of subsequent performance (Evans, 2004). The 
same study identified a positive relationship between performance measurement 
system maturity and subsequent performance. The more established the system 
was, the greater the impact on performance. This finding Is supported by the 
qualitative study of Ukko et al (2007), which sought to capture the perceptions of 
managers and employees at business unit level. According to Davis and Albright
(2004) and based on a single case organisation, the balanced scorecard is 
effective in improving financial performance. Lipe and Salterio (2002) found that
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the balanced scorecard had a “priming" effect. Their study used experiments 
based on decision scenarios of divisional managers evaluating the performance 
of business unit managers. The structure of the balanced scorecard categorising 
performance measures in four groups, produced a bias in subjective performance 
evaluations. However, some caution should be exercised here as the 
respondents in this study were MBA students rather than retail managers.
Summary
This section has reviewed the academic work looking at the relationship between 
performance measurement and the subsequent performance of the business. 
Various empirical studies over the last 15 years have endeavoured to find 
support for a positive relationship between the two. The results are inconclusive. 
Most of the studies cited in this section do not concern themselves with what 
managers actually do with performance measurements (an important exception 
here is from Bourne et al 2005). As previously noted, the logic of a performance 
measurement system is that it will change behaviours of managers in a manner 
that will positively affect subsequent performance. Just how this works in practice 
remains unanswered at this point. As Olson and Slater (2002) ask: “What are 
the intervening steps between measuring performance and excelling?”
Performance measures are adopted by business organisations primarily as a 
foundation for managing performance. This section has noted that “scorecards" 
have enjoyed attention from both professionals and academics. Part of the 
rationale for a scorecard is that it better reflects the breadth, depth and diversity 
of desired performance by including a selection of measures. However, the use 
of performance measures is not perfect, even in a scorecard. Some dimensions 
of performance are less tangible and Identifying suitable measures can be 
challenging. Conducting ‘suitable’ measurement can be expensive. As 
previously noted, desired performance is prescribed by a strategy and in a 
dynamic environment will require constant revision. Businesses therefore 
exercise degrees of pragmatism when measuring performance.
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EVIDENCE THAT MPIS EXIST 
Tacit knowledge: a measurement challenge
This section will consider the potential use of informal indicators of performance 
that managers may make use of and which may influence subsequent actions by 
those managers. This has received relatively little attention in the academic 
literature. Support for the existence of Manager Performance Indicators (MPIs in 
Figure 1) is implied by some writers in the field. Kaplan and Norton (1996) point 
out that disappointing results, rather than necessarily being indicative of poor 
performance, might be an early indication of a dated strategy, and therefore the 
adopted measures no longer being appropriate. Exercising that judgement may 
imply an intuitive feel for performance. Pfeffer and Sutton (1999) in a 
commentary aimed at a professional audience, imply that managers will use their 
own measures of performance. These authors focus on the intangible nature of 
knowledge, pointing out that tacit knowledge is not captured by the company 
system. Cohen (1998) in a paper with a similar pitch, makes the claim that 
managers often know what the problem is, even if they do not act accordingly. 
There are however, relatively few explicit examples in the literature of managers 
using informal measures or their own information. Wilson (2000) studied four 
service delivery cases, each a strong performer from different sectors. This study 
was heavily based on the perceptions of both senior managers and unit level 
managers. Only in one of these companies was there evidence of managers 
using their own performance indicators. Ittner et al's (2003) statistical analysis of 
the outcome effect, found some examples of managers incorporating other 
factors in performance evaluation.
Bourne et al (2005) are unusual in seeking to establish what managers actually 
do with performance information. Their case study research was based on a UK 
service organisation with a branch network of repair shops. As such, the findings 
of the study from a rather specific sector may not have wider application. The 
research identified high-performing and average-performing business units, with 
the aim of discovering what was different about managing performance between 
the two. Further consideration will be given to this study later. Crucially however,
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it found that the managers of high performing business units made significant use 
of their own performance information, with the formal performance measures 
adopted by the company having a secondary role in confirming to these 
managers what they already knew (Bourne et al, 2005). The basis for the 
managers’ own performance information came from their own experience and 
insight into what the true drivers of performance really were. This use of other 
performance indicators was not so apparent in the average-performing business 
units.
“Gut feel”: the role of intuition in the mind of the manager
It could be that a manager using their own performance information is best 
described as "intuitive" behaviour.
Intuition is a capacity for attaining direct knowledge or 
understanding without the apparent intrusion of rational thought 
or logical inference.
Sadler-Smith and Shefy (2004), p 77
In this context, intuition and rationality are both cognitive processes, operating 
alongside each other, in the mind of the manager. In situations where the volume 
and complexity of information is very substantial, and where there is pressure on 
time and finite processing capacity, it may not be feasible to rely on purely 
rational decision-making. Sadler-Smith and Shefy (2004) note that senior 
managers are more likely to be intuitive, but speculate that “closet intuition” may 
be prevalent at more junior levels. These authors regard intuitive and rational 
cognitive processes as complementary to one another. They point out that 
intuition has risks associated with it and that in “many routine situations is 
probably inadvisable” (Sadler-Smith and Shefy, 2004). If so, intuition may be less 
relevant to this study’s focus on retail store managers.
Summary
This section has briefly explored a rationale for managers adopting their own 
performance indicators (MPIs), rather than relying exclusively on those
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nominated by the company. Logic would also suggest that if the company 
performance indicators were inappropriate or inadequate in some way, that this 
would give rise to this informal practice. There is very little support for this in the 
existing literature, but this may well be due to the paucity of studies focusing on 
how performance information is actually used. The work of Bourne et al (2005) is 
a notable exception to the rule. This section finished with a brief reference to 
academic work on the intuitive mind of the manager, as compared to rational 
thought processes.
MANAGEMENT BEHAVIOUR AS A RESULT OF USING 
PERFORMANCE INFORMATION
What managers actually do with performance information
There are very few academic studies that focus on what managers actually do 
with performance measures to manage performance. Of those that do, the study 
from Bourne et al (2005) deserves particular attention. This case study research 
is hosted by a multiple outlet, repair shop business in the UK, using five high 
performing business units and five units identified as having average- 
performance. Given the practical problems associated with observing decision­
making, this behaviour is subsumed into a broader “taking action” category. To 
what extent could high performers be differentiated from average performers on 
the basis of the actions of their branch managers? The study found that 
relatively:
High performing business units:
• were differentiated from others by their branch managers’ use of simple 
mental models, for day-to-day management. These managers described 
how they use their own indicators rather than the company ones to 
manage. These unofficial indicators came from experience or insight into 
what the true drivers of business performance were. The paper does not 
specifically identify these unofficial indicators, beyond saying that many 
related to handling volume and that some related to individual and team 
working skills development.
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• their managers collected additional data from meetings, conversations and 
observations of activity. Company scorecard results were not then a 
surprise. This was much less apparent in average performing units.
• the managers were making light use of the facility in the company system, 
to analyse data at a more detailed level. The researchers concluded that 
the scorecard data was just being used to check the manager's own 
assumptions “and not as a fundamental tool for managing the business”. 
There was evidence that managers were using their own systems to 
manage. Examples of this included instances where there were specific 
problems that needed to be overcome.
• the managers ignored inappropriate targets, and use their own targets, 
sometimes higher than national figures.
• the researchers found that the intensity of communication within the unit 
was much greater. There was evidence of a “perpetual performance 
dialogue” in high performing units, and in the view of the researchers this 
was the most significant differentiator.
Bourne et al (2005)
Managers in high performing units were making sophisticated use of performance 
information that was not reliant on the company systems. They had their own 
systems for analysing performance information and this was used in intensive 
communication within the business unit (Bourne et ai, 2005). Superficially all 
units were conducting basic measurement and management of performance. 
However, the average performers were driven by the company performance 
measurement system, whilst their smarter colleagues drew on other information 
such as trends, local conditions and people issues, and used the company 
generated read-outs to confirm what they already knew (Bourne et al, 2005). 
Essentially, the higher achieving managers were proactive in their orientation to 
performance, whereas their average achieving colleagues were relatively 
reactive. Interaction and engagement with the performance information were the 
key to better results. The researchers acknowledge the caution required in 
making wider generalisations for a case study, particularly when this industry
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sector may have its own peculiarities. However, the results are interesting and 
would benefit from further research.
A more recent study provides insight to the world of UK supermarket managers 
and what they do (Grugulis et al, 2010). This found that the work tasks and 
routines of store managers were both heavily prescribed and then heavily 
monitored by company systems. Any freedom enjoyed was described as trivial. 
Managers were expected to inspire and enthuse those working for them, whilst 
being driven by challenging performance targets over which they themselves 
exercised no influence. Even the softer people management dimensions of their 
role were very constrained. For example, company policy dictated daily "caucus- 
styie” meetings in part to motivate the management team and head office 
produced templates to set the agenda for these. In the analysis of these 
researchers, there was a leadership “rhetoric” that was adopted by senior 
executives, permeated the language of lower ranks, and effectively “bought into” 
by store managers. For example, there was a wide perception that unplanned 
events could and would affect performance, but could also be used to excuse 
poor leadership. Such unplanned events (late deliveries, staff absentees, etc.) 
could be overcome by the drive of the manager inspiring the team to push 
themselves to cope with the adversity. (Grugulis et al, 2010)
The case for prescribing management actions on the basis of performance 
indicators
In a substantial case study of a high performing UK restaurant chain, Ahrens and 
Chapman (2007) observed failed attempts by senior managers over a four-year 
period, to “tighten up” performance measurement within their business. It was 
felt that performance could be further improved by developing rules and 
prescriptions for what restaurant managers should be doing in particular 
instances on the basis of performance measurements. These researchers 
concluded that, “the complexity and interdependence of factors that impact on 
restaurant performance in the case company meant that specific metrics could 
not be tightly coupled to simple prescriptions for management action” (Ahrens 
and Chapman, 2007). The sales growth metric is used as an example. If
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performance is below expectation on this basis, there are a number of potential 
strategies to employ, that are open to the manager. A choice is best made based 
on the local context. Prescription directed by head office would not be 
appropriate. This is not to suggest that the performance measurement system 
did not or should not engender any management response. It can also be noted 
that in hospitality there may well be more scope for the unit manager to 
customise the service than in other sectors. Similar to the Bourne et al (2005) 
case, the metrics promoted communication across the management hierarchy 
with a focus on managing performance. "By treating performance information as 
equivocal rather than concrete, the output of performance measurement systems 
triggered beneficial discussions and explorations of restaurant operation."
(Ahrens and Chapman, 2007 p 490.)
To coerce or to enable?
Other studies that specifically address manager behaviour in this context are 
limited. Wilson’s (2000) four case studies from various service sector industries 
find no consistent use of performance information and little apparent guidance 
from within the organisations either. Ukko et al (2007) find support for a link 
between increased interactivity between management and employees at the 
business unit level, and higher levels of performance. Their study deserves 
attention for its focus on this level of the organisation. Melnyk et al (2005) identity 
a “metrics tension" - if metrics are changed, users show a tendency to stick to 
existing metrics which they understand better. Morgan et al (2005) find a 
potential for tensions between using customer satisfaction information for control 
purposes and the same measures as a basis for organisational learning. Whilst 
not addressing performance measurement specifically, Adler and Borys (1996) 
make theoretical comparison between coercive versus enabling characteristics of 
bureaucratic controls. “Middle managers can coerce compliance and intensify 
work or they can provide guidance, support, and coordination” (Adler and Borys, 
1996). Following this lead, Wouters (2009) reports on a longitudinal case study 
on the implementation and use of a performance measurement system using an 
enabling approach. From this study, employee beliefs in the system and their
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commitment to improving performance apparently benefit, but the impact on 
performance itself is only implied.
Away from empirical research on performance management, there are a number 
of informed commentaries and observations on the subject. Cohen (1998) 
advocates incremental action over radical change. Managers’ action should yield 
benefits in time, but as March and Sutton (1997) are keen to emphasise results 
may be short-term or long-term. Pfeffer and Sutton (1999) advocate trial and 
error, rather than meticulous planning in advance. Given that the business 
environment is not static, it is better to act sooner, than spend too long in 
preparation.
Negative implications of performance measurement
The influence on behaviour from performance measurement information may not 
be entirely positive. Sobotka and Platts (2009) cite Franco and Bourne (2003) in 
recognising the negative effects that “tedious” performance measurement 
activities can have. There Is speculation as to whether performance 
measurement and management processes can interfere with innovation and 
dampen creativity (Radnor and Barnes, 2007). These authors in their analysis of 
existing literature, trace the development of the field and would like to see more 
focus on the “software” of performance measurement and management systems 
rather than just the systems themselves, but recognise the "great challenges” this 
involves.
Summary
This section has addressed the limited treatment in the academic literature of 
what managers actually do with performance information. Bourne et al (2005) 
note a continuing debate in the literature as to whether performance 
measurement has a positive impact on business performance or not and that 
evidence is mixed. It may well be that a focus on measurement is misplaced. 
Rather, the influence of measures and performance information on manager 
behaviours may be of greater significance. 'If action doesn’t follow measurement 
... most of the efforts ... will be wasted’ (Franco and Bourne 2005 pi 15). Radnor
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and Barnes (2007) are not alone in wanting to see more focus on the “software” 
of performance measurement and management systems rather than just the 
systems themselves, but recognise the “great challenges” this involves.
MANAGER PERCEPTIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS OF 
PERFORMANCE INDICATORS
In the opinion of the manager
Having established that a significant element of the rationale for performance 
measurement systems is to influence the behaviour of managers, this section 
considers the mitigating effect that manager perceptions of measures may have 
on this relationship. Interest in this area stems from the likelihood that the 
commitment or motivation of the manager will be affected by their perception of 
the measure. For example, if an indicator is perceived as beyond the control of 
the manager or is in some way unfair, then this might have a negative impact on 
the influence i.e. the relationship will become weaker. Conversely, there may be 
instances of favourable perceptions of measures accentuating the effect that they 
wield over behaviour. Academic attention to manager perceptions of 
performance measures has focused on three areas: issues associated with the 
use of subjective evaluations, plausibility of the measures and linking 
measurement to rewards. Each of these areas can affect the commitment or 
motivation of the manager. The effects of pay for performance will be considered 
in the section on dysfunctional behaviours.
Subjectivity, the “outcome” effect and equity issues
Subjective measures or ratings, as has already been noted, are used by 
companies endeavouring to capture the full breadth of performance. As noted 
previously, several studies have found support for an outcome effect, where 
ratings are influenced by knowledge of objective measures (e.g. Ghosh and 
Lusch, 2000). It would perhaps be not unusual for a business unit to fail to hit a 
target described with an objective measure, but for a manager to have performed 
well in other dimensions. The Ghosh and Lusch (2000) study is based on 
developing and testing hypotheses and provides limited explanation, particularly
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when as the authors note, there is a plethora of other variables present, which 
are difficult to control for. They call for further research to test:
- Whether better communicating the decision process mitigates against the 
outcome effect?
- Whether training could reduce bias in the evaluators and reduce the 
outcome effect?
- Whether conducting ratings in advance would mitigate against outcome 
effect?
- How organisational or industry factors might influence level of outcome 
effect?
Ittner et al (2003) in another hypothesis-testing study confirming the outcome 
effect, found that subjectivity in the performance measurement system led to 
perceptions of inequity amongst branch managers. This led the authors to 
believe that psychology-based explanations may be as important as economic 
ones.
Webb (2004) found that the commitment of managers was greater when the 
cause and effect links in the performance measurement system were perceived 
as plausible. As financial goal achievement is at least partially contingent on 
achieving the non-financial goals, if the non-financial goals are seen as 
achievable, then the financial goals are also likely to be seen as achievable. This 
study tested hypotheses within an experimental design, which may not 
adequately reflect the complexity present when managers make decisions and 
take actions in a real world context.
The Ahrens and Chapman (2007) case study of the UK restaurant chain serves 
to reveal something of operations managers’ perceptions of company 
performance measures. The study, conducted over a period of four years, 
identifies a conflict of views between senior management and branch managers. 
Whilst the chain is reported as consistently successful, the senior management 
perceived potential for improvement in performance from tightening 
measurement and devising protocols to govern operations responses. 
Unsurprisingly, these were consistently resisted by the restaurant managers who
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did not wish to become ‘glove puppets’; acting on behalf of head office without 
discretion of their own. “Restaurant managers were well aware of the drivers of 
performance within their businesses, but conceived of the various metrics as 
contributing to performance by setting out a framework within which managers 
could determine appropriate trade-offs in the light of emerging contingencies" 
(Ahrens and Chapman, 2007). Again, it could be that unit managers in this type 
of hospitality operation (full-service restaurants) enjoy greater degrees of 
discretion over operations than do their counterparts elsewhere in the service 
sector.
Whilst most academic attention has been devoted to perceptions of performance 
measures in the context of manager commitment and motivation, the literature 
includes a number of other perspectives. There is some support for recognition 
of the underlying logic for using performance measures. Morgan et al (2005) in a 
major qualitative study, identified a perception amongst managers that effective 
customer satisfaction information usage is associated with supporting business 
performance. This study is interesting for its focus on a commercially sensitive 
activity. Most of the 142 interviews upon which it was based, were recorded by 
hand rather than being taped. This may have increased the error rate and bias 
potential in the post-graduate student interviewers used by the researchers. The 
paper provides little on the analytical techniques adopted to process the interview 
scripts. Ukko et al (2007), in another qualitative study, found a shared view 
amongst managers and the employees that they were managing, that 
performance measures had a positive impact on performance. Similar to the 
Morgan et al (2005) study, Ukko et al (2007) collected more than one perspective 
in each of the respondent organisations, which should serve to reduce the bias 
potential. In case studies of service sector organisations, some performance 
measures were perceived as systems-led indicators rather than needs-based 
(Wilson, 2000). These measures existed because it was relatively easy for the 
system to generate them, rather than being selected for their utility. However, 
this was only found in two out of the four cases presented, and therefore should 
be treated with some caution.
2 8
In this research the focus is on the performance of the retail store as a business 
unit. There is an issue in this context, in that store managers effectively share 
responsibility for retail service delivery with other functions in the wider retail 
business. For example, a customer’s experience of poor product availability 
could be attributable to store level, but could as easily be the responsibility of 
buying or supply chain managers. The problem is identified by Ghosh and Lusch 
(2000) previously cited, in their study of retail store managers. A UK food retail 
study found performance measures that were seen as inappropriate at store level 
on account of the inability of managers to influence outcomes (Wilson, 2000). 
Some care should be exercised in making wider generalisations from this study.
Summary
This section has explored performance indicators from the perspective of the 
manager whose behaviour is the focus of interest. The logic of performance 
indicators is that they will trigger changes in behaviour in pursuit of desired 
performance outcomes. The perception of manager is important because a 
positive view of the utility of the indicator is more likely to instigate the desired 
change in behaviour. Conversely, a negative view of its utility will weaken its 
impact on behaviour.
“GAMING”: UNINTENDED OR DYSFUNCTIONAL BEHAVIOURS 
ARISING FROM USE OF PERFORMANCE INFORMATION
Quantitative measures of performance are tools, and are 
undoubtedly useful. But research indicates that indiscriminate 
use and undue confidence and reliance in them result from 
insufficient knowledge of the full effects and consequences.
Judicious use of a tool requires awareness of possible side 
effects and reactions. Otherwise, indiscriminate use may result 
in side-effects and reactions outweighing the benefits, as was 
the case when penicillin was first hailed as a wonder drug. The 
cure is sometimes worse than the disease.
Ridgeway 1956 p.240
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The limitations of objective measurement
As has already been noted, performance is multidimensional. It is not possible 
to capture the intangible realms of performance using exclusively objective 
quantitative measures. Attempts have been made to reflect this in performance 
measurement, through the use of scorecards which incorporate subjective 
metrics or ratings. These scorecards may also adopt weightings of individual 
metrics, in pursuit of "balance" to better reflect the complexity of the performance 
vision. In practice this is imperfect. Kaplan and Norton (1996) recognise the 
potential for unintended behaviour if rewards are linked to scorecard measures. 
Ittner and Larcker (1998) are not alone in suggesting that objective measures are 
more likely to encourage gaming. On this basis the authors identify that 
theoretically, weighting of individual measures could help to address this and an 
argument for subjective measures could be to design out gaming.
Recognition of the potentially negative effects of human behaviour in this context 
is not new. Ridgeway (1956) identified the existence of a ratchet principle where 
an improvement in performance leads to target measures being increased. In 
such cases deliberate restriction of output is common. Employees recognise that 
exceeding a target can lead management to increase targets in future periods. In 
this situation workers enter a tacit agreement not to exceed quotas. Sobotka and 
Platts (2009) cite Smith 1993, to summarise the negative effects of performance 
measurement:
• myopia: a concentration on short-term issues at the expense of long-term 
outcomes
• Convergence: a tendency to stay within recognised limits. This is the 
response to Ridgeway’s (1956) ratchet effect. No motivation to be 
outstanding.
• Ossification: disinclination to experiment or be innovative
• Gaming: manipulating behaviour to generate another outcome
• Misrepresentation: generating false indications. Would include fraud and 
creative accounting.
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Unreaiistically high targets may not have the desired effect either, in such cases, 
rather than make any attempt to reach the set target, managers may decide at 
the outset that figure was unattainable and consequently, there is no influence on 
behaviour. The Bourne et al (2005) study, for example, reports managers 
ignoring “inappropriate” targets.
As already noted, the rationale for having performance measures is in part to 
influence behaviour and in doing so, improve performance. Radnor (2008) points 
out that gaming is essentially behaviour influenced by performance measures, 
but with an ulterior motive. Gaming activity consumes the energy of those 
involved and misleads others. At best it is inefficient and at worst it is fraudulent. 
The challenge is to design systems that generate appropriate influences on 
behaviour. Radnor's (2008) paper develops a typology of gaming behaviours, 
and focuses on the public sector where performance measurement is part of a 
significant politically charged accountability agenda, but this observation clearly 
has wider application.
Linking rewards to performance
The logic of linking rewards to performance measurement is that the individual 
will be motivated to behave in a manner that will deliver improvements for the 
business. There is a very substantial literature on motivation extending back a 
long way. To start with there are issues of practicality in administering the link 
between performance and reward. For simple tasks where performance can be 
defined in a relatively narrow dimension, the activity of operatives in a distribution 
centre for example, there is evidence to suggest that piece-rates are effective. 
However in contexts where performance is multidimensional and more complex, 
and the activity of most managers would fit this description, a debate continues 
as to whether pay for performance really works (Osterloh and Frey, 2007). 
Intrinsic motivation stems from the activity itself; from finding some value from 
better performance for its own sake. On the other hand extrinsic motivation is 
external to the activity itself; where the activity is a means to an end, rather than 
an end in itself. Arguably, there is little intrinsic motivation inherent in the work of 
a distribution centre operative and performance can be defined relatively easily
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by breaking activity into small units set against the clock. Motivation is extrinsic 
and stems from earning bonus payments for achieving preset targets. For most 
managers, this would not be so easy. Rynes et al (2005) in a comprehensive 
review of the recent literature, conclude that monetary rewards and intrinsic 
motivation do not generally work against each other. They note however, that 
money is a very powerful motivator. It is therefore important to ensure that 
rewards do not encourage the wrong kind of behaviour (Rynes et al, 2005).
Others urge more caution in the use of incentives. Webb (2004) identifies goal 
attractiveness as a source of intrinsic motivation; “the anticipated satisfaction 
from goal attainment” and that this has a positive association with goal 
commitment. Webb's (2004) experimental research design may however, not 
adequate reflect the complexity of the context. Osterloh and Frey (2007) identify 
“crowding out effects”. In their view the introduction of rewards as a device to 
increase extrinsic motivation, has the effect of compromising intrinsic motivation. 
The benefits are not clear-cut and nor is the academic conclusion. “Monetary 
incentives are entangled in an extensive web of psychological contracts, 
cognitive self-evaluation and fairness considerations” (Osterloh and Frey, 2007, 
p444). Bourne et al (2005) in their qualitative study of high performing and 
average performing branches in a repair business, identified incentives for both 
branch managers and operatives. Branch managers were paid an annual bonus 
for hitting profit target. Operatives were paid productivity bonuses, with penalties 
designed to maintain attendance and protect quality. The incentive for managers 
did not appear to generate unintended behaviours, whilst there were examples of 
dysfunctional behaviour amongst operatives.
Summary
Performance measures are used by business in part because they will influence 
the behaviour of managers and this in turn will have a positive effect on 
performance. Measures are believed to be a useful tool in driving performance. 
However, there is evidence that the influence on behaviour may not be entirely 
positive and indeed could be counter-productive. In such cases businesses will 
have wasted resource in designing and implementing systems, as well as bearing 
the cost of the outcomes of dysfunctional behaviour. According to Radnor and
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Barnes (2007) in their comprehensive review of the development of the 
operations management perspective towards performance management, further 
research in this area is needed.
EXTRANEOUS FACTORS THAT MAY MITIGATE THE EFFECT OF 
USING PERFORMANCE INFORMATION ON PERFORMANCE
The view presented here is of performance information’s impact on manager 
behaviours being mediated by the perceptions and interpretations of those 
managers (Figure 1). It is appropriate at this point to acknowledge the potential 
for other factors to have a mediating influence on manager behaviour. Numerous 
academic studies recognise that whether performance improves or not, is indeed 
contingent on a broad range of internal and external factors. This section will 
provide a brief review.
March and Sutton (1997) in their cautionary paper observe the effects of 
competition. Strong performance promotes imitation and therefore more 
competition, diluting the benefit. Weak performance has the reverse effect and 
direct competition weakens as a result. According to March and Sutton (1997) 
these effects become institutionalised through pursuance of ‘“best practice’ and 
...the activities of managerial media and consultants."
External Factors
Bourne et al (2005), (citing Smith and Goddard 2002, and Waggoner et al, 1999) 
in their review of existing literature suggest market uncertainty, supplier 
characteristics, and the economic situation as external factors, all affect the 
success of performance measurement. Morgan et al (2005) studied 
contingencies affecting customer satisfaction information utilisation (CSIU) and 
concluded that the more intense the competitive environment, the more and 
wider use is made of customer satisfaction information. These authors also 
found that contingencies affecting relationships between CSIU and firm 
performance as follows:
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• Customer homogeneity - in a highly heterogeneous customer market 
CSIU “distinguishes a firm's ability to understand and effectively segment 
its markets and deliver higher satisfaction levels to different groups of 
customers.”
• Market dynamism - How rapidly are customers and preferences 
changing? If slowly - all firms can achieve similar understanding. CSIU 
may offer less competitive advantage. (Morgan et al, 2005)
Whilst the Morgan et al (2005) study is relatively narrow in its focus, it would 
perhaps not be surprising if these findings hold more generally in performance 
measurement terms. Hoque and James (2000) found that greater scorecard 
usage is associated with increased organisational performance, with larger 
organisation size and with businesses where products are at the early/growth 
stage of the product life cycle. However, no association was found between 
scorecard usage and market position. Respondents in this study were senior 
financial managers within sample organisations and this may have created a bias 
potential.
Internal Factors
There appears to be more academic studies of the internal factors that 
performance may be contingent upon. Some of these are summarised neatly in 
Table 1 taken from Bourne et al (2005).
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Table 1: Internal contextual factors impacting performance measurement 
effectiveness. (Reproduced from Bourne et al 2005, p376)
Internat context Authors
System maturity:
more mature systems are more effective 
Organisational structure:
Evans 2001, Martins 2002
Hendricks et al 1996, Bourne et al 2002
importance of aligning structure and measurement 
Organisational size:
measurement is easier in larger organisations and more 
problematic in smaller ones 
Organisational culture:
alignment between the cultural elements embedded in the 
measurement system and the users’ cultural preference Is 
beneficial
Management style:
appropriate style is important, appropriate style may be 
different in different settings and phrases of implementation 
and use
Competitive strategy:
measures should be aligned to strategy 
Resources and capabilities:
companies need resources and capabilities to implement 
and refresh their measurement systems 
Information Systems infrastructure:
high data integrity and a low burden of data capture are 
important
Other management practices and systems:
there should be alignment between measurement and other 
systems (e.g. budgeting, compensation)
Hoque and James 2000, Hudson 2001a, 
2001b
De Waal 2002, Gates 1999, Johnston et al 
2002, Lingle and Schlemann 1996, Lockamy 
and Cox 1995, Maisel 2001, Malina and Selto 
2002, Bititci et al 2004
Gelderman 1998, Libby and Luft 1993,
Hunton et al 2000, Simon 1987, Bititci et al 
2004
Kaplan and Norton 1996,2001, Lockamy 
1998, Mendoza and Saulpic 2002, McAdam 
and Bailie 2002. Neely 2002
Bourne 2004, Kenneriey and Neely 2002
Bititci et al 2002, Eccles 1991, Lingle and 
Schlemann 1996, Manoochehri 1999
De Toni and Tonchia 2001, Eccles 1991, 
Eccles and Pybum 1992, Kaplan and Norton 
1996, 2001, Moon and Fitzgerald 1996, Otley 
1999
Bititci et a! (2006), identify from the literature a likely relationship between 
organisational culture, management style and performance measurement 
systems. To better understand the causal links between these phenomena, their 
chosen method is action research, conducted within five UK manufacturing case
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studies. Wider generalisation of case study findings should be treated with some 
caution and the authors note that there is some potential for bias created by the 
selection criteria for the cases. Their key finding is that the links between 
performance management, organisational culture and management style are bi­
directional; that they are “interdependent during the life cycle of the PMS” (Bititci 
et al, 2006 p. 1344). For example, they found some suggestion that successful 
implementation and use of a performance management system may lead to “a 
more participative and consultative management style” and that successful 
implementation and use of a performance management system may lead to “a 
change towards an achievement culture”. The authors call for more research.
Expert opinion from 24 respondents was captured in a 2002 study that yielded 
nine factors which “seem to have a greater impact on the way organisations 
manage through measures” (Franco and Bourne, 2003). Of these nine factors, 
organisational culture stood out as having the greatest influence. The other 
factors were management leadership and commitment, compensation link to the 
strategic performance management system, education and understanding (need 
for training), communication and reporting, review and update of the system, data 
process and IT support, business and industry, performance management 
system framework (Franco and Bourne, 2003). It should be noted that this study 
took a strategic review of performance management and that there is potential for 
some bias in the sample drawn from amongst delegates at a performance 
measurement conference. However, its findings were consistent with existing 
work in this field.
Writing for a practitioner audience, Cohen (1998) identifies the scope for a 
“performance paradox”; a situation where managers may know what the problem 
is, and what needs to happen to act in the organisation's best interests and yet 
fail to take appropriate action. On the basis of considerable if relatively 
unsubstantiated experience, the author believes that such situations are not 
unusual (Cohen, 1998). Others have developed this theme, arguing that whilst 
there will be differences in what organisations know, the gap between knowing 
and doing is more important. In their words, “a much larger source of variation in 
performance stems from the ability to turn knowledge into action” (Pfeffer and
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Sutton, 1999). This is another conceptual paper aimed at a practitioner 
audience, but this time with greater substantiation. The authors cite evidence 
that transferring knowledge across firms and within firms does not happen as 
might be expected. Pfeffer and Sutton (1999) go on to point out that knowledge 
management systems can actually serve to exacerbate the knowing/doing 
problem identified above. Such systems have an emphasis on technology and 
the transfer of codified information. Therefore, they are not good at coping with 
tacit knowledge, which by implication is not easily described or codified.
Ukko et al (2007) conducted case study research, founded on hermeneutics to 
gain a deeper understanding of performance management practice. The eight 
case studies included interviews with senior managers, and notably a focus on 
employee experience at the business unit level of the organisation. The principal 
finding was that the interactivity between managers and employees, spurred by 
performance information was crucial to the future success of the organisation. 
Extraneous factors identified from the eight case studies included in the study 
were the maturity of the RMS, links with rewards, and education levels of the 
employees (Ukko et al, 2007). Lipe and Salterio (2000) found “cognitive 
difficulties” amongst users as an issue for the effective use of performance 
information. Wilson (2000), again conducting multiple case study research, 
identifies management training related to use of performance indicators and the 
timeliness of reporting as extraneous factors.
Morgan et al's (2005) previously cited study of the use of customer satisfaction 
information, found also that the “cultural orientation of the firm” was influential. 
Businesses with a stronger customer or competitor orientation were more likely to 
make greater conceptual and instrumental use of customer satisfaction 
information across a broader range of decisions than were firms with a 
technological orientation.
A summary table of relevant performance measurement and management 
studies is presented in Appendix A.
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RETAIL SERVICE OPERATIONS
Generic service operations/service delivery systems
The study of service operations management has been extended from the 
foundation of operations management, originally grounded in manufacturing 
activity. Services have intangibility, heterogeneity, simultaneity, perishability and 
in some cases customer production as distinguishing features. Sampson and 
Froehle (2006) provide a contemporary review of these service characteristics 
and note that the existence of each is rooted in the customer input to service 
delivery. Intangible elements of service defy precise specification and 
measurement. Customer perceptions and judgements become extremely 
important. Heterogeneity refers to the uniqueness of individual customers and 
therefore service encounters. To be affected at all, service delivery requires at 
least some customer presence during the process; hence simultaneity. 
Perishability as a service characteristic refers to the providers’ facility or capacity 
to deliver the service. The management challenge here arises from the degree of 
match between facility on the one hand and customer uptake on the other. All of 
these four characteristics are present to some degree and are what differentiate 
service operations management from operations management in a 
manufacturing context. In some service delivery systems customer participation 
in terms of additional inputs is also identifiable. "Service processes are 
distinguished from non-service processes only by the presence of customer 
inputs and implications thereof (Sampson and Froehle, 2006, p334).
Service delivery systems can be presented as diagrams depicting inputs being 
fed into processes with ensuing outcomes (see for example Figure 3).
Essentially, service providers combine a number of inputs to create a facility to 
delivery the service. Take-up of the service reflected by sales to customers is a 
measure of output. Beyond this, there are a number of potential outcomes in 
terms of impacts on those customers.
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SERVICE OPERATION
INPUTS
Materials PROCESS
Equipment
OUTCOMES
Value
Emotions
SERVICE PRODUCT
Customer
Figure 3 Managing service and service operations 
(reproduced from Johnston and Clark 2005, page 10)
Performance of service delivery systems is reflected in three key areas; 
productivity, capacity, and quality. Service providers combine a number of inputs 
to create their facility to deliver with varying degrees of productivity. Johnston 
and Jones (2004) provide a useful clarification of the dimensions of service 
productivity. Issues of capacity management are concerned with the match or 
mismatch between facility to deliver, supplied by the service provider and 
demand from customers. In simple terms, excess capacity implies wasted 
resources and insufficient capacity implies lost business or disappointed 
customers; none of which is sustainable in the long-term. Service quality is 
concerned with the outcomes of the service delivery system. Customers make 
comprehensive judgements about the extent to which their perceptions of what 
should have been delivered compares with what was delivered. Intangibility and 
heterogeneity as characteristics of services, both make managing quality a 
challenge. Finally, these dimensions of performance in service delivery do not 
exist in isolation. A myopic pursuit of performance improvement in one domain, 
is likely to have undesirable implications in another. Cutting back on inputs to the 
point where in the perception of the customer, the service experience suffers, is a
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common example. So a balance is required and the interrelationships are more 
complex than this example reflects. Roth and Menor (2003, p. 146) in their review 
of service operations management research, note that “many service 
management problems are fuzzy and unstructured; are multidimensional and 
complex; and less conducive to normative, analytical modelling.”
Retail service delivery
Having outlined the generic principles of service delivery, it is now appropriate to 
reflect on how these apply to the retail sector. The core of retail service is about 
providing the customer with the right goods, in the right place, at the right price, at 
the right time, in the right quantity, at the right quality, and all at the right cost to 
the retailer. Note that all but the very last of these “rights” of retailing are in the 
perception of the customer, fitting with the previous more general observation of 
services. What is right for the customer is of course a moving target and retailers 
have to keep up. Further, it is worth noting that customer expectations can now 
extend well beyond the core availability of the right merchandise and into a range 
of service enhancements.
Davies (1994, p.6) provides a more academic definition of retailing as the “the 
management of resources to supply the product and service needs of the end 
consumer, encompassing the supply chain of any physical products and the 
exchange processes involved.” This usefully includes the supply chain 
dimension. As John Kay (1996) concisely observed from his economic view, 
“retailing exists because consumers are small, ignorant and immobile.” So 
retailers can be seen as supply chain intermediaries, whose practical function is 
to help close gaps between production activity and the act of consumption. “In 
our modern economy, the distribution network makes possible specialized mass 
production on the one hand and the satisfaction of the differentiated tastes of 
consumers on the other” (Alderson 1954, p i4 cited in Svensson 2002). The 
significance of retailers in the supply chain has increased dramatically over the 
last century. Not only have they become larger in absolute terms, but many have 
taken over the role of other former intermediaries upstream in the supply chain 
and perform wholesaler functions. In relative terms, many retail sectors are now
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concentrated, with relatively few organisations representing a large proportion of 
the market. UK grocery retailing would be a case in point, with the market share 
of the top four retailers now exceeding 70 percent (Kantar Worldpanel, 2010). 
Retailers have become more powerful as a result.
Performance dimensions in retail
Traditionally, retail activity has been concerned with trading; buying and selling 
merchandise at prices that generate sufficient surplus to cover expenses and 
generate profits. Accordingly, performance has been measured through sales 
figures, cost control and achieved gross margin. The focus here is on 
productivity, and is very immediate. There are established input-output ratios for 
the purpose.
In reality retail performance is wider than mere trading (Dobson, 2005). Retailers 
provide services beyond just having the right goods, in the right place, at the right 
time to affect a sales transaction. Customers have evolving expectations that 
extend beyond merchandise availability. The quality of the retail service in terms 
of the extent to which it meets these expectations, is also an element of overall 
performance.
Retail Organisation
This study focuses on large scale retailers with multiple outlets. These 
businesses are characterised by centralised buying and marketing functions, and 
geographically dispersed store operations. Providing the right goods consistently 
is a complex activity. The various functions within a multiple retailer effectively 
share responsibility and accountability for service delivery. For example, a 
customer’s experience of poor product availability could arise from poor 
execution in buying, in distribution, in store operations or indeed, in any 
combination of the three.
Retail Store Operations
The in-store retail operation is all about trading; facilitating transactions with 
customers. The principle retail-specific activities can be identified as follows:
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Transaction processing 
Merchandising 
Replenishment 
Inventory Management 
Wastage control 
Security/Shrinkage control 
Customer Service 
House-keeping
Transaction processing in the food retail context, is handled by the checkout 
operation which covers the scanning of customer purchases, payment and bag 
packing. Recent advances include self-scanning systems. In service delivery 
terms, there is scope to match labour resource with sales activity as a capacity 
management technique. Perceptions of queuing remain sensitive for customers.
In terms of product merchandising, the presentation of goods for resale is 
typically predetermined centrally by the retailer. Stores are expected to conform 
to plans or for assortment or range selection, space allocation, floor layouts and 
shelf layouts. In-store replenishment concerns the physical activity of ensuring 
the on-shelf availability of merchandise to customers and is a key responsibility 
for the store. Some stock reserve may be held in back-up storage, but 
contemporary distribution systems have moved towards more frequent delivery of 
smaller quantities, reducing the need to hold stock at store level that is not on the 
sales floor. The scope for store management to influence inventory management 
is again relatively limited. Stock control systems are typically automated with 
forecasts built into algorithms that govern re-ordering. Some local intervention by 
the store management is normally possible, but not likely to be on a significant 
scale. It is normal for a store to have a level of recordable stock loss, such as for 
breakages or mark-downs on merchandise that is past its prime condition, and 
this element of loss is normally referred to as waste. Poor working practices at 
store level will generate high wastage. From a management perspective, 
identified policies and procedures should be followed to avoid excessive waste. 
There is an accountability problem with wastage, in that poor decisions in central 
functions or the supply chain can contribute. For example, perishable product
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can arrive at store with relatively short shelf life, through a distribution function 
error. Store management can perceive this as unfair, as the resulting loss will be 
added to the store's waste record. The retailer may include an allowance for 
such losses in the budget, but in practice, preserving accountability is an issue. 
Shrinkage is unrecordable stock loss, such as from theft. Again, from a 
management perspective there are established techniques which will minimise 
losses of this type. Consumer expectations of retail service extend beyond the 
core of product availability and stores are responsible for the delivery a level of 
customer service determined by the retailer’s offer. In competitive strategy terms 
this is important as a means for differentiating the retail brand. Customer service 
will include service recovery for example. Store managers have responsibility for 
housekeeping, or maintaining threshold operating standards. Some of this is 
enshrined in legal obligations, such as the duty of care to staff and customers 
under health and safety legislation, or the requirements under trading standards. 
Also within housekeeping, managers are responsible for the local compliance 
with company policies and procedures, typically presented in store manuals for 
easy reference.
In addition to the retail-specific activities that store managers are accountable for, 
their other significant responsibility is for managing people. The front-line labour 
resource in much of retailing is low-paid and part-time. Most retail stores have 
supervisory teams to cover the breadth of in-store departments and the extended 
trading hours. Larger units typically operate twenty-four hours a day, even if their 
trading day is shorter. Effective management of people is a key element of 
ensuring that the retail-specific responsibilities are discharged effectively. At the 
basic level this means scheduling appropriate cover to match task requirements 
of retail operations on an hour-by-hour basis. The appropriate service 
experience has to be delivered for the customer, without unnecessary overspend 
on wages. This is no mean feat in itself as unplanned events can place 
additional demands with little or no notice. Staff training and development need 
planning to ensure that the appropriate skills resource is available on an ongoing 
basis. There will be a constant pressure to motivate staff to get the immediate 
job done and to accept changes to working practice when sometimes there will 
be resistance (Varley and Rafiq 2004, p97). Store managers need to enthuse the
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people working for them (Grugulis et al, 2010), whilst being prepared to 
administer disciplinary procedures as the situation requires.
There has been some academic attention given to the leadership qualities of 
store managers. Lusch and Serpkenci (1990) sought to measure, using self­
perceptions, the personal traits of store managers and explore the relationship 
these might have with the performance of the store. Similarly, Koene et al (2002) 
looked for correlations between leadership traits in store managers and store 
performance. The following quote is drawn from this paper;
When asked about supermarket managers in fact, employees 
recounted very concrete actions and behaviours of managers 
that had influenced employee attitudes and store performance 
in the first months after the new managers arrived in their 
stores. These actions ranged from firing underperforming 
employees and motivating store employees by setting, 
checking, and rewarding clear and interesting daily, weekly, or 
monthly objectives, to inspiring the store's staff by clearly 
translating corporate objectives to goals for the stores and 
individual employees. At the same time, such interviews 
suggest that changes in store outcomes are frequently impacted 
by changes in store managers.
Koene et al (2002) p.212
Duckett and Macfarlane (2003) linked emotional intelligence with transformational 
leadership qualities in store managers and then with store performance. Hales
(2005) reflected on the argument that organisational change trends had led to a 
shift in the role of “first-line” managers towards team leadership at the expense of 
the supervisory capacity traditionally held. In this large study that included 
retailers, he found that the supervision function within the job-role of this 
population was stronger than ever. More recently still, Grugulis et al (2010) in a 
study of supermarket managers within two major UK chains find a ‘discrepancy 
between the rhetoric of leadership’ adopted by senior retail executives and the in-
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store reality. They found the scope for the store managers to show leadership to 
be very limited.
To summarise, store managers are responsible for the efficient and effective 
delivery of retail service delivery. The creation of physical store capacity imposes 
financial thresholds that dictate minimum levels of sales activity if the location is 
to be sustainable. Commercial pressures dictate the store managers are 
expected to maximise sales and trading profit by minimising costs and losses. It 
is normal to set targets for sales and for this to be the primary measure of 
performance. Budgets for costs and stock losses are often expressed as 
percentages of sales (Cox and Brittain, 2004). Good practice would be for store 
managers to be held accountable only for those costs and losses which they can 
influence. If sales exceed budget, it is easier for a manager to meet targets for 
costs and stock losses.
Information Systems Development
Retail operations generate massive volumes of data. Innovations in information 
technology and systems have revolutionised practice over the last twenty five 
years, including a massive impact on store management. Whilst the industry 
could be seen as relatively slow to adopt new systems which emerged during the 
1980’s, enabling technologies such as Electronic Point of Sale (EPoS) became 
almost universal as the new millennium arrived (McGoldrick, 2002). The impact 
has been dramatic and has facilitated re-organisation of the entire supply chain.
McGoldrick (2002) identifies the efficiency gains and therefore cost reduction 
from less administration, lower stockholding and therefore better stockturn, and 
associated lower levels of waste. In-store productivity is boosted by faster 
checkouts, lower labour costs. Improved labour scheduling, the scope to monitor 
individual staff performance in quantitative terms, more accurate space planning 
and removal of the requirement to price-mark individual items. Sales were 
boosted by better assortment and availability, along with the ability to respond 
more quickly to trends and changes in consumer demand (McGoldrick, 2002). 
Customer service has benefited from improved assortments and better 
availability, shorter checkout queues and itemised receipts with fewer errors
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(McGoldrick, 2002). Enabling technologies, notably EPoS, Electronic Data 
Interchange (EDI) and internet based communication have transformed supply 
chain organisation and underpinned major initiatives such as Quick Response 
(OR) and Efficient Consumer Response (ECR) (Fernie and Sparks, 2004).
These initiatives are based substantially on the automation of inventory 
management, which would not be possible without the enabling technologies.
This automation has relieved retail store managers of a very significant and time- 
consuming stock control burden, previously conducted manually.
Information systems development continues to impact on working practices in 
retail stores. Grugulis et al (2010) note the increasing levels of “close prescription 
and standardisation of work tasks" for store managers, accompanied by “far 
greater surveillance in terms of observable results" in the two UK supermarket 
chains that they studied. Insofar as it is quantifiable, the information system 
facilitates monitoring of performance in highly structured terms defined by head 
office. For the store manager, the scope to exercise discretion is diminishing.
In summary, this section has provided generic retail context for this study. It has 
presented service delivery as a system before developing an overview of 
operations in retail stores and outlining the breadth of responsibilities typically 
held by the store manager. The section concluded with a brief overview of the 
impact that information systems development have had in this context.
Literature review - Conclusions
This chapter started with a vision of the role of information in the management of 
performance (Figure 1). In simple terms performance information is available to 
operations managers either via the corporate system or conceivably, via other 
less formal sources. The rationale for a corporate system is to encourage 
subsequent behaviours that will positively affect future performance outcomes. 
Managers using performance indicators will have their own perceptions or 
interpretations which will mediate their subsequent behaviours and decisions. 
There may also be other extenuating factors that will influence behavioural 
outcomes. The model recognises that management behaviours take varying 
degrees of time before being reflected in future performance outcomes. Using the
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principal elements of the model in Figure 1, the key findings from this literature 
review can be presented as follows;
Corporate performance indicators and scorecards
1. Most companies use performance indicators, providing ample support for 
the claim that if you cannot measure, then you cannot manage (Kaplan 
and Norton, 2001).
2. Academic attention focuses on measuring rather than managing 
performance.
3. To be effective performance measurement and management systems 
need to be aligned with the strategy of the organisation. As strategy 
changes, then so must the performance measurement system.
4. Financial indicators of performance have strict limitations. They are not 
very good at capturing intangibles and they are not sufficiently predictive. 
There is therefore a role for non-financial performance indicators.
5. Kaplan and Norton's (1992) balanced scorecard, which includes non- 
financial performance indicators, enjoys the widest adoption by industry 
and the greatest academic attention. There is however, mixed evidence 
from empirical tests of the balanced scorecard. There are a number of 
positivist studies of its "use", but these do not explain what managers 
actually do with the information.
Managers’ performance indicators
6. There is very little evidence of managers adopting their own informal 
performance indicators (MPI's). One study suggests that this practice 
might be associated with the managers of higher performing business 
units (Bourne et al, 2005).
Manager perceptions and interpretations
7. There is a consensus that perceptions and interpretations of performance 
indicators can influence subsequent behaviour of managers, and that this 
can be either positive or negative.
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8. The literature recognises that there may be a Hawthorne effect to 
consider. However, existing studies provided no conclusive response to 
this.
Extenuating factors
9. Many business organisations link rewards for managers to corporate 
performance indicators. The intention here is to provide extrinsic 
motivations for operations managers to pursue particular outcomes.
10. There is a risk of performance indicators triggering unintended or 
dysfunctional behaviours. This risk can be exacerbated by a link with 
rewards.
Manager behaviours/decisions
11. What do managers actually do with performance information? There is 
some limited evidence of managers using performance indicators to 
promote engagement and communication with a performance focus. In 
turn, this behaviour is associated with a positive influence on performance 
outcomes (Bourne et al, 2005. Ukko et al 2007).
Outcomes and timeframes.
12. Several writers note that in researching the relationship between 
performance indicators, management action and subsequent performance 
outcomes, there is an endogeneity issue to consider. The benefits 
accruing from management action may extend over more than one future 
accounting period.
As Ghosh and Lusch (2000) note, in the retail performance management context, 
there are a "plethora" of variables to contend with. On the basis of this literature 
review there is ample justification for a study that seeks to better understand how 
managers collect, assimilate and use performance information in a retail 
operations context.
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY
INTRODUCTION
This chapter will present an account of the execution of this research project, 
starting with the philosophical underpinnings of the approach and extending 
through to an account the precise methods and processes adopted.
PHILOSOPHICAL UNDERPINNINGS
The broad context for this research project is the world of business management, 
comprising much complexity and intangible as well as tangible elements. There 
is an existing body of knowledge available to practitioners and academics and a 
very generic aim of any doctoral thesis in this domain is to extend our 
understanding of this theory. It is appropriate in the first instance to reflect on my 
epistemology, or assumptions concerning the nature of knowledge.
Epistemology extends from an objective view of reality at one end of the 
spectrum (positivist), through to a subjective view at the other (interpretivist or 
phenomenological). Positivists see the business management world as a 
separate, observable reality from which the researcher remains independent. 
Similar to the physical sciences, knowledge and understanding from this 
perspective can be extended by developing laws or law-like generalisations, by 
focusing on relationships between variables. The complexity in the business 
management world is a challenge for positivists, who seek to reduce and simplify 
as a strategy (Remenyi et al, 1998). This will run the risk that some other 
variable not recognised in the current analysis is pertinent to apparently direct 
relationships. Evidence is collected in quantitative form and emphasis is placed 
on reliability and validity measured by statistical techniques. Positivist research 
studies are limited in terms of the insight that they provide.
At the subjective end of the epistemology continuum, interpretivists believe that 
the world of business management is one that is socially constructed. The 
researcher is not independent of the subject being studied and believes in the 
"primacy of subjective consciousness” (Remenyi et al, 1998). Qualitative studies 
yield rich descriptions and are used as the basis for developing arguments, to
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which the researcher contributes interpretations. Interpretivist studies treat the 
business management world holistically, which is a strength where insight and 
explanatory power are concerned, but complexity makes replication more 
challenging. This is an issue as single qualitative research projects are "not 
readily conducive to generalisations" (Remenyi et al, 1998). These 
commentators note further that under pressure to defend themselves against the 
accusation that interpretivist studies are somehow less scientific, researchers 
have devoted much attention to accounting for their methods.
Remenyi et al (1998) observe that knowledge and understanding take time to 
develop and that researchers with varying epistemological assumptions help this 
process by challenging existing theory and then proposing and defending new 
findings. As has been noted, business management is complex and has 
intangible elements that are not easily susceptible to quantitative measurement. 
Rather than suggesting that a positivist orientation is fundamentally flawed, I find 
it is less suitable in pursuit of the research findings in this study. The topic here is 
performance management; a complex field where experts contend that we know 
comparatively little (Johnston 1999, Bititci et al 2006, Ukko et al 2007). The 
research objectives are exploratory and to this end, I believe that an interpretivist 
study offers the best chance of insight to this phenomenon. When greater 
knowledge and understanding of performance management has been developed, 
and it will take more than this one project, then positivist studies will be better 
placed to make a contribution.
RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
As has been noted previously, DBA research projects are typically applied to the 
researcher’s own employment context. In this instance, I have chosen to conduct 
my research in the field of my professional interest, but not within my employer’s 
organisation. My field of interest is that of retail operations management and the 
specific research objectives are as follows:
• To explore where retail store managers draw performance information 
from
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• To explore what retail store managers actually do with performance 
Information
There is no initial presumption that store managers rely on the corporate system 
for indications of performance and that they might have their own unofficial 
performance indicators. The literature review has included reference to limited 
examples of this. As has been noted, whilst the academic literature on 
performance is extensive (Neely 2005) it is biased towards measurement rather 
than management. This is apparent in Appendix A, which summarises 59 papers 
mostly from the operations management discipline and many based on positivist 
assumptions. It is argued here that an interpretivist study has much to offer in 
terms of understanding what happens between measuring performance and 
subsequent performance outcomes. Indeed, if our knowledge of how 
performance information is used is currently limited, then a qualitative approach 
to seeking insight and understanding would seem most appropriate. I am not 
aware of CIT being used elsewhere in a performance management research 
context. Whilst not without its limitations, the use of a different method augurs 
well for expanding knowledge in this field.
RESEARCH DESIGN
In order to achieve the research objectives this study was organised in the 
following manner. The first step was conceptualising the use of performance 
information by retail store managers (Figure 4). This was then used as a 
framework to conduct a comprehensive review of the literature pertaining to 
performance measurement and management in retail service operations. This 
review provides the theoretical basis informing the primary research in this study.
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PERFORMANCE
In f o r m a t io n
AND THE 
r e t a il  STORE  
M a n a g e r :
A  G E N E R IC  M O D E L
Area Manager
The Retailer
Service Operation
strategic Management
Company
Scorecard
Store Manager
Actions
Outputs
Line Management ^  Performance Information Flow —
Store Manager's tacit knowledge
With some input drawn from Johnston and Clarke (2005)
Figure 4: Performance Information by retail store managers
Having adopted an interpretivist perspective for this project, it was important for 
me to understand the context in which the store managers in the main study have 
to operate. Therefore, I set up preliminary interviews with senior managers from 
CC. This was designed to provide an insight to the corporate view of 
performance management within the business. It could have been used to adapt 
the proposed methods of data collection for the main study, but in the event no
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such adjustment was made. The views of these senior managers were used to 
inform the analysis of the main study.
Store managers were then interviewed using a critical incident technique protocol 
and this will be detailed later in this chapter. Interviews were piloted and small 
adjustments made to subsequent data collection. These store manager 
interviews form the largest component of this study.
The role of the researcher is integral to each step in the research process and 
comprehensive treatment of my contribution to the outcomes of this study is 
provided in the final chapter.
Due consideration was given to the ethical guidelines for research produced by 
the University and Faculty. In consultation with my supervisor it was decided that 
there were no specific issues created by the design of this project and that no 
formal permissions to proceed were needed. As far as the industry partner is 
concerned, the purpose of the research was made explicit. In line with normal 
practice, the organisation has not been formally identified in this thesis and all 
respondents have been anonymised.
Industry partner
The primary research for this study was conducted within the food retailing 
business of the CC in the UK. This very large consumer co-operative is owned 
by its customer members and with substantial other interests including financial 
services, travel agency and funeral care.
Initial access was achieved through a senior member representative, who 
provided contacts with the Commercial Director for Food Retail and with the 
South-East Regional Operations Director. Both of these senior managers agreed 
to recorded interviews for the purpose of conducting this academic research 
project. The Commercial Director was interviewed at the corporate head office 
on 8 April 2010, for approximately forty minutes. The interview with the Regional 
Operations Director was conducted 25 February 2010, in his car, en-route 
between London and Manchester, with the respondent driving. The interview
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lasted for approximately ninety minutes. In both cases, the quality of the 
recordings was very good, with very little inaudible material.
The interview with the Commercial Director - Food Retail, provides the strategic 
perspective of performance management across the business. For trading 
purposes the CC is organised into regions, each with its own operations director. 
The interview with the Regional Operations Director for the South East (London 
and the Home Counties) retains some strategic perspective, but provides insight 
to how strategies and policies to manage performance are operationalised within 
the CC. Together, these two views provide context for the main study.
Table 2: Store Locations. (‘ Denotes pilot) The stores in 
this study are identified by their physical location.
AF Aperfield
AR Guildford*
C Cranleigh*
FC Farncombe*
HG Hamsey Green
MB Maidenbower
Rof Roffey
RH Rose Hill
SW Southwater
TC Tattenham Corner
WL Warlingham
WT Wellington
The Regional Operations Director facilitated access to conduct interviews with 
twelve store managers (Table 2). These were selected by the CC as reflecting 
the range of store sizes, formats and locations operated by the business. Table 3 
summarises these interviews in terms of duration and word count. Store 
manager interviews were piloted with three of the twelve respondents. Minor 
additions were made to the subsequent interview structures. All interviews were
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conducted at the manager’s base store, with the exception of Cranleigh, 
Farncombe and Wallington. For these three, interviews were held at 
neighbouring stores, on the occasion of a manager’s meeting. All store manager 
respondents agreed to audio-recording of the dialogue. The stores were located 
in an area covering outer, south west London and Surrey including Rose Hill, 
Biggin Hill, Southwater and Guildford. The CC selected the stores to be included, 
as broadly representative of the range of size, format and locality that the retailer 
operates. The interviews were substantially based around CIT technique 
(Flanagan, 1954). The pilot study comprising interviews with three store 
managers in the Guildford area was conducted on the 6 April 2010. On this 
basis, some adjustments were made to the interview protocol for the remaining 
nine interviews in the study, conducted in early May 2010. Table 3 presents a 
summary description of the interviews in numbers. Appendix B presents a 
specimen interview transcript.
Table 3: Summary of interviews with store managers
interviews
T ,  Average interview duration
• Respondents’ 
Total Interviews duration
12
3h43m 17s^ 
,1 8 r :4 5 s '^
r Shortest Intenriew duration i  i  8m 23s 
Longest interview duration* 33m 28s 
Total words in interview transcripts ^ 45 202 
Average length of interview by word count 3 767
Critical Incidents #
Total Incidmts
Shortest interview by word count»,7^775
Longest interview by word count „6 625
..
Average length of incident description in words 
% Short^t incident descriptiorfby word counf
Longest incident description by word counL
5 1 - ^
509 ,, 
59 ^  
2066 «
The interviews were prefaced by a brief preamble which included a personal 
introduction and an imprecise account of the purpose of the research.
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Specifically, respondents were told that the objective was to develop 
understanding of the store manager perspective and that there was no interest in 
eliciting commercially sensitive information. The respondents were given 
assurance that their anonymity would be preserved and all of them gave their 
permission for the interview to be recorded. It is at this point that the recorder 
was switched on. The interviews for the three pilot stores are all relatively short. 
This may be inexperience on the part of the interviewer and that points of enquiry 
were added to the protocol following the pilot phase.
I conducted all interviews in this study. All interviews with the exception of the 
Hamsey Green store manager were transcribed by myself, using Dragon voice- 
recognition software. I checked the transcription of the Hamsey Green interview.
The conduct of Interviews
Qualitative interviews have the advantage of being flexible; suitable whether the 
subject is very specific or more general (King, 2004). This includes coping with 
topics where there are likely to be very different levels and perspectives of 
meaning. McCracken (1988) advocates taking advantage of the contingency that 
interviewing as a technique allows. On a very practical level, the interview as a 
research technique enjoys a certain familiarity beyond the academic world. King 
(2004a) notes that this makes the initial request more acceptable and less 
intimidating. In his experience, the majority have a positive view of being invited 
to talk about their work, either out of enthusiasm for what they do, or having the 
opportunity to vent frustrations. On the negative side, interviewing is a relatively 
time-consuming activity, that can be wearing for both parties and can generate a 
daunting volume of raw data (King 2004a).
Qualitative interviews are widely recognised as having the potential to generate a 
rich data source. For this to be realised the respondent needs to feel sufficiently 
comfortable (Myers, 2009). The interviewer will need to build a rapport with the 
respondent but without compromising their neutrality with the subject matter 
(Patton, 2002).
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The goal of any qualitative research is ... to see the research 
topic from the perspective of the interviewee, and to understand 
how and why they come to this particular perspective.
King 2004
To this end, McCracken (1988) identifies the need for obtrusive/unobtrusive 
balance and counsels against what he calls “active listening” or too much 
engagement with the content by the interviewer. There is a need for the 
researcher to deliberately “manufacture distance” during the interview and to 
maintain proper critical awareness of any preconceptions concerning the 
meanings behind the subject being related (McCracken 1988). Indeed the need 
for reflexivity or recognition of the role played by the researcher in participating 
and shaping the process and outcomes of the study, is an important 
consideration (King 2004a). Too many preconceived ideas can “create a 
treacherous sense of familiarity" and blind the researcher to the perspective of 
the respondent (McCracken 1988). This must not be allowed to compromise the 
conduct of the interviews or the subsequent analysis.
In this study, the researcher had no first hand, prior experience of qualitative 
interviewing. Having been appraised of the need to be an “active listener” 
(McCracken 1988), and have critical awareness of the researcher role, the critical 
incident technique (CIT) pilot study interviews provided a useful experience. It is 
fair to reflect that the level of personal anxiety in the interviewer, reduced 
thereafter. The pilot respondents were probably less comfortable than their 
colleagues in subsequent interviews and probably less forthcoming as a result. 
Having listened through each recording and reflected on the performance of the 
interviewer, it is possible to identify some transgressions of the active listener 
ideal, but these are not sufficient to unduly compromise the analysis. It could 
further be argued that the use of the CIT technique for this study is actually 
helpful to preserving the neutrality of the interviewer.
McCracken (1988) asks, “Who does the respondent think the investigator is?” 
and makes the point that this can have a significant impact on the responses.
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In this study, both senior managers were accessed via the same contact, a very 
senior representative of the CCs membership. It is plausible that both 
respondents felt some pressure to give some acknowledgement to, and say “the 
right things” about the mutual ownership of the business to meet a perceived 
expectation on the part of the researcher. Whether such a bias is present in the 
responses is difficult to judge and probably not fundamental to the research 
objectives. For the store managers in this study, who were selected by their 
senior managers to participate in this study it is not easy to gauge what they 
thought of having to be interviewed by the researcher from the “University of 
Surrey”. One respondent made reference to previous experience of being 
interviewed by a researcher from another institution, but generally it is likely that 
these respondents did not have to deal with at all frequently. McCracken (1988) 
advocates having regard for the perceived risks and costs to the respondent, 
whilst agreeing with King (2004) that there are benefits too. It is important to 
control the available cues. In each of the interviews, the interviewer wore jacket 
and slacks, with an open necked-shirt. It was hoped that this smart, casual 
appearance would appear professional without being too formal and conform to 
general perceptions of academics. In the view of McCracken (1988), the promise 
of anonymity promotes candour, but that this effect is reduced as rapport 
increases. Each respondent in this study was promised anonymity.
Interview Protocol
Prior to the interviews with senior managers, and following their agreement to be 
involved there were email exchanges to arrange convenient times and venues. 
Some indication of the line of enquiry was provided in advance. The emails 
referred to the “retail operations research project” being conducted and more 
specifically the focus on “how retail operations managers use performance 
information.”
The interviews themselves were preceded by personal introductions and 
permission was sought to record the proceedings. The protocol for the interviews 
with the Commercial Director and the Regional Operations Director follows 
Patton’s (2002, p343) convention as follows:
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Preamble
Thanks for giving me your time.
As I have already indicated, I am interested in the way that retailers 
manage their performance. I am going to start with very broad 
questions, with the idea that I should not presume anything about the 
way that the CC approach this.
It is also possible that your practice is ahead of what I have read in 
academic papers.
Can you start by telling me in broad terms, about performance at the 
CC?
What does the CC do well, compared to the competition?
How does the CC go about managing performance?
How is performance measured?
What is a store manager expected to do?
What is the area manager expected to do?
Supplementary prompts:
-  How/where does the store manager get performance information ?
-  Is it possible for the store manager to use their own performance 
indicators (i.e. not the company scorecard?) If so, what are these 
likely to be? And explore this further ...I
-  Are store manager rewards linked to performance ?
-  What do store managers think of the company/scorecard system ? 
Is it perceived as fair?
-  Are there any situations where the company/scorecard system, 
encourages behaviour in store managers that was not intended? 
Examples?
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In your view, what does a high-performing manager do in terms of 
using performance information that doesn’t happen with weaker 
managers?
It was envisaged that the first question (“... in broad terms”) would initiate a 
dialogue and discussion that could be coaxed from general performance 
management and measurement in the CC observations through to a more 
specific view of operations in a store level context. Therefore the above 
questions that followed were seen as providing a checklist rather than as being a 
prescription (Patton, 2002).
CIT Interviews
The twelve store manager interviews in this study were conducted using a CIT 
protocol. The Critical Incident technique was adapted for this research context. 
The key questions were to ask the respondents to recall a recent occasion when 
business in their retail store environment had been going particularly well or not 
well, and to describe this situation. Opportunity was provided to start responding 
either positive or negatively. The word “performance” was deliberately omitted 
from the initial question. If necessary, prompts were then used to elicit a 
sufficient understanding of the situation to support subsequent CIT analysis. Key 
to the research questions in this study, respondents were prompted to identify the 
first indications of strong or weak performance pertaining to the situation. Finally, 
prompts were used to elicit the actions taken by the manager in the light of the 
stated performance indicators, if this was not forthcoming in the first description of 
events. Each respondent was then given further opportunity to identify and 
describe such occasions. Following the conduct of the pilot study, it was felt 
appropriate to add two further questions at the end of the interview. The first was 
to ask whether in the view of manager, the corporate performance measurement 
system was fair. The second was to establish whether in their perception, the 
measurement system could encourage behaviours that the organisation had not 
intended.
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Critical Incident Technique
Flanagan’s (1954) seminal paper is acknowledged as the origin of Critical 
Incident Technique (CIT). The early development of this research tool took place 
during the 1940’s and early 1950’s in occupational settings; specifically the US 
military. Significantly, CIT is a qualitative method that emerged during a period in 
which the underpinnings of most scientific research were set firmly in the 
positivist paradigm (Butterfield et al, 2005). In simple language, CIT is based on 
collecting, analysing and classifying separate accounts of human behaviour in 
specific situations (Gremler, 2004). Resource constraints have meant that data 
collection for CIT normally means self-reporting. Respondents are asked to 
select significant occasions or critical Incidents for themselves and then provide a 
descriptive account in sufficient detail for the researcher to fully understand the 
event and crucially, the meanings that the respondent ascribes to the key 
elements that comprise the situation. Critical incidents can have positive or 
negative polarity. Analysis of CIT data starts by seeking to identify underlying 
themes or factors that can be used as a basis for developing a classification 
scheme for the incidents. Ultimately, the aim Is to have a set of categories that 
are both mutually exclusive and comprehensive. Once all incidents have been 
categorised, the final stage of analysis seeks to gain insight from the patterns 
evident in the resulting classification.
CIT has been adapted over the 50 years since its original development, 
something that perhaps Flanagan himself envisaged:
(CIT) does not consist of a single rigid set of rules governing 
such data collection. Rather it should be thought of as a flexible 
set of principles that must be modified and adapted to meet the 
specific situation at hand.
Flanagan 1954 cited by 
Butterfield et al, 2005
Notably, Bitner et al (1990) applied CIT to analysing service encounters in their 
seminal paper. Elsewhere, Chell (2004) provides an account of her development
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of interpretive or phenomenological approaches using the technique for the 
purpose of organisational analysis, with some similarity to this study. This brings 
CIT well away from the positivist climate within which it was originally based. The 
technique has now been adopted across a diverse range of academic disciplines 
and industries (Butterfield et al, 2005).
The primary virtue of CIT is that the qualitative data that it generates is distinctly 
the respondent's perspective (Gremler, 2004). The respondent enjoys a freedom 
to identify the significant occasion or critical incident, unfettered by researcher 
bias. The interview question should prompt recall of a situation of some import to 
the respondent, but otherwise there is no precondition or restriction of choice. 
Significance is a subjective judgement by the respondent and by implication will 
be relative to other potential options in the perception of the individual. "Critical" 
as an adjective does not have an absolute meaning. The focus on a situation in 
the interview protocol is a neat device for neutralising the line of questioning. The 
respondent is asked to describe the situation, which can in itself provide a wealth 
of detail for the researcher. Prompts can then be used to fill in any gaps and to 
ensure that the researcher has properly understood, including the meanings that 
the respondent assigns to the situation. Given that the report is self selected, if 
prompts are necessary they should not have to unduly lead the respondent.
Another benefit of the open nature of the CIT interview proposition is claimed to 
be as a "culturally neutral method” (Gremler, 2004). As the respondent is asked 
to choose and relay a story in their own words, this should not skew the data on 
the basis of personal background. Respondents in this study were not asked to 
identify cultural origin, but a diversity was present amongst the sample of store 
managers interviewed.
The absence of preconceptions, for example from existing theory, creates the 
potential for inductive analysis. Whilst the researcher may be guided by the 
existing literature in analysing CIT data, there remains scope for patterns to 
emerge without. Extant theory is not a prerequisite for applying CIT. This makes 
the technique very suitable for exploratory research where existing theory and 
knowledge is relatively insubstantial (Gremler, 2004). As has been noted,
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previous studies of performance indicators and associated management 
behaviour in a retail operations context, are strictly limited, and in this context CIT 
is very appropriate as a method.
CIT has the potential to generate a very rich level of detail, which in turn improves 
prospects for insight from the analysis (Gremler, 2004). Flanagan’s 1954 paper 
proposed that accuracy will be improved by collecting more detail (cited by 
Butterfield et al, 2005). CIT can be a very powerful tool (Gremler, 2004).
For a more interpretative approach, sufficient detail will be very important to the 
analysis. The level of detail should be enough to yield the meanings assigned by 
the respondent to events in the report of the incident. By implication, less detail 
in the report would require greater input from the researcher in the classification 
stage of the analysis. According to Gremler (2004), most CIT studies in services 
are at the latter end of this spectrum and this author suggests greater use of the 
interpretive approach. In this study, there is a wide variation in terms of detail 
provided to describe each incident.
Chell (2004) uses a phenomenological approach and teases out what the 
incident really means to the respondent and extols the virtues of CIT for this 
purpose. In her view the technique is very good in organisational analysis for 
identifying patterns and developing understanding of the relationship between 
“context, strategy and outcomes.” Chell (2004) specifically identifies a strength of 
CIT as being where interviews are conducted across multiple sites within an 
organisation. Themes that emerge from such a study have a stronger basis for 
generalisation.
CIT is not without its limitations. Fundamentally the data is generated from self- 
reported incidents. The implication here is that it is based on perception and it is 
retrospective (Gremler, 2004). Accuracy in reporting will be reliant on memory 
and if the occasion was back in time, the respondent’s assessment of the 
meanings involved may have changed. Chell (2004) believes that this recall bias 
problem is alleviated to some degree by seeking incidents that are critical, which 
by implication should enjoy the sharpest recollection in the mind of the 
respondent. In this study, respondents were asked for "recent” occasions. Some
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examples were indeed very recent, being within the previous week. Others were 
more than twelve months old.
Chell (2004) emphasises the need to establish “a rapport of trust and confidence” 
between the interviewer and the respondent as a foundation for a detail-rich 
report. In this study, there were varying degrees of anxiety apparent in the 
respondents. In the preamble to each interview and before the audio-recorder 
was activated, there was a personal introduction, including reference to the 
researcher’s experience of working in food retail operations over 25 years 
previously. The purpose here was to try and break down barriers and empathise 
with the lot of the store manager, whilst recognising that this work experience 
was very dated now. The respondents in the pilot interviews seemed the most 
anxious, suggesting that the interviewing technique improved with experience. 
Chell (2004) implies that an effective rapport is crucial if sufficient detail to 
facilitate understanding the respondent’s perspective, is to be forthcoming.
Gremler (2004) suggests that poor response rates can arise because the 
question is asking too much. As can be seen in the findings of this study, 
respondents reported negative to positive incidents in a ratio of approximately 
three to one. The willingness to recall positive accounts was much weaker. This 
has to be seen as a limitation.
CIT also attracts criticisms on the basis of reliability and validity (Gremler 2004, 
Chell 2004, Butterfield et al, 2005). Butterfield et al (2005) note that many and 
particularly older CIT studies cite Andersson and Nilsson (1964) and Ronan and 
Lathan (1974) to allay reliability and face validity concerns with the method. It is 
possible for stories to be misinterpreted, which again can be addressed by 
emphasising attention to sufficient detail. The development of the classification 
scheme is not without difficulty. Ambiguity in the identified categories is an issue 
(Gremler 2004). This can be off-set by using expert judges working 
independently in both the initial development phase, and then to check that 
incidents can be consistently allocated to categories. CIT studies need to be 
sufficiently "exhaustive” (Butterfield et al, 2005). They should reach the point 
beyond which no new categories emerge through the process of collecting
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additional incidents. In large scale studies with numerous incidents, it may be 
easier to demonstrate adequate coverage. In studies with relatively few 
incidents, and this study is at this end of the scale, then there may remain a 
concern over “exhaustiveness". In turn this could undermine any basis for 
generalisation. Chell (2004) cites concerns over generalisation of CIT study 
findings particularly from her favoured interpretive approach, but believes that 
rigorous application with a focus on properly establishing the respondents 
perspective, offers some safeguard.
This section has explained CIT as a qualitative research method, noting its origin 
in an occupational setting and its adaptability. It is particularly suitable as an 
exploratory tool, as data collection requires little preconception of meanings in the 
context being studied.
Data Analysis
The primary data in this study is in the form of interview transcripts and has been 
analysed using two approaches. Firstly, for the store manager interviews, and 
following CIT principles (Flanagan, 1954), the text relating to individual incidents 
was identified and concise descriptions for each were prepared using the 
following headings;
• Cause
• Implication
• Action
• Initial Performance Indicator
The 51 incidents are presented using this format in Appendix D. I then classified 
all incidents by manually sorting paper copies on a desk-top. This process took 
three iterations, each reducing the number of categories. Expert opinion was 
sought from two retail academic colleagues from another University in refining the 
classification system to the five categories presented in the next chapter. These 
colleagues were given the summary information and initially worked 
independently to categorise incidents. The results provide one insight to the
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perspective of store managers; an insight which is not dependant on any 
preconceptions or existing theory.
In addition to the CIT process described above, all interview scripts were 
subjected to a thematic content analysis (King 2004b). The principal codes for 
this analysis were drawn from the literature and were as follows;
• Financial performance Indicators
• Non-financial performance indicators
• Managers’ performance indicators
• What do managers do with performance information
Sub-codes were then developed under each heading.
It is argued that by conducting the interviews in the work-places of store 
managers, personally transcribing most of the interviews and then analysing the 
data using the two approaches outlined above, I have created the basis for a 
rigorous interpretivist study which yields insight and a depth of understanding. 
This is valuable in a context where existing research is relatively sparse.
CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter has provided a treatment of the methodology and then specific 
methods adopted in this study. It has considered the philosophical assumptions 
adopted, as they compare to alternative perspectives. The rationale for the 
research design has been outlined along with the principal methods adopted. A 
detailed treatment of the processes involved has been included; specifically 
including interviewing technique and CIT.
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CHAPTER 4: FINDINGS
INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents the findings from the primary data collected for this study. 
The data comes from interviews with managers within the CO. Firstly, two senior 
managers were interviewed to help understand the organisational context 
Interviews with twelve store managers from the South East trading region of the 
GO, provide the data for the main study. GIT protocols were used to structure the 
front end of these interviews. This provides insight to a store manager 
perspective of performance management.
THE VIEW FROM HEAD OFFICE - INTERVIEW WITH THE 
COMMERCIAL DIRECTOR (CD) - FOOD RETAIL - 8 APRIL 2010
The Respondent
No direct questions addressed the personal profile of the respondent and little 
information in this regard was volunteered. He has worked for the co-operative 
sector for about 10 years in a variety of positions, and has worked previously for 
GX, a business that the GG has acquired recently. The respondent has previous 
experience at store manager level, presumably with the GX organisation.
The GO’S Food Retail Business
This organisation operates approximately 3000 individual retail outlets each with 
a sales area of between 600 and 22 000 square feet. Many of these units can be 
described as neighbourhood convenience stores, operating extended trading 
hours across seven days of the week. Staffing is arranged in shifts to cover the 
trading hours. Normal staffing cover in smaller outlets at any one time, can be a 
manager plus two members of staff. These stores do not enjoy the scale 
advantages of the UK’s standard, superstore format. Such relatively small 
stores, as the respondent notes in this interview, are vulnerable to changes in 
trading conditions. New competitor activity can compromise the viability of a
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store, where a superstore could be expected to remain sustainable, on a lower 
level of turnover.
Stores are supported by a network of field or "operations" managers. Each 
operations manager is responsible for fourteen stores.
Co-operative organisation and the membership
The respondent identifies the mutual ownership of the organisation, as important 
to understanding the context for measuring and managing performance. As a 
consumer co-operative, the business is owned by its member customers. 
Following co-operative principles, it is controlled democratically on a one member 
one vote basis. Members elect representatives to sit on the board of directors, 
who determine policy and hire executive managers to run the business. So there 
is a fundamental difference between co-operative business organisation and 
private enterprise, which the CD believes permeates down to store level;
So values, the values of our organisation, the place that the 
store has in the community, the place that the store has with 
membership, is obviously far higher up on the agenda of the 
store manager in the co-operative world, than it ever was in a 
pic world....
CD
According to this senior manager, customers that are members tend to spend 
more and be more loyal, and are therefore important to the long term strength of 
each store. Members are issued with swipe cards which are then presented at 
the point of sale, as the means of recording patronage. Similar to other store 
cards, these members are guaranteed a minimum retrospective discount on their 
purchases. Unlike other store cards, the GO uses the card-based record of 
patronage as a basis for distributing dividend; a share of any profits that the 
business makes. Penetration rates for sales to members are captured on a store 
by store basis. Nationally, the highest penetration rates running between 50 and 
60% are achieved in rural Welsh communities. Whilst this measure could be
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seen as a soft performance indicator, the respondent believes that the link with 
the financial performance of the store is actually quite strong. He reports success 
from membership drives, launched in stores acquired from the CX business.
The role of the store manager, as viewed from head office
This respondent was asked to talk about performance in the context of the 
manager at the store level. The following quote captures the fundamental role 
and goes on to recognise that with such a large population of store managers, 
there is some variation in terms of achievement:
The purpose in life is about serving ... giving great customer 
service, developing great people ... delivering a great store for 
my customers, driving our membership agenda, and being at 
the heart of the community. If we could get 3000 store 
managers being like that, I think we are in a really good place.
We are a long, long way from that.
CD
The respondent also gives consideration to what he regards as retail instinct, 
suggesting that a good store manager has an intuitive feel for the operation they 
are running. This is an interesting concept, given the focus in this study on where 
a store manager draws performance information from.
I would have known, when I was a store manager, what was 
going on in my competitors. I would have known without 
anyone having to tell me, whether my store was in good order, 
was punching its weight for the store and I would know the level 
of service I was giving. Would I have needed really detailed and 
articulate reports to know whether actually I was punching my 
weight? ...No.
CD
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The respondent is a strong advocate of this opinion, claiming "this retail nous 
thing you know, its really important. Retailers are an individual breed in my 
opinion ... I think you can sniff a good retailer." Before going on to talk about key 
performance indicators, this was his attempt to describe what a good manager 
would be like:
How do I get to what is a good store manager overall? For me, 
a store manager that is very visible, a really great communicator 
with his team and with his customers and a good retailer. You 
know, those things are critically important for me...
CD
There is an explicit recognition in the respondent’s responses, that a good store 
manager does not need the KPIs provided by the corporate system in order to do 
their job effectively.
Development of key performance Indicators (KPIs)
The respondent was keen to stress that the current set of KPIs in use, were 
under development. Over the last 10 years efforts have been made to rationalise 
the measures used, and particularly to exclude those that the store manager was 
not able to influence. Managers receive a weekly confirmation of sales:
... sales performance will always be the number one measure 
of what they're doing ...
CD
A full profit and loss account for the store is circulated on a monthly basis. 
Availability is gauged on a daily basis, with the system calculating a theoretical 
score, which is then compared with the gap check conducted by store personnel 
as part of the early morning routine. These KPIs are then supported by softer 
measures. Labour turnover is gauged, focusing on what is controllable by the 
store manager. There is a measure for team development and the system 
produces a "stability" index, by calculating absenteeism levels and producing a
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score. Membership card presentation rates are logged. On a quarterly basis, 
there is a mystery shopper program in operation, recently improved to include 
qualitative as well as quantitative feedback. Store managers are then charged 
with posting this feedback on to staff notice boards, along with agreed actions 
reached at team meetings. Finally, an “engagement” score is calculated from an 
annual staff feedback form, which includes a section on the individual’s line 
manager.
The next stage of evolution for corporate KPIs within the CC will be to develop a 
balanced scorecard. The respondent believes that the necessary components 
have been identified. The demands from the CX acquisition have slowed down 
the development process. A balanced scorecard accessible by all levels of 
management including the store, should be up and running by spring 2011.
Role of the field manager
Flaving identified what he calls the "interdependencies" between hard and soft 
KPIs, this respondent goes on to observe that a proportion of the store managers 
will have limited capacity for understanding these relationships. The role of the 
field manager is therefore to guide and support "store managers to see through 
that sometimes myriad of information." The company policy is to have a 
maximum of 14 stores to a field manager, to prevent this resource being too 
thinly spread.
In addition to regular monitoring provided by KPIs, field managers have access to 
an information repository called the "in centre". This is designed to facilitate an 
on-the-spot investigation of particular circumstances, giving the field manager the 
tools to drill down through a company database.
Is the measurement system fair?
In response to this question, the CD observed that the company system may still 
be a little crude. Specifically, he felt that where the local competitive environment 
was tough and changeable, then the measurement system needed to do more to 
reflect this.
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So, I think if you talk to a store manager in what I call is a stable 
store, it's a lot more joined up than it's ever been. But if you talk 
to a store manager that went through a Tesco opening up next 
door to me, I think they'd find it a little bit tough ... what's the 
business doing to help support me through that? ... The business 
probably could be doing more.
CD
Dysfunctional behaviour
In the view of this respondent, the CC has no serious problem with corporate 
KPIs encouraging behaviours in store managers that were not intended. 
Arguably, the system could still be seen as too complicated, but this is where the 
support of the field manager would help. Whilst store managers have not been 
asked directly for their view of this, the respondent felt that a positive trend in 
engagement scores (staff feedback) suggested that the current development of 
corporate KPIs was moving in the right direction.
Rewards for store managers are linked to the corporate measures of 
performance. The initial threshold for this is to achieve a profit target. Once the 
profit target has been reached, a further bonus is then available for achieving a 
target engagement score. The rationale for this is to preserve the balance 
between financial performance in the short term and promoting engagement from 
staff, perceived as likely to yield longer term benefits.
Summary
This interview provides an interesting overview from a head office perspective of 
performance measurement and management within the CC. It portrays an 
evolving system, still relatively crude but one that recognises interrelationships 
between hard financial measures and softer indicators. Current sales levels are 
explicitly recognised as the primary key performance indicator. For a good store 
manager, somebody with retail nous, the corporate performance measurement 
system is confirming something that is known already. However, given the large
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estate of smaller stores, the system Is providing valuable support for a significant 
proportion of managers.
INTERVIEW WITH REGIONAL OPERATIONS DIRECTOR (ROD) 
SOUTH-EAST
Moving down the organisational hierarchy, the next interview is with the Regional 
Operations Director in the south-east of England. The respondent has been with 
the CC for over 3 1/2 years, having been headhunted from another major food 
retailer. Prior to this his experience included working with BandQ in the DIY 
sector.
Performance management
In his reflection of the development of performance management within the CC , 
this respondent used the label "comfy co-op" to describe where they had come 
from in a comparatively short time. In his view the CC had not traditionally been 
very good at managing performance, in effect fostering a culture of accepting 
poor performance. This was not good for poorly performing individuals, who by 
implication needed help. It was also not good for wider morale and motivation 
within the business. Passive acceptance of poor performance in the view of this 
respondent could be seen as the opposite of the "engagement" in individuals and 
teams, now seen as a priority. This situation has changed dramatically. A talent 
and resources director has been appointed at senior level. There is now a new 
corporate view of, and support for training, coaching, counselling, and mentoring, 
each as key to effective performance management. The CC now has a large- 
scale performance improvement process (PIP). As the name would suggest it 
has a positive orientation and is measured, time-bound and targeted in its 
approach. Each manager now has four or five key objectives, which are 
designed to sharpen expectations and reduce ambiguity. The PIP programme is 
underpinned by personal development plans. Calibre analysis is conducted for 
each manager every six months. In the view of the respondent, the programme 
is well-established, but has further to go to become fully embedded across the 
organisation.
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The individual performance of managers is assessed on a regular basis as being 
threshold, target or stretch in terms of level. The assessment is made on the 
basis of hard measures and measures of behaviour to do with engagement and 
service. This is then developed using a simple traffic light or colour code labelling 
system (Table 4).
Table 4: Colour code labelling system
Gold
Outperforming. Ready for the next job. 
Reward with promotion and pay rise.
Green
Acceptable. 
Meeting targets.
Amber
Improving.
60% of the store manager population
Red
Underperforming. Needs lots of help. 
20% of the store manager population
The respondent described these categories as rather ambiguous, particularly 
Amber and noted that the degree of challenge involved was always a function of 
the individual capability.
A store manager in a small branch (Sales floor - 600 ft^ ), would be paid modestly 
(circa £25 K pa.) According to the respondent expectations of managers at this 
end of the spectrum should be similarly modest. The likelihood was that 
managers of small stores would be closely managed by the field team 
(immediately by an "operations manager"). All store managers are asked to do 
"a hell of a lot" on a task by task basis, and this is followed-up by a system check 
to see that the job has been done.
Performance indicators and targets
The respondent provides a broad perspective of performance indicators. He 
recognises the wealth and therefore formidable volume of performance
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information available to managers at all levels. However, there is an issue with 
being able to effectively use the information with limited resources. He sees a 
danger in managers not being able to see the obvious. Aggregating data 
illustrates this point. A score produced by some kind of weighted average can 
mask real issues that need dealing with.
The ROD believes that budgets themselves are fair. So for example, waste 
budgets for all stores would include an allowance for markdowns that could be 
attributed to central decision-making, beyond the control of store managers. In 
situations where circumstances might be unique to the store, such as the arrival 
of new competition, then adjustments to the budget would be made in advance. 
According to the respondent, "there's nothing more demoralising than having 
unfair budgets and targets to perform against i f ... you don't stand a cat in hell's 
chance of getting near them." His claim is that the budgets are “decoupled” to 
reflect the store manager’s accountability. The example he provides of this is 
when earlier in 2010, winter weather caused severe disruption to distribution. In 
the circumstances, performance targets were relaxed out of fairness.
If you make it too unattainable, people will cheat. People will be 
forced into... their livelihoods are on the line and their family, 
and this and that. People will find a way to massage, cheat and 
get to the final result.
ROD
The respondent recognises that on occasion, the budgets are too soft or 
insufficiently challenging. However, this can be a virtue from a management 
perspective, in his view such a situation will highlight those that "inevitably over­
deliver a soft budget and those that believe they can coast because it's a soft 
budget and that's all that is required."
The respondent believes that the CC is right to develop the existing framework of 
performance indicators into a balanced scorecard. A relatively crude version of 
this exists currently, as developed by the region and is used by the senior 
management team in the south-east. This provides an opportunity to "knit”
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performance measurement and management together in a coherent manner that 
will emphasise those areas that require priority in terms of attention. However, he 
expresses some scepticism where the balanced scorecard is concerned, 
“because scorecards in themselves are just another version of performance 
management; a technique." Reducing the volume of information that is already 
available by making it more accessible is a desirable outcome, but there would 
be dangers in formalising it too quickly, as it could lead to dysfunctional 
behaviour.
Currently in the south-east, the CC operates a system of "Model stores." Stores 
that are identified as exemplary in terms of compliance with company standards, 
play host to visits from groups of other store managers in the area. This 
mechanism has replaced large-scale manager conferences previously held in the 
region. The broad aim of the model store is to improve compliance. Other 
benefits have accrued from the challenge that it introduces. Stores can aspire to 
be the model. The showcase sessions are interactive and operational problems 
can be discussed. The engagement of store managers with improving standards 
has increased over the last three or four years.
Retail instinct
Concurring with the view of the CD, this respondent recognises the innate sense 
that a good store manager will have for their retail operation:
I think a good, a good store manager always ... still relies on gut 
and ... Yeah, I think a good store manager intuitively knows if 
something is right or wrong ...
ROD
a store manager really shouldn't need ... a talkback survey once 
a year to tell them that . . . if  their team ... think they're doing a 
very great job in being their manager.
ROD
76
Engagement
The respondent is keen to focus on the extent to which store managers and store 
teams are actively engaged in the process of improving performance. He cites 
the “employee profit chain thing” as something he believes in.
Store teams hate the fact that their store manager doesn't 
communicate with them and it is the biggest thing you hear time 
and time again. So, working on improving that is an ongoing 
challenge for us
ROD
He endeavours to get out and visit stores every week, and would normally visit 
unannounced. His interest is in "high-level performance indicators" such as 
engagement, and checking to see whether decisions at a senior level within the 
region are filtering through to stores. The focus on indications of engagement is 
interesting because, by implication this is not a corporate KPI. His judgement of 
engagement is much more subjective and extremely intangible.
... if I go in and I think this store doesn't feel right. Why is that?
And if it is in the atmosphere, you start talking to the team and 
the availability is not right and ... you can have an absolute 
availability measure. It will tell you that the shelves are pretty 
empty, but that doesn't tell you why.
ROD
This quote reflects the limitations of quantitative scores. The respondent goes on 
to say that it is not difficult to investigate by talking to the store team and 
identifying the underlying cause of the problem.
Dysfunctional behaviour
In the view of the respondent, the corporate KPIs will generate some unintended 
behaviours and it will not be possible to make the system foolproof. Amongst a
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large population of store managers there will always be some dishonesty. Some 
dysfunctional behaviour will arise from individuals being led by poor example.
The bigger issue for managing retail operations, will be to reduce the overall 
burden on store managers. In the view of this respondent, store managers are 
asked to do too much and that the organisation is not sufficiently coordinated in 
this regard. There are too many bright ideas flowing out from head office, each 
worthy in its own right, but collectively close to being overwhelming:
It's completely unreasonable therefore to continue to throw stuff 
down the funnel (the intranet) ... if they (the store manager) are 
maxed out in terms of there is one of them, they get X  hours to 
do this, this and this, and so therefore you will force a culture of 
making choices, or choosing to do everything and fudging most 
of it I think we are acutely aware of that
ROD
The respondent believes that the business needs to address the sheer volume of 
different demands placed on store managers. A failure to do this will promote a 
perception of unfairness amongst store managers and risk higher levels of 
unintended behaviours.
I think they find it very difficult to get It all done ... because I 
think there's too much put on them, and I think that's what we 
must work to improve.
ROD
Summary
This respondent provides a strategic overview of the development of 
performance measurement and management in the south-east region of the CO. 
This view recognises the deep-seated cultural force that has traditionally tolerated 
under-performance and the on-going shift to towards actively engaging with 
performance improvement. The ROD believes that the CC has some way to go
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in refining its performance measurement system to enhance easy access to key 
information from the substantial volume of material available. The business is 
moving towards a balanced scorecard.
Given the relatively small scale of the CC’s stores, the calibre of many of their 
store managers is modest. This population is closely managed by the field team.
In the view of the regional operations director, too much is expected of store 
managers.
FINDINGS FROM INTERVIEWS WITH STORE MANAGERS 
CIT findings
The twelve interviews yielded a total of 51 incidents. Of these 38 were negative, 
and the remaining 13 were positive. A summary table of all incidents identified in 
this study appears in Appendix C. These store managers appear to find the 
recall of poor performance, easier than that of positive experiences.
The 51 incidents collected were categorised into five groups (see Table 5).
Table 5; Critical Incident categories
nts arising from: Positive Negative Total
Staff 2 8 10
Support systems 0 11 11
Customers 1 5 6
Senior Management 1 2 3
Target-related 9 12 21
Total 13 38 51
Key to Table 1
Staff Occasions When members of the store staff subordinate to the manager, 
are the source of the performance implication (e.g. Incident 31a, absenteeism).
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Support Systems Incidents generated by failure (all instances collected are 
negative) of the support systems. This includes Distribution (e.g. Incident 29a, 
late delivery). Information Systems (e.g. Incident 3, EDN failure)
Customers Situations that are directly attributable to customers (e.g. Incident 
29, positive feedback. Incident 14, “Drive-off’ theft.)
Senior Management Performance-related occasions that are triggered by input 
from above store level in the management hierarchy (e.g. Incident 7, positive 
feedback).
Target-related Occasions where a disparity exists actual performance and 
company targets, (e.g. Incident 13, the “joy” of exceeding target. Incident 34, 
stock losses beyond acceptable limits).
Financial performance indicators
Most of the managers in this study explicitly recognise the measures adopted by 
the company to capture financial performance. Specifically, these are sales, 
waste, leakage and personnel costs. Sales or turnover is a gross figure for each 
store, captured at the point of sale and available to managers on demand. Waste 
is the cash value of "markdowns", or stock losses that can be accounted for. 
Examples of this retail phenomenon would be breakages, which have to be 
disposed of completely and their entire value written off, and the reduction of 
merchandise approaching the end of its shelf life, very often characterised in 
supermarkets by adhesive yellow labels. Stock losses that cannot be accounted 
for at the time of the loss, such as theft, are referred to within the CC as 
"leakage". Poor inventory management practice is likely to lead to higher levels 
of waste and leakage. Leakage is accounted for periodically by physical stock 
checks. The store manager can influence the outcome of these four financial 
measures of performance, but ultimately shares responsibility, notably with the 
buying department at head office and the food distribution function. Where 
responsibility is shared, this gives rise to issues around accountability and some 
frustration with this is reflected in these interviews. Personnel costs are a 
function of pay rates and hours. These managers have no direct control of the 
rates paid for the job, but have some influence over the volume of labour 
resource consumed (and therefore cost) through the use of some part-time staff. 
Sales, waste, and personnel costs are key elements of the calculation of trading 
profit for the store, along with other overheads such as rent and rates, and that
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the store manager is not able to influence. These other overheads are not 
recognised explicitly in any of the interviews conducted.
The role of sales as a performance measure
Sales emerge from this study as the most influential corporate performance 
indicator in the perception of these store managers. Almost without exception, 
the sales or turnover of the store is explicitly recognised by the respondents.
I can see from today’s two o’clock report, I can... what will be 
my end-of-day today.
Incident No. 13
it works from the top line down, so obviously If you are, if you 
are not able to meet your sales, and we've got an 11 point...
11% increase, up on last year’s sales... That's a big bloody jump 
in a recession ... or just on the arse-end of a recession. So, 
there's a lot of pressure going on, on that.
General comment -  MB
Both of these illustrative quotes reflect the importance of the sales level for the 
store manager. Incident 13 above recognises a focus of interest during the 
trading day for sales achieved and knowing from experience what that indication 
suggests about the likely prospects for the whole day. The perception has a very 
immediate perspective. The interviews then provide an insight to the 
interpretation by store managers of the sales level. A single absolute measure of 
sales has limited value. Meaning is assigned to the measure in the eyes of the 
manager through comparison with other points of reference, of which company 
determined budgets are a leading example in this context. The general comment 
above, is just one example of a store manager perception of the sales budget as 
a target along with his rationalisation for the company's increase relative to the 
previous year.
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A number of the respondents appear to be under pressure from having what they 
would perceive as very demanding sales budgets which they are struggling to 
achieve.
And there were times when I actually come in and I'd look at the 
sales on the system and I couldn't actually see where we were 
going to get customers from ... how are we going to take this 
extra 15 grand a week?
Incident no. 44
This pressure is further illustrated by the following quote where the manager is 
not achieving the budget set for him, and chooses an alternative point of 
reference with which to compare his current sales level:
I mean, last couple of weeks ... this week, we are slightly down 
on last week, but we’re still going to do about thirty four... about 
thirty-four, thirty-five ... which is good in terms of what we were 
doing last year. Cos, what it was, the company set us a high 
budget. E rr... no-one’s hitting that budget. So, what they are 
looking at, they’re looking at like-for-like sales on last year and 
we are actually starting to get positive growth, on, on last year’s 
sales
Incident No. 21
As previously Identified, sales, waste, leakage and personnel costs each 
contribute to the profit calculation for the store. There is a strong perception 
amongst managers that achievement of the budgeted level of sales will make 
achieving targets for the other three financial measures, that much easier. It is 
standard practice for retailers to express targets for waste, leakage and 
personnel costs as a percentage of sales.
the first thing was to put a ...to get sales good. When you have 
sales, the costs will take care of themselves.
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Incident No. 32
our performance ... /s based on sales and in relation ... how your 
waste are doing, how your personnel..., that sort of thing ... / 
mean if your sales aren't quite there, then you won't have quite as 
much of a budget for everything else
Incident No. 27
If your sales increase... your wastage normally decreases, it's like 
a correlation, a negative correlation, if you like? And as that 
happens, the bottom line, the margins will increase. You'll, you 
will make more profit. Basically. So ... and you will not be 
wasting personnel in a store that is budgeted to do say 50,000 ... 
that's doing 45, you're still using £50,000 worth of personnel... 
when you're doing 45,000. Underperforming.
Incident No. 37
The latter quote reflects the understanding that additional sales on top of the 
budgeted level will be more profitable, as by implication a number of costs will not 
increase in line with sales activity.
That sales are underpinned by availability is explicitly recognised by most of the 
respondents in this study. The CC has KPIs that are specifically focused on 
availability (see later section on non-financial performance indicators). It is well 
established that relying on the record of store stockholding as a guide to the 
customer experience of availability is extremely crude. These managers clearly 
recognise the importance of having the right product in the right place, to support 
sales.
... sales Increase because you got more availability on the shelf
General Comment/HG
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As previously noted, some managers make temporal comparisons as the point of 
reference for current sales. This can be with last week, or with this week last 
year, sometimes referred to as a like-for-like comparison. Like-for-like 
comparisons appear here in the context of stores that have been converted from 
the old CX format to the new CC format (see for example, quote from incident 
number 21 above). Also reflected in these transcripts is the company’s use of 
benchmarking techniques to compare store performance across the CC. League 
tables are produced on a regular basis. Some managers referring to this practice 
may do so out of a sense of injustice, as they do not fare very well and feel that 
the measures do not reflect the unique circumstances of their store.
The respondents in these interviews clearly perceive sales budgets as very 
challenging. Some refer to what they see as substantial increases in sales 
targets compared to the previous year. Some respondents rationalise 
demanding targets either in terms of recessionary economic climate and even a 
pressure on the business brought about by the recent acquisition of the CX 
business and having to service the loans to pay for it. This implies a vision of 
significant factors at work, which are beyond the control of a store manager. Of 
the 51 critical incidents collected in this study, the source of the situation 
described was beyond the control of the store manager on 23 occasions. All of 
these 23 incidents described situations where performance was suffering. An 
example of this would be the information systems failure described in incidents 3, 
29A, 31B, and 47. Briefly, when a delivery arrives from the distribution centre, 
the system should generate an "electronic delivery note" (EDN) and a record of 
delivery quantities by SKU, should be transferred to the stock record for the store. 
When the EDN fails, inventory management is compromised. The physical 
merchandise is delivered to the store and is turned over in the normal way, but 
the automated ordering system reads the order as yet to be delivered. So, 
despite their merchandise selling through, no subsequent re-order is generated. 
This quickly manifests itself over the following few days as a poor availability 
problem, which in turn negatively impacts on sales. There is a clear perception 
that store managers need support from other functions within the organisation if 
they are to realise the level of sales demanded. When that support is not
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forthcoming or breaks down, these managers feel exposed. This is apparent in 
several of the interviews.
I mean at the end of the day you know, we're here for the 
community to provide good service and availability, and in a 
sense the depot is there to provide us with that service and 
availability, bu t... we don't always ... get that.
Incident No. 29A
Perceptions of fairness will be tackled separately in a later section. However, it is 
appropriate to note here that there is little perception of these budgets as being 
so challenging as to be inappropriate.
Waste
In a retail operations context, it is likely that a proportion of the merchandise will 
not realise its full retail price. Examples of this could be damaged goods, which 
could either be disposed of completely or reduced in price. Either way, it is 
possible to recbrd the loss Involved. Store managers exercise discretion over 
price reductions or "markdowns". In this food retail environment, a significant 
proportion of markdowns are likely to be short coded fresh product. Procedures 
are in place to monitor stock holdings in support of timely mark down decisions.
Like other financial performance measures there is a budget for waste, primarily 
to act as a target. Minimising waste is the desirable outcome, as like other stock 
losses it has a direct impact on store profitability.
... and how do I know if I'm doing well on my waste? Because I 
going I get my report sent down on my system. I check that, on 
a daily basis.
Incident No. 35
In reality some level of waste is inevitable. However there are examples in these 
transcripts of managers having to bear charges for waste which they do not
85
perceive as problems of their making. At a basic level, if merchandise arrives at 
the store having been damaged in transit, this Is then charged to the store. 
Similarly, stocks of promotional lines are allocated to the stores. At the end of the 
promotional period, the stores may be left with some residual stocks. There are 
situations where this residual stock has to be marked down to clear and again the 
store is expected to bear the associated waste charge.
so that waste, even it wasn't my fault ...is  still counted as 
waste, and I think it's really unfair
General Comment/HG
Leakage
Stock losses that cannot be accounted for at the time are referred to by these GO 
managers as leakage, which again has a direct impact on profitability. Such 
losses are accounted for retrospectively by a physical count. Stock checks are 
relatively infrequent. Store managers develop their own means of monitoring 
likely stock losses and these are dealt with in another section.
we had horrendous stock results where I think the stock result 
was about 2.5% ... loss and budget was 0.5%, so that flagged 
up to me that obviously we had a problem ...
Incident No. 23
Summary
Corporate financial KPIs form a significant focus of attention for store managers 
within the CC on the basis of these interviews. Sales levels enjoy pre-eminent 
status in this regard. There is a keen appreciation of relationships which 
underpin or affect sales. A sense of the pressure from higher up the organisation 
to deliver performance as measured by financial outcomes comes through very 
strongly. In turn, managers are very aware of factors beyond their control that 
can have a negative impact on the financial performance for which they are held 
accountable. Similarly, the limited nature of financial key performance indicators
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for capturing the full picture of what store managers deliver also provides a basis 
for perceived injustice. Such equity issues will be explored more fully later.
... when it's on the downturn and you're having a really poxy 
time, all of a sudden that's a major problem. The world is going 
to end. Yeah? And you get phone calls left, right and centre 
from everyone.
Incident No. 24
NON-FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE INDICATORS
In addition to the financial performance indicators, the corporate system includes 
other measures which in turn were identified by store manager respondents in 
this survey. These non-financial measures focus on availability, customer service 
and feedback from store staff.
Obviously you get a lot of reports down, saying how well you are 
doing and availability scores and stuff like that. ...as long as I'm 
hitting those kind of targets. I'm very happy. I know things are 
going well then.
Incident No. 30
Availability
As has been noted, high levels of availability in terms of what the customer 
actually experiences are a precondition for achieving sales targets. This is clearly 
recognised by these store managers. All bar two of them make specific 
reference to the importance of improving availability. It would appear that the 
corporate system succeeds in reinforcing this emphasis. Electronic point-of-sale 
technology and database systems facilitate the tracking of merchandise by stock­
keeping unit (SKU). In turn, it is possible to monitor the sales behaviour of 
individual lines, along with in-store stockholding to identify products that are 
probably not currently available on the shelf in store. This availability check is 
conducted for a selected number of key lines from the total stock range, where
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non-availability could be expected to be particularly sensitive. The system 
compiles a report on this basis and gives the store a score. The gap list that this 
generates provides a basis for a physical check by store staff, as an early 
morning routine. At minimum, this promotes some engagement with what needs 
to be addressed to improve availability. In the words of one respondent:
They'll scan in the morning. ... this will go on and hit the head 
office computer and it will work out what's a gap ... why the 
gaps are there ... So then we have to action that report.
Incident No. 15
The corporate system is therefore providing an initial and perhaps crude 
indication of availability, followed by taking the store’s gap check data and 
producing a further score for the accuracy of the store input. This is all 
happening in the early part of the trading day. There are some claims that it is 
possible for store managers to "play the system" by manually inputting false data. 
Such dysfunctional behaviour will be addressed in a later section.
Another manager provides a sense of the significance he affords this 
performance measure:
Our gap compliant... basically ...we achieved 97.23% the 
week before, and this week has been nearly 98%. Basically, 
that tells me that my store... is fu ll... my gap compliance is the 
most important as a store manager
Incident No. 39
In a grocery retail environment, maintaining availability is central to providing 
customer service and depending on the capacity constraints of the store in 
question, can be a constant challenge for the operations managers. There was 
no suggestion in these responses that availability measures were inappropriate 
and this implies that the corporate system is genuinely helpful to store managers 
seeking to improve performance.
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... well you've got your gap check, exception counts, your stock 
counts, your negatives ... there's lots of different... low lines 
and stuff like that There's lots of stuff to actually pick up on 
things...
General Comment/TC
Customer Promises in Action
The GO conduct a mystery shopper survey in all of their stores on a quarterly 
basis. This is a check on customer service standards. A checklist is conducted 
to produce a score for the store and more recently, some qualitative feedback 
has been included.
... there’s a “customer promises and action” survey. There’s a 
person comes and ... so, when I get 100%, so I’m over the 
moon. ... When I get 60... nasty day. Then I have to 
investigate and action plan ...
Incident No. 13
The profile of the mystery shopper survey in this study is limited, perhaps 
because of its relatively low frequency. The quote above is from the only incident 
where the mystery shopper is mentioned. The following observation was in the 
context of considering dysfunctional behaviour, where the manager appears to 
believe that this measure has more integrity than some others.
Well I mean, the thing is with the customer, the mystery 
shopper... the mystery shopper one where they do the 
customer focus audit, you don’t know it’s going on ... and 
there’s no way you can reaily cheat that.
General CommentAA/L
89
Talk-Back
The remaining corporate measure of performance for store managers, that gets a 
brief mention in these transcripts, is that of a staff survey. This is conducted on 
an annual basis and is only two years old. There is little to gauge the store 
manager perceptions of this feedback. It is however an interesting development, 
given some of the later findings in this study.
Summary
Of the non-financial corporate KPIs recognised in these interviews, those 
associated with product availability appear to have the greatest significance. 
Whilst availability is not a financial measure, it is still calculated in quantitative 
form and can be regarded as a "hard" measure. Once again, managers are very 
aware that availability is afforded significant emphasis by the business. On this 
basis they are sensitive to factors that impact availability and yet are perceived as 
beyond their control.
MANAGER’S PERFORMANCE INDICATORS -  MPI’S
One of the principal research objectives for the study was to establish whether 
retail operations managers relied entirely on the corporate system, or whether 
indeed they made use of their own informal performance indicators to some 
extent. The respondents do make reference to other sources of performance 
information. There appear to be two main categories. Firstly, those of a 
functional nature derived from the manager's experience of retail operations. 
Secondly, a number of the respondents identify picking up on staff disposition as 
a useful guide in this context.
Retail Operations
Store managers report being able to gauge short-term performance prospects 
from visual cues, but qualify this by recognising the potential fallibility of such 
indicators. In this first example, the manager is talking about the visual 
appearance of the shelves in the store, on his arrival first thing in the morning.
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However, it is possible to replenish shelves with stock and "face up" product, 
making the shelves appear fully stocked, when that may not be the case.
....I don't know, you never really know when things are going weil, 
because the shop can look amazing at 7am in the morning and by 
10am it can look like a complete pigsty, just by customers coming 
in and appearances can often be deceptive.
Incident No. 5
In a similar vein, several managers refer to being able to crudely gauge likely 
sales from a visual check of checkout activity, but again this is not infallible;
...it depends on your tilis. I’ve got nine tills here, and if all nine are 
manned... for good six, seven hours. That tells me ... wow... 
yeah? You’ll walk down there and see that happening ...so, you 
know automatically your sales is going to be good. You know, but 
having said that... from past experience, when I was managing 
little stores, ... your tills could be ringing, customer count is high ... 
but the average basket spend is ... very low.
Incident No. 32
A number of stores in this study are constrained by physical capacity. This 
applies to both the sales floor and any backup storage area. Managing capacity 
is particularly difficult when bulk quantities of stock are delivered. From a security 
perspective (avoiding unnecessary stock losses), it is not desirable to have 
merchandise left outside of the building. Typically, stock will arrive on roll cages 
and where possible retained within the backup storage area. When space is at a 
premium this is a real challenge. Workspace becomes clogged, normal 
processes are obstructed and there are attendant health and safety issues. 
Incident number 40, describes a situation where this type of situation was 
exacerbated by staff shortages and a consignment of chilled product was left out 
of the temperature controlled environment that should be maintained and had to
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be written-off. Elsewhere amongst the transcripts, there are a number of other 
references to having the backup storage sorted out as a positive indicator.
Your warehouse and your sales are very good. It's pretty much a 
good time.
Incident No. 30
There is one example of a manager exercising judgement from experience and 
recognising that a stock range introduced following a store refit was not 
appropriate. This is an interesting case, in that ranging decisions are normally 
beyond the remit of the manager, but does reflect the store manager’s focus on 
improving performance:
...we just had so much stock coming in and ...it was just the 
wrong lines .. .and everything was going wrong... in terms of sales 
and waste.
Incident No. 21
As has already been noted, unplanned events are a problem when it comes to 
managing performance. By definition there is little notice given, but the retail 
operations manager knows immediately that short-term performance is going to 
be more difficult to maintain:
if the delivery has come late, that automatically throws a lot of 
people off their tracks... and to me that's what causes a lot of 
friction ...in stores.
Incident No. 1
Last Tuesday, for example, they phoned me at 10 o'clock in the 
morning, and they said "We are running about forty/forty-five 
minutes late"... and delivery came at quarter-to-ten at night... so 
... there is nothing you can do, unfortunately...
Incident No. 41
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Late deliveries as illustrated by the two quotes above, can be expected to disrupt 
operations and staffing schedules, having a negative impact on availability and 
then sales.
Staff absentees represent another immediate indicator of short-term performance 
prospects.
I mean they don't really have to tell us until... 10am. So it only 
gives us so many hours to find a replacement and if you've 
already got someone off on sick ... that can be a very stressful 
day.
Incident No. 4
The last source of unplanned events that recurs frequently in these transcripts is 
that of information systems breakdowns. The following quote is one of several 
describing the failure of the inventory management system to update the book 
stock at store level, following a delivery. The manager receives no prior warning 
of this failure and as the quote reflects, he knows that it will have a negative 
impact on availability and therefore sales over the coming week. However, 
systems glitches in this study are not limited to this particular scenario:
Now, if you are missing an EDN (electronic deiivery note), it all 
sits on the on order column., .which means it knows it's coming, 
but doesn't know when it's coming. So, as a result. . . i f  I miss the 
Saturday one, most of the time I probably won't get it sent down 
‘til Tuesday. On Wednesday, the counters out there are empty. 
Nothing left.
Incident No. 47
Staff Disposition
.. .it's not just sales and things as well, I've got to be honest. I 
think that if you've got a happy workforce... I think everything 
else in the store can change... just through that little thing.
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Incident No. 25
The retail operations MPIs described above, are all relatively tangible. Several of 
the respondents in this study make significant reference to the disposition of their 
staff as a powerful performance indicator. This is clearly much less tangible.
... normally it is from what the staff say to me in the morning, 
normally gives me an idea of what kind of day I'm going to have.
If they are all very quiet, I know something's gone wrong, but it 
might not be easy to see. If they are very excited or they are not 
really doing very much, if they are standing around chatting and 
things, that's normally a sign that everything is done and the 
shop is running well.
Incident No. 2
in the perception of a number of these managers there are causal links in a chain 
which starts with staff disposition. Expressed positively, this would suggest that 
happy staff tend to be more industrious, and are more likely to have a positive 
effect in their direct dealings with customers. Greater industry leads to better 
availability, which is also going to please customers. If this is working, then 
customers will be loyal and sales will increase over time. This is how one 
manager describes this effect:
We (my staff) always laughing and joking but then the job has to 
be done... you see because ...the customer happy; ...the 
customer are laughing; you can hear when ...the team is... led 
into the business ...the chatting at the check-out and, believe it 
or not, sales increase... sales increase because you got more 
availability on the shelf... the customer is tantalised when he 
come into the store - he sees this marvellous atmosphere In here 
... and it does make a difference. At the end of the day, you 
wouldn't go shopping anywhere you would feel uncomfortable...
General Comment/HG
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Another manager reflects on the same causal chain factor in the following quote, 
but this time in a negative context:
... you get subliminal indicators that things are going wrong, in 
terms of staff motivation and it’s not so easy, ... but there is like 
an internal mechanism ... most people are aware of it  Not 
everyone picks up on it, but you can see people’s body language 
and expressions and the nega- the negativity -  you can almost 
smell it ... Or this person ... and they start bickering amongst 
each other. It’s amazing that once things start to take a 
downward turn, there’s a lot of internal struggles that start to 
come to the surface ...
Incident No. 37
For the most part the indications are extremely intangible; they are "subliminal", 
until they manifest themselves in individuals actively blaming each other. Not 
everybody can recognise It, but it is there in the atmosphere and in the body 
language of the staff. You can almost smell the negativity. For this individual, 
this is a powerful performance indicator. A number of the other respondents 
make reference to the atmosphere in store as an intangible performance 
indicator.
Yet another manager is again very clear about the causal links in the chain and 
goes on to suggest a cyclical effect. It is interesting to note that he describes the 
effect here as being initiated by happy staff delivering a shopping experience that 
leaves customers happy and friendly, which in turn feeds back to the staff to 
close the loop:
... if your team are happy and good you know, it means they're 
going to be working hard ... it's just getting into a cycle ... 
virtuous. . . . if  the shop looks good and ...the customers are 
happy and they're friendly, then it rubs off on the staff, so they 
are happy and friendly. They tend to work a bit better and ... that
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helps the customer again. So, it's just trying to get in tha t... 
routine reaily
Incident No. 29
Summary
These interview transcripts reflect two groups of MPIs. The first have to do with 
what can be described as retail operational issues and are relatively tangible. 
Late deliveries and systems malfunctions both illustrate operational situations 
where managers know there will be an ensuing performance implication. The 
second group is less tangible, whilst still being influential. Indications of staff 
disposition are recognised by several managers as important. Several 
respondents identify causal links through productivity and customer service and 
on to financial outcomes. Some note a cyclical effect, either vicious or virtuous 
depending on the direction of travel.
WHAT MANAGERS ACTUALLY DO WITH PERFORMANCE 
INFORMATION
Introduction
...m y role within the store is part court jester, part judge and 
ju ry ... because obviously I've ... it's my job to maintain 
discipline. I mean obviously, make sure the store's legal, make 
sure the store’s running, obviously people can't take the 
Michael, ... but I think you have to make a good balance of 
picking people up when they're down and pushing them down 
when they are getting a little bit too up, ... / think that if you've 
got good people communications and you can create a good 
team around you, you create loyalty and you can't buy that.
You just can't...
Incident No. 24
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One of the principal research objectives of this study was to explore just what 
retail operations managers did with performance information. These interviews 
provide a rich variety of store manager perceptions of their own actions in this 
context. The quote above provides a good example, capturing as it does the 
retail specific activities and those relating to the management of people, which 
have a more generic feel to them. The following sections will explore firstly retail 
management actions in this context, and then those related to people. The 
treatment of what managers actually do with performance information will be 
concluded with a focus on behavioural self perceptions. Again the quote above 
gives a flavour of how one manager saw his own inter-personal behaviour with 
staff, and why this was important.
Retail Operations
Store managers bear responsibility for ensuring that the retail operation is 
conducted within the regulatory framework. A number of the respondents 
referred to their obligations to maintain a safe working environment. Also explicit 
are the requirements of the trading legislation. There is a single incident (number 
24) that concerns a legal infringement. On this occasion, the licensing laws 
governing the sale of intoxicating liquor are broken by the store on two 
consecutive occasions. This led to a temporary withdrawal of the alcohol licence 
at this location and a major inquisition on the part of the company. The loss of 
the licence led to an immediate drop in sales and to dissatisfied customers.
Aside from incident number 24, the legal responsibilities of these store managers 
have a low profile in these interviews. Similarly, there is relatively little reference 
to complying with company policies and procedures. One respondent (AF) refers 
to a store manual, which includes the details. Other managers make reference to 
improving compliance with company policies and procedures, usually in the 
context of them taking up a new store manager role (e.g. Rof); the implication 
being that practice had become relatively lax before they arrived. For example, if 
compliance with stock handling procedures is weak, then stock losses both as 
waste or leakage, would be expected to rise and profitability decline. A store with 
a strong performance is likely to have a manager with a firm grip on ensuring staff 
follow procedures.
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There are references by respondents in this study to their responsibility for 
inventory management. In practice this means actively monitoring stockholding 
levels and composition. Information systems glitches feature as a problem and 
generate a number of negative incidents. Some manual interventions are 
possible and the store manager perspective appears to be that the more accurate 
the stock records in the system, the better the retail operation will function. This 
will be enhanced by actively monitoring stock and where possible making 
adjustments to keep the record up to date. This problem is illustrated by the 
failure of electronic delivery notes to update the system automatically in a number 
of the incidents, creating ongoing problems.
A number of the incidents collected in this study relate to situations where 
unplanned events have occurred and require actions and resources to address 
the consequences. As a manager of one of the larger stores in this study puts it:
I could have my plan for the day .. .and I’ll get into the store... 
totally different Typical working day is determined by events.
General comment/RH
In service operations terms, a constant level of activity would be relatively easy to 
manage. In reality, retailing and many other service operations are made more 
challenging to deliver by the occurrence of unforeseen issues. Examples such as 
the staff absentees, late deliveries, and information systems glitches are a 
recurring theme through the transcripts in this study. It follows that some of the 
actions that managers recognise are specifically focused on dealing with these 
situations. So it is possible to identify what might be regarded as a "fire-fighting" 
category of responses to performance information. The following quote from 
incident number four, illustrates the somewhat ad hoc nature of having to deal 
with staff absentees where there is little or no notice available:
So it oniy gives us so many hours to find ...a replacement and if 
you've already got someone off on sick, that can be a very 
stressful day.
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Incident No. 4
Fire-fighting actions are characterised by being reactive in nature, requiring 
additional time and/or resources on top of normal process activity and making the 
best of the situation, which may have sub-optimal short-term outcomes. Late 
deliveries are a good example of an event that will require a response from store 
management. All of the store locations in the study are in residential areas with 
restrictions on out of hours delivering. The CC is therefore obliged to make drops 
during the daytime from its distribution centres at Thurrock, close to the Thames 
River Crossing on the M25. Traffic congestion is common in this area. Stores 
are given delivery "windows" to aid with staff scheduling. Several of these 
managers complain about late deliveries. If the delivery misses the window, then 
there will be underutilised staff for a period, followed by a delivery at a time when 
the staff resource is inadequate. There are significant physical capacity issues in 
some of these stores, and this will be exacerbated if there is insufficient labour 
resource to handle the goods received. The respondents in this study are 
particularly sensitive to issues that require firefighting responses, as they know 
that this will almost inevitably have a detrimental impact on performance and be 
reflected in the corporate KPIs.
If management responses to unplanned events are inevitably reactive in nature, 
these interviews also provide insight to store manager actions using performance 
information that are much more proactive. Some of these respondents make 
detailed reference to investigating, analysing and planning activities, using 
performance information.
So you've got all different departments. You look at areas 
where you've under-traded for the week and that's what drives 
your priority for the next week. Why were we down? Got to 
investigate why ... whether you didn't order enough or what's 
gone wrong. ...but in terms of personnel... because we are 
over-spending, we have people in the wrong places.
Incident No. 32
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The incident above describes one manager's approach to using performance 
information from the corporate system as a basis for taking action and changing 
behaviour. In the first instance, sales for the store are down; it has 
underperformed or "under traded" in the language of the manager. This needs 
investigating. The sales figure is broken down by department, to facilitate a focus 
on the problem. Why were sales down in this department? Perhaps insufficient 
stock created an availability problem. Increase the orders for next week. In the 
second instance, if the wage bill is too high then the response should be to check 
first whether the right people are in the right place at the right time, as opposed to 
crudely cutting back on labour hours. Such an investigation may lead to 
identifying the need for restructuring staff across departments and trading hours 
to better match process activity. This manager concedes that such a 
restructuring can be challenging in itself.
The following quote, from another manager, provides more detail. The store in 
question was formerly part of the CX portfolio. It has been refitted and rebranded 
to the CC format. These changes include adjustments to the stock range on 
offer, the merchandising and space allocation; decisions normally made by head 
office and implemented by the store operations team. Having reopened for 
business, the store is failing to meet its sales target. The manager provides an 
insight to the approach adopted to address the identified underperformance:
...we looked at sales, we looked at the range, we looked at our 
availability, we were looking at the availability. We’re doing a 
gap-walk, every single morning., and identifying if it is in stock.
Why isn’t i t .. and get it onto the shelf. If not, we’re correcting 
the book stock and bringing the stock ....in terms of sales, we 
looked at range as well. I called in through the regional space- 
planning manager and we walked round the store and we 
decided that certain departments weren’t working for us. So, 
we’ve actually done some merchandising moves, around the 
whole store ... and its really getting behind every sales 
opportunity we get, and really going for it.
1 0 0
Incident No. 21
This respondent has first hand experience of managing the store as a CX unit 
and therefore some knowledge of the local market. Using this knowledge he was 
able to negotiate with range and space planning functions within the organisation 
to affect fine tuning of the store merchandising. The implication here is that 
having the right product (a decision normally made by a central marketing 
function), in the right place is key to supporting sales. The "right place" here can 
be seen as a shared responsibility. The central marketing function are making 
decisions about where to merchandise in-store store and the store operations 
team have responsibility for ensuring that replenishment maintains availability in 
terms of the customer experience. As noted elsewhere, maintaining availability 
comes through as a key focus of attention for the retail operations manager, in 
most of these interviews. ,
People Management
In addition to those management actions that are peculiar to the retail operations 
context, these interview transcripts provide a very rich perspective of practical 
people management with a more general feel to it. Several of the respondents 
acknowledge the store "team" without which the operation could not function. 
Developing, training, coaching, and engaging individuals to work as a team is 
another key focus for store managers. Developing an effective team is a 
complex business and they will be factors that obstruct or mitigate against the 
building effort. Teams by implication have to communicate with one another:
Communication is the key of any business; people have to 
communicate...
General comment/HG
... and realiy, reaiiy good communication in the store team and 
this is my expectation... and then you can achieve whatever 
you wanted.
Incident No. 12
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A number of managers provide insight to practical communication. Team 
meetings clearly feature in most stores. There is the perception that proper time 
should be given to support full explanation and clarify any misunderstandings, as 
a means of promoting engagement. The following quotation recognises the 
potential barriers involved;
So if you don’t communicate with your people .. give them 
information, you will get resistance. Cos people don’t like 
change. Cos they’re happy in their comfort zones. The only 
way you can get them out is by getting them engaged, ... They 
might buy into it and that will help you achieve your change.
Incident No. 33
Team meetings can be used as a forum for building peer pressure into a team 
whilst fostering a mutual spirit of support. The department managers can present 
their financial results for the week to their colleagues, to engender a competitive 
rivalry. However, this should not be allowed to reach a level where it inhibits 
individual members of the team from helping a colleague with a problem. This is 
a delicate balance to strike. Team meetings should have a learning dimension 
included and avoid unrelenting recrimination, even in difficult times. One 
manager's technique for teambuilding was to present the team with the problem 
of the moment and then seek to elicit a group solution. In his view, this was a 
powerful means of enlisting support and ownership of initiatives to improve 
performance.
... and what i did to eradicate the problem was ... training, 
coaching, information. I have my team meeting every Monday, 
where they all know by ten o’clock they’re in my training room, 
meeting room, ready with their figures,.... So, they come with 
them, their sales, their wastage, their losses for the week and 
their personnel cost, for the week. So, we’ll discuss it then, ... 
the department manager that’s not doing well, he knows that 
come next meeting, oh no! I don’t want to share my sales with 
ali my colleagues and they do better.
102
Incident No. 34
A number of the respondents emphasised their own role in coaching staff to 
achieve better results. This reflects a recognition on their part that a positive 
disposition is important to a process of development. Having identified 
weaknesses, it is important in the first instance to establish that the relevant staff 
have the appropriate skills and competence to execute the task effectively. It is 
too easy, and some managers suggested rather lazy to seek to blame staff, when 
this may not be very fair.
In the following quote, the manager of one of the larger stores provides detail on 
how he delegates responsibilities and duties to members of his staff, if somewhat 
immodestly. Significantly, it includes how he follows up to ensure that the task 
was done properly. Again it Illustrates his approach to dealing with the situation. 
His method can be seen as having lasting benefits and is more than just an 
immediate remedy. The role of effective communication can be identified.
How do you manage your people? Like you've got ten people 
working for you, how do you delegate? So when you delegate, 
what do you do?... I also make sure you know, I follow up. I go 
back, check if it's been done... thank you very much. Well done.
Or, if it's not good enough,... give them instant feedback
...this is not good enough ... what's happening? Oh, I don't 
know how. Okay, I'll show you how. You know, and, and,... so 
all those things put together, ... You'll have a successful 
business. So, I think the key thing is people management and 
that's what's helped me.
General Comment/RH
Personal Behaviour
A large component of the perceptions found in this study with regard to managing 
people, relate to the respondents’ view of their own personal behaviour. There is 
a clear implication that because the store manager is a focus of attention for all
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employees that work in store and that employee behaviour is susceptible to their 
influence, then it is important to get this right. At a basic level, a number of 
respondents referred to their physical profile. The following quote suggests a 
very clear idea about the difference that it makes:
If I'm around, if I'm talking to people, it (the task in hand) can 
start at quarter to seven; if I'm not around, it can start at quarter 
to nine. My ...the difference is... in any business I have been, 
the role or the figure as a store manager is vital
General comment/HG
All of these stores in this study trade for extended hours, typically from 7am until 
10pm, and for seven days a week. For even the smallest stores this requires 
staff working different shift patterns to cover the trading hours. If the manager is 
to maintain a visible profile to all staff in the store, this is a challenge in itself.
... / used to work mornings a lot and now, I try and do a couple 
of nights a week, because it's a completely different shop and 
well it looks lovely in the mornings, but in the evening after a 
whole day of people shopping, you can be a bit like that 
(laughs). Well ...the evening staff don't see any difference.
They kind of see that as a norm. So ... that kind of helped me 
get the store better. Just realising that.
Incident No. 5
Another manager summarises the balance to strike between having a profile on 
the shop floor and the other demands of running the store as follows:
Two types of manager. Manager that’s ... likes to work, work, 
work, stack shelves, stack shelves, stack shelves. The modern 
retail manager don’t do that. ... you buy-in say 50-50.
Obviously, you want to work with your staff to show leadership.
The other 50% is analysing the information.
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Incident No. 34
Beyond maintaining a presence, being seen on the shop floor, these interviews 
capture a number of examples of managers being self-conscious about their type 
of behaviour, when their staff can see them. The implication here is that they 
ought to be leading by example and conversely being careful not to let negative 
inferences have a "knock on" effect on the staff. There is a strong perception that 
managers should accentuate the positive and share a laugh on occasion, but that 
this should be moderated so as not to compromise on the working relationship.
I don't fear or threaten my staff at a ll... I have a very positive 
approach with them - I’m very laid-back; we always laughing 
and joking but then the Job has to be done... OK
General comment/HG
There is a perceived danger that negative behaviour, for example aggression, 
can "rub off' on the staff. This is particularly important during periods of under 
performance, as the manager will be the bearer of bad news in this context.
I'll be aware. .. . I f  I’m being negative and it’s rubbing off on 
people, and I think I’ll probably be more aware of things that are 
more ambiguous. But it’s not so easy to define... or to give 
evidence for
General comment WT
This respondent went on to speak of the realisation that he was allowing his 
frustration to manifest itself in the aggressive handling of shoplifters. He 
recognises this as poor personal behaviour that could have a negative impact on 
his own staff who were witness to these events. The following quote Is from 
another manager who also recognises this danger in his own behaviour. The 
quote is interesting for starting with a reflection on the need to be self-critical in 
the context of managing store performance. It captures something of the wrath of 
his own manager holding him to account and the subsequent need to moderate
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his own behaviour when trying to improve the performance of the store through 
his team:
Obviously, as a store manager, we are a KPI of ourself as well... 
we have to measure ourself... Obviously, the figure of the store 
manager has got an important role ...a vital role ...in terms of 
team work and team player... I tend... 99% of the time - to come 
into the store and basically ignore anything bad that could 
possibly affect me, like my mood... if I 'd ... rowed with my boss on 
the phone before I come here, for example. I tend to hide the bad 
things away from my team - even if I get a gap result bad one 
day, I'm not the sort of person who goes straight away outside 
and say: "No guys - this is no good" ...I always give time to my 
team... I think it would be very very unprofessional and unfair if 
something goes wrong to attack the team straight away, because 
... / think... I we all make mistake; we all human being, and 
mistakes are part of the human life. The majority of them knows 
when it's actually it's very good and when it's not.
General comment/HG
The quote reflects the need for sensitivity and a recognition of the human 
dimension, where mistakes are possible and a degree of tolerance is appropriate. 
Again, there is a balance involved. The same manager elsewhere in his 
interview speaks of the need to have high expectations.
Reference is made in other interviews to the significance of personal confidence 
for the manager. This is neatly summarised by the following quote:
.... a lot of it is confidence as weil... I need to be confident and 
where I am confident I perform very well. If my confidence gets 
knocked, my performance takes a downward turn.
Incident No. 37
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Some of the respondents spoke of situations where the store was 
underperforming and in response they sought to pick their moment, take a risk 
and then really push hard to make it come right. The manager, from whom the 
following quote is taken, reflected that this probably was dependent on the 
personal motivation of the manager:
Although it's not a huge team, we still have regular meetings.
. And I put to them ... that we don't sell enough fresh foods.
There's always gaps. It always looks, not quite right. Why don't 
we increase the profiles, which will tell the computer we are going 
to want more stock.... Let's gamble, because what we are doing 
now is not helping. So, we increased this. I passed it through my 
area manager. He didn't think it was such a clever Idea, but he 
said just to try it for a week or two, and if the waste starts to build 
up, you know, we'd better reanalyse things and but, it's your store
Incident No. 38
This quote details the adjustment made to the automated replenishment built into 
the inventory management system. The store manager was able to increase the 
stock levels of fresh foods held in store. If successful, this would improve the 
availability for the customer and then sales levels. However, it carried a 
significant risk that waste levels would increase dramatically because the sales 
would not be realised. It is an interesting example because on the one hand 
there is a distinctly retail-specific feel to it, but it also reflects a very personal 
willingness to take a bold step and bear the associated risk, to address an 
ongoing situation where performance was deteriorating. There are other 
examples of actions that represent more of a step change to practice, than mere 
incremental adjustments.
To finish with, one manager is clearly driven to stay one step ahead of his field 
manager, when it comes to managing performance:
I don't like my boss coming in every five minutes, you haven't done 
this, you haven’t done that. What I do is, I go out and get information
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out of the system, implement it and he walks through the door and 
goes wow! That’s good.
General comment/RH
In summary, these interviews provide insight to the actions taken by managers in 
response to performance information, as perceived by the managers themselves. 
These can be categorised as retail specific actions and those that are more 
generally associated with people management. There is significant reflection on 
the extent to which the store managers own personal behaviour impacts on their 
staff and through to the likely impact that will have on store performance.
I say ... there is... let's say ...the operational side, which is... 
like ...the stock, the compliance, and everything else... and the 
team side - but, as a store manager, I personally feel it's the 
team is what make the business... it's what drives the business 
fonward...
General comment/HG
Perceptions of time
Operational
The transcripts were analysed to explore respondent perceptions of time in the 
context of their use of performance information. Once again, it is appropriate to 
distinguish between the management of retail operations and the management of 
people. In terms of retail operations there is a very strong sense that product 
availability underpins sales and that the effects can be very immediate. Poor 
availability will have a prompt and negative effect on sales performance.
However, there is also a recognition that sales can build over a longer period, if 
there is a sustained effort to improve and maintain availability, as illustrated by 
the quotes from incident numbers 39 and 45 below. As already noted, unplanned 
events can compromise availability. A single late delivery can have an effect that 
is short-term and has little lasting impact. The inventory management glitches 
such as the failing electronic delivery note can create availability problems over
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the ensuing week, but again is relatively short time. However, inadequate stock 
profiles in the automated ordering system as illustrated by incident number 38, 
can have a more enduring effect.
So then you know that it's going to generate another repeat 
order, which is obviously going to be not what you want It's just 
going to be what you had last week. So that's going to have a 
knock-on effect on the waste. ... it goes on from there really....
Incident No. 8
... and you can see throughout, week after week, there has 
always been increasing... I say, even this morning... I've got 
the latest one... we are again top of the region again for the 
week
incident No. 39
there was like a catalyst for me of, of.... as it started to improve, 
you really get behind it and then, you really get on top of it. You 
get the stock in, you keep pumping it in all the time and it just 
went... you know, then it just went on its own.
Incident No. 45
A number of the store managers refer to sales budgets/targets and their role in 
motivating or driving performance improvement. This implies a longer term view 
of managing performance; one that extends well beyond a delivery being several 
hours late.
People
As was noted in the section on store managers’ use of their own informal 
indicators, several respondents perceive a number of causal links in a chain that 
comprise performance improvement through people management. In summary, 
the store manager has a role to play in promoting a happy working environment
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for staff. Happy staff will be more productive and availability will improve as a 
result. Customers will be happy as a result of being able to find what they were 
looking for and from the cheerful interactions with store staff. Happy customers 
will become more loyal. Sales and profitability both increase overtime. Some 
respondents saw this as either a virtuous or vicious circle, depending on the 
direction of travel. This can be illustrated with the following quote:
... if you're not aware of your emotions, you can find that your 
negative approach starts to manifest itself in physical form and 
that rubs off on your management team and hence... therefore, 
it will rub off on to the staff... and probably rub off onto the 
customer's perception, so ... it has a doubling effect of 
negativity. I mean it can become a vicious circle, if you are not 
aware of what's going on.
Incident No.37
A number of the respondents regard the resolution of people related problems as 
key to addressing underperformance. Given the causal links described here, the 
implication is that performance management has a much longer term perspective 
when it comes to managing people.
Perceptions of Fairness
Having conducted pilot interviews, minor changes were made to the protocol.
One of these was to add a question to the end of the interview, after the critical 
incidents had been elicited, asking whether respondents felt the company system 
for measuring store performance was a fair one. Analysing the transcripts on this 
basis, most but not all of the relevant material identified is in response to this 
question. It should be noted that the bias potential is much greater than with the 
CIT technique adopted for the front end of the interview.
There is a pervasive sense through these interviews that broadly the budgets and 
targets used by the GO are challenging, in what Is seen as a difficult trading 
environment, but essentially fair. Most of these managers do believe that setting
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targets is an appropriate tool for higher management to use in pursuit of stronger 
performance. This is captured in the following quotation forming part of the 
answer to the direct question:
I think it is (fair), because they monitor you on sales. Customer 
focus is another one um... where they come round and do the 
mystery shop. ... when we was in CX, we had a similar thing ... 
where we had about eight objectives we were being managed 
on and the co-op now are going down to... I think its  about 
five... main ones that they’re looking at. ... it’s a pretty fair 
system, because you’ve always got to have something that 
you’ve got to be able to shoot for
General CommentAA/L
However, whilst the system is broadly seen as fair, it does generate an adverse 
reaction from some store managers. The 00  uses the information in the 
corporate system to benchmark stores against each other. The principle behind 
this is that stores of a similar size ought to be comparable to each other. 
However, for some managers in the study, this was perceived as distinctly unfair 
in that it failed to take account of the unique constraints present in their store 
environment. This particular manager was passionate about it:
So, I am being judged against a manager who might have an 
enormous warehouse, with ail the facilities, and they can 
manoeuvre their store, however it's going to suit them. I think 
that's very unfair. ... why would I bother? ... they will say to 
me, this manager can. Ah but it's not that store.
General Oomment/MB
Another manager reflects on whether the pressure placed on managers to 
achieve targets. In his view it is entirely appropriate to use "surveillance", his 
language for the corporate monitoring system as a performance management
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technique, but is very conscious of the negative impact that using poor 
performance figures to chastise store managers and staff, could have.
Several of the respondents reflect on what they perceive as the limited picture of 
store operations that the selected corporate measures, convey to head office. In 
their view, there is a lack of understanding or appreciation by both field managers 
and senior management within the organisation, of the true reality of managing 
retail operations at the front line. Relying on a relatively small number of 
quantitative KPIs, presents a very partial view of what store managers and their 
staff are doing in pursuit of stronger performance. There is a clear sense of 
resentment and injustice over this. The corporate system is seen as somewhat 
crude.
They haven't got to worry about somebody phoning in sick and 
there's only two people on the checkouts, and the customers 
have just thrown a basket at one of my checkout operators, 
because they couldn't get served in time. Another person has 
just kicked a stand down and I know my area manager is going 
to come in the next day and look at that stand and say why is it 
a mess? And there is no point in telling him because... it sounds 
like the dog ate my homework. ... coz as I say, it's no 
quantitative evidence in there.
General commentA/VT
/ think people in higher management have got this idea that 
everything should be right and perfect.... and in an ideal world 
that could, could happen.
General Comment/Rof
A similar lack of appreciation for what goes on at store level is reflected in the 
following quote. In the view of this manager the expectation to deliver new 
initiatives was too great. He spoke of frustration with demands on him to attend 
meetings and then to implement changes to working practices back at store, at
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frequent intervals. He was keen to point out that making such changes, with staff 
that work across different shifts during the trading week, was especially 
demanding.
In his view, introducing new initiatives was taking him away from what he should 
be doing i.e. running the store. He felt that some of these changes sometimes 
compromised his own credibility when dealing with staff who were being paid a 
little more than the national minimum wage. As this quote suggests, a store 
manager’s enthusiasm for implementing new initiatives, is not helped by a failure 
to abort the scheme promptly when it fails:
Unfortunately, when they (senior managers) have an idea, its 
majored to work, whether it's good, bad or ugly. And I think that 
demoralises staff... we're standing there saying, but it don't 
bloody work, and they are like, well it's their idea and it's going 
to work
Incident No. 26
As has already been noted, a number of the incidents related to situations or 
events caused by factors beyond the control of the store manager. There is an 
underlying implication running through the transcripts that it is unfair when the 
corporate performance measurement system reflects the negative impact of 
these events without recognising this perceived lack of control. The following 
quotes explicitly recognised the frustration. The first of these relate to problems 
with the punctuality of deliveries:
... it is pointless for us, or pointless to go on the phone... 
because you're not gonna change it.
General Comment/HG
it is still counted as waste.... even it wasn't my fault... you're 
stiii charged... and I think it's really unfair... OK
General Comment/HG
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In summary, the broad perception of these store managers is that budgets were 
tough but fair. Perhaps unsurprisingly, issues of accountability do generate a 
sense of injustice. This may be accentuated by conducting the survey at a time 
when sales targets were perceived as difficult to achieve. There is some 
suggestion that the corporate KPI system is relatively crude and that it does not 
help senior managers understand the reality of retail operations.
Unintended behaviour
The final question in the store manager interviews, added after the pilot, was to 
ask respondents whether in their opinion the corporate management system 
could encourage any behaviours that were not intended by the CC. Some 
caution should be exercised in analysing the findings. Whilst by the end of the 
interview respondents could be expected to be more relaxed and have developed 
some sort of rapport with the interviewer, it is reasonable to assume that they 
may have been somewhat wary of this line of questioning.
Most responses reflect some consideration given to the scope that store 
managers might have to abuse the system, either by circumventing it or by some 
other creative means. The answers include a wide range, extending from a flat 
denial that cheating the system was possible, through to the assertion that 
cheating was widespread amongst colleagues. This first quote represents the 
view that it is not possible to get round the system:
... no we can't trick the system because this is what our... the 
system I am foiiowing is a very, very advanced system...
Even the, ... when I say system, whatever I am wasting, the 
system knows it.
General comment/AF
In the subsequent dialogue, this respondent appeared to soften the rather 
unequivocal position reflected in this quote. Rather less explicitly he 
subsequently appears to accept that it might be possible, if not the right thing to
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do. At the other end of the spectrum, some respondents believed that cheating 
the system was rife. The following quotes illustrate this perception:
but a lot of stores.. used to go round and put one in their book 
stocks and ail that so it never showed on their report. .. .you are 
always going to get people that will try and buck that system
General comment/WL
But apparently, if you waste one a day, you still hit that 
avaiiability. Whether you bake it or not. Whether you sell it or 
not. if you are wasting one a day you can hit your availability.
So, managers could be just going 'Til waste that, even if it 
doesn't exist". Just to hit their scores. Which obviously wiii go 
onto either their wastage or leakage. So there are flaws in the 
system, but it ail depends how honest and... motivated the 
manager is at the time.
General comment/SW
Between these two positions, several respondents recognised the possibility that 
store managers could cheat the system, by making manual adjustments to stock 
records for example. Some felt that the system did not encourage dysfunctional 
behaviour, but that such behaviour was nonetheless possible. These 
respondents held the view that cheating the system required a sustained effort 
and was not therefore worthwhile.
As previously noted a strong sense of the pressure on these managers to 
improve performance runs across most of these transcripts. The popular 
perception is that underperformance is reflected in the corporate KPIs and this is 
then used by senior managers as a "stick" with which to beat the store manager. 
As the following example illustrates, it is entirely possible that such pressure on 
the individual could manifest itself in behaviours that were not intended:
I've become more aware of the shoplifters entering the store.
And my approach, whereas it was always very measured,
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...started to become a touch more erratic and desperate and 
aggressive if you iike.
Incident No. 37
This store manager could recognise more aggression building up in his own 
behaviour and his concern with this, was the effect that would have on his own 
team.
As has already been noted, the corporate KPIs are perceived as being relatively 
crude and yet they form the basis for management by a higher level, remote from 
the realities of retail store operations. In the view of some of these respondents 
there is a danger of encouraging unintended behaviours by exerting too much 
pressure on the basis of underperformance, as captured by the corporate KPIs. 
Firstly, this can engender negative behaviours in the manager, which then rubs 
off on the management team, staff and can impact customer perceptions. There 
is then a danger of a vicious circle. In a similar vein such pressure can 
compromise self-confidence, which is seen as important to being a leader and 
effective coach. Last but not least, it can cause stress and frustration. One 
manager describes the issue as follows
...the powers that be don't see that sort of thing, they don't 
capture that... they don't realise and I think they are, quite often, 
too separate from the reality of retail and trade, and they're 
looking only at the quantitative... things. They are looking at the 
KPIs, the figures and the profit drivers and they don't see the 
amount of good relationship, communal spirit that goes on 
within the co-op. But this.... only happens, when people are 
happy and if you are pushing them too hard... people react very 
strange ways under pressure.
...too much emphasis on results and targets, sometimes 
detracts from things that are not seen like good management 
behaviour and.... the way we are dealing with customers.
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General comment IWT
Arguably, it is the way that the measures are being used that is the source of the 
problem here, rather than the existence of the measure itself. Another manager 
complains that a great deal Is expected of store managers by way of achieving 
targets, without continual additional demands being placed on them. In these 
somewhat irreverent words of this respondent, speaking about his regional 
director:
So ROD farts, and everyone else worries about it Which fair 
enough, at the end of the day, he's the boss. But sometinfies ... 
sometimes i think it can be counter productive. It takes us away 
from what we are actually here to do.
Incident No.26
To conclude, the critical incident front-end of this interview protocol did not reveal 
any strong examples of dysfunctional behaviour. When respondents were asked 
directly about the subject, there were a range of responses forthcoming. Most 
managers appeared to be aware of how they could mislead the information 
system, for example in its assessment of availability. However, it is not possible 
to gauge the true level of incidence where this type of dysfunctional behaviour is 
concerned.
Some of these respondents believe that it is possible for managers to generate 
unintended behaviours through their use of KPIs. The perception Is that in a 
situation where the store is underperforming, too much pressure on individuals 
can create negative behaviours, which may just exacerbate the problem. This is 
underpinned by the belief that happy staff are more productive, dealt with in an 
earlier section of these findings.
Chapter Conclusions
Two senior managers from CC were interviewed to help understand the context 
in which these store managers have to function. These senior managers provide 
an outline of the corporate performance indicators in operation and confirm the
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pre-eminence of sales above all other measures in use. They share the view that 
a good store manager has a retail instinct that means they are not reliant upon 
the corporate system to know how the store is performing. The interviews with 
store managers in this study appear to support this view.
The key findings from the review of the literature were presented in the 
conclusions to chapter two, using the model of performance measurement and 
management in Figure 1, as a framework. The key findings from the analysis of 
CIT interviews in this research project are now presented using the same format;
Corporate performance indicators and scorecards
1. Sales levels dominate store manager perceptions of performance. Store 
managers are very sensitive to sales in relation to budgets and other 
benchmarks. This is articulated relative to other financial performance 
indicators; specifically waste, leakage and personnel costs. Other financial 
targets are more achievable if sales levels are meeting budgets. The direct 
relationship between availability and sales Is explicitly recognised.
Negative influences affecting sales and perceived as beyond the control of 
store managers, create a strong sense of injustice.
2. Corporate measures of availability appear very effective in influencing 
manager behaviours in pursuit of stronger performance. All other non- 
financial performance indicators have a low profile in store manager 
responses, raising possible concerns about their effectiveness.
3. Store managers expressed concerns that the corporate reliance on 
financial performance indicators provides only a partial view of the reality 
of managing performance at store level. There is a significant qualitative 
dimension to managing performance that is not captured by the system.
Managers’ performance indicators
4. Store managers use visual cues as indicators of prospective performance, 
but recognise their fallibility. Unplanned events, of which late deliveries, 
systems failures and staff absentees are frequent examples, typically have 
a negative impact on performance.
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5. The disposition of store staff is perceived as linked to performance. Happy 
staff will be more productive and provide a better customer service 
interaction. More productive staff will improve availability. Customers will 
be more loyal to a store with high levels of availability and a positive 
atmosphere. In turn, financial performance will improve. The reverse effect 
is also possible, through the same causal links between unhappy staff and 
poor financial performance. Some managers saw this effect as cyclical.
Manager behaviours/decisions
6. in terms of what is actually done with performance information, these 
managers recognise the basic requirements to operate a legal and safe 
store that complies with company standards, policies and procedures. It is 
then possible to identify reactive actions in response to unplanned events 
and more proactive use of performance information via a range of 
analytical techniques. Actions to maintain availability in support of sales 
come through very strongly.
7. Store managers own the responsibility for the development of store staff. 
The need for effective communication and the promotion of teamwork 
come through very strongly as prerequisites of high-performance.
8. Store managers recognise the potential for their own personal demeanour 
to "rub off' on their staff. This is an important precursor to the chain effect 
identified above. It also represents a particular challenge during periods 
when the manager is under pressure because the store is performing 
below expectations. In these circumstances, if the individual allows 
frustration to manifest itself in negative behaviours, then this can further 
exacerbate the performance problem.
These findings from the research will be analysed using the previously reviewed 
existing literature, in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER 5: ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
UNDERSTANDING THE CONTEXT
The research approach for this study is seeking to understand performance 
management from the perspective of store managers. Insight stems from 
exploring the meanings assigned by these respondents to the constituent parts of 
their world; in this case the food retail stores in which they work and the 
structures that connect them to the larger business organisation. Key to this 
interpretivist approach is to devote proper attention to the context in which the 
study is conducted.
The GO’S food retail operation is broadly similar in key respects to the standard 
model of retail organisational structure in the UK. The CC operates a vertically 
integrated supply chain, in some instances extending further backwards than 
their competitors. It operates multiple outlets that are geographically dispersed 
and centrally controlled via a field management team. This is similar to the 
market leading UK food retailers (Grugulis et al, 2010). However, the store 
portfolio is mostly convenience stores and small supermarkets, and therefore 
lacks some scale advantages enjoyed by superstores. These stores are more 
vulnerable to changing local trading conditions, such as new competitors. The 
business has invested in enabling technologies to support automated inventory 
management and facilitate store operations (McGoldrick, 2002), but systems are 
not at the leading edge of practice, as has been highlighted by the recent CX 
acquisition. Relative to the hierarchy within CC’s food retail operation, store 
managers are junior managers and as such are modestly remunerated. Senior 
management’s expectations of store-level management are similarly modest. 
According to the Regional Operations Director a mere 20% of this population in 
the South East warrant a Green rating (Acceptable/meeting targets) or above. 
There is also a perception from some of the store manager respondents in this 
study that some colleagues are of limited calibre. As reported by Grugulis et al 
(2010) most front line retail staff are paid little more than statutory minimum wage 
levels, and the CC is no different in this respect. In the view of some managers in
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this study, the expectation to continually change working practices of poorly paid 
front-line staff was unreasonable.
There is a shared perception from all levels of respondent in this study that 
managing performance has not always enjoyed the emphasis that it justified and 
that this is changing. The Regional Operations Director described the cumulative 
negative effects that ignoring a performance issue could have on the individuals 
concerned and on the wider organisational culture (his label was the “comfy” co­
op). The historical explanation for this is beyond the remit of this study. It may 
be that it is rooted in a consumer co-operative’s raison d’etre as service to its 
consumer members, rather than a more narrowly defined profit maximisation, as 
for private enterprise. It could be that the less tangible provision of service to the 
membership deeply embedded in the organisational culture, introduces a degree 
of ambiguity to the performance management agenda. Whilst ultimately the 
sustainability of the business is dependent on financial outcomes, there could be 
some trade-off between profit maximisation as the imperative and service 
provision. Again, some store manager respondents observe a lack of 
performance orientation in some of their colleagues. The extent to which this 
could be embedded in the culture of the organisation is a consideration. Bititci et 
al’s 2006 case study based on action research, found that organisational culture, 
coupled with management style could influence performance management 
outcomes and vice versa. They found that implementing new performance 
management systems could positively influence management style and foster an 
“achievement culture”. Findings from this study would suggest that store 
managers recognise a stronger emphasis on performance generally and that 
some use performance information to promote participation in a performance 
agenda amongst their staff. It is however, not possible to gauge how new this 
store level activity is.
The respondents identify a development of the performance management system 
over time. Whilst financial measures of performance continue to dominate, there 
is growing recognition of non-financial indicators. According to the senior 
managers interviewed, the elements for a balanced scorecard are all present and 
a new “dashboard” should be ready for introduction in 2011. Arguably, this is well
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behind the widespread adoption elsewhere (Marr and Schiuma 2003, Neely 
2005, Witcher and Chau, 2008). Even without a fully developed balance 
scorecard, performance management is firmly on the agenda for CC store 
managers and they are aware of increasing emphasis on a wider range of 
measures. In the view of the ROD, store managers are closely managed by the 
field teams.
The use of information systems by central management to prescribe tasks for the 
store manager and then monitor execution, is certainly apparent in this study, 
which supports the findings of Grugulis (2010) in larger food retail outlets. The 
internal debate that this generates is whether store managers are asked to do too 
much. There appears to be some consensus between store managers and their 
bosses, that indeed the added burden is too great and that some tasks take the 
recipients away from what they should be focussing on. The senior view is that 
the list of demands or tasks could be streamlined, to make the store manager’s 
job simpler. The remote prescription and monitoring regime reported in the 
Grugulis (2010) does not appear to meet resistance from store managers, 
despite the limits to discretion that it imposed. This contrasts with recent 
research in the hospitality sector however, where Ahrens and Chapman (2007) 
found strong objections from restaurant managers to attempts by senior 
management to prescribe actions at unit level.
Corporate KPIs
The CC provide a number of KPIs for use by store managers. Of these, hard 
financial measures predominate and sales receive the greatest attention. The 
financial logic that store profitability is a function of sales revenue and cost 
expenditure, emerges very strongly in this study. The store manager 
respondents almost universally acknowledge their focus on sales as the means 
of keeping their finger on the pulse of store performance. The senior managers 
interviewed confirm the primary status of sales for this purpose. As reported by 
the CD in this study, rewards in the form a bonus paid on top of salary, are linked 
to performance for a store manager, and this is the case in competing retailers 
(Grugulis, 2010). For a CC store manager the bonus is triggered by achieving
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sales targets. Further enhancements are then possible for achievement against 
other performance measures, but not without reaching the sales target first. The 
corporate reward system reinforces the primary status of sales as the measure of 
store performance. The logic here would be to provide extrinsic motivation to 
drive store sales. There is some disagreement in the literature as to the effect 
that linking rewards to performance might have on intrinsic motivation. In the 
comprehensive review of Rynes et al (2005), they do not necessarily see a 
conflict, but do caution that monetary rewards are powerful and should be 
administered carefully to avoid unintended behaviours. Osterloh and Frey (2007) 
argue however, that bonuses will have a “crowding out” effect on intrinsic 
motivations. From this study it is not possible to judge whether the reward for 
achieving sales has any detrimental effects on other motivations. However, the 
bonus system does serve to emphasise the importance of driving sales.
The store managers have another rationale for a focus on sales which they 
explicitly recognise. From an accounting perspective, stores are profit centres, it 
is easier to achieve cost expenditure targets if the budgeted sales volume is 
being achieved. This does not mean that targets for waste, leakage and 
personnel will be realised just by achieving sales; rather that it will be more 
difficult without. Extending this cost-volume-profit relationship further, a small 
minority of store managers explicitly recognised that sales achieved above the 
budgeted level were likely to have a disproportionately positive effect on 
profitability. This again supports the logic of driving sales.
The financial measures discussed so far, are recognised in the literature as 
having limited capability to indicate future performance (Eccles, 1991) and this is 
a key rationale behind the development of the balanced scorecard (Kaplan and 
Norton, 1992). Whilst the development of such a scorecard is still limited to the 
higher levels of the regional operations team and has not reached store level, the 
CC has started to adopt non-financial measures as KPIs. Arguably, the 
availability of product is the core expectation of the grocery shopper. Effective 
retail service delivery is built around being able to find your food requirements on 
a shopping trip. Until relatively recently, it has not been easy to capture the real 
customer experience of availability. It is now possible for automated monitoring
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in the inventory management system to produce exception reports of product 
lines that appear to be unavailable in-store, based on their sales pattern, or lack 
of it. This report can then be used as a checklist for the store to follow up on.
The follow-up is a prescribed task, which in turn can be monitored. The system 
will know whether the "gap-check" has been conducted within the prescribed time 
limit. This has become standard practice in food retailing (see Grugulis et al, 
2010) and is an example of a non-financial performance indicator with a link to 
future financial outcomes in the form of sales revenue. Webb (2004) found 
higher levels of commitment from managers when the cause and effect links in 
the system were perceived as plausible. This study supports that finding.
The role of product availability as a prerequisite for achieving sales, is a 
pervasive theme that emerges from the store manager interviews. The gap 
check routines prescribed by the system oblige a daily engagement with in-store 
availability, but do not generate any negative reactions or frustrations. In the 
perceptions of these managers, offering availability or service capacity to the 
customer is a key responsibility and the system provides positive support in 
achieving this. In Webb’s (2004) language, the causal link is indeed plausible in 
the view of the store managers. To be critical, it could be argued that availability 
and sales are very closely aligned and that there is little scope to dispute the 
relationship between the two. Further, whilst this measure is not financial, the 
system is still generating a hard, quantitative score which may be a crude 
indication of a more qualitative assessment that the customer might provide. 
Finally, the system provides a partial view of availability, to be pragmatic. Whilst 
the availability principle applies to every stock line carried by the store, the 
system Is set up to monitor a selected core range which would include key 
commodities and promotional lines. It could be that the focus on core line 
availability is at the expense of availability in the non-core range, but there is no 
suggestion of this from this study.
The other non-financial corporate KPIs that are identified in this study, appear to 
have a relatively limited profile in the perception of the store managers. The CC 
use mystery shoppers in every store on a quarterly basis. Fundamentally, this is 
a covert, checklist approach designed to reflect customer experience. They
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generate a score. However, a more recent addition has been to include some 
more subjective, qualitative feedback. Managers are required to post up the 
scores and feedback on staff notice-boards, along with appropriate actions in 
response. There is little to suggest that this performance measurement has 
much additional influence. Similarly, a staff survey introduced two years ago and 
conducted annually to produce an “engagement" score, finds very little profile in 
the responses from store managers in this study. This could be a lack of 
perceived plausibility (Webb, 2004) in the link between softer measures such as 
the mystery shopper feedback or staff perceptions, and financial performance 
outcomes, it could be that the relative infrequency of these measures has the 
effect of reducing their priority. It is also possible that in the store managers’ 
perception, these measures offer little for the purpose of managing performance.
According to the Commercial Director in this study, there are other softer 
corporate KPIs that are calculated on a store-by-store basis. These include 
membership card presentation rates, labour turnover adjusted to reflect store 
manager accountability and a “stability” index based on staff absentee rates. It is 
not clear whether these are available directly to store managers or are for the use 
of field management. None of these measures surface in any of the store 
manager interviews in this study. This is perhaps surprising. Given that for 
example, staff absentees generate a number of negative incidents in this study, 
this would suggest that the plausibility of the causal link was well-recognised. 
However, a stability index is retrospective and perhaps therefore a poor indicator 
of future performance.
The corporate KPIs adopted by the CC’s food retail operations division are 
dominated by sales-led financial measures which in themselves are poor 
predictors of future outcomes (Eccles 1991, Kaplan and Norton, 1992). The only 
non-financial measure that appears to enjoy a real and shared recognition is that 
of availability. Another recent qualitative study sought to establish that different 
levels of employees shared a view that performance indicators had a positive 
influence on performance (Ukko et al, 2007). In this study, availability is the only 
indicator that is legitimised by such a shared vision. Both senior managers 
describe a broader list of corporate KPIs than store managers appear to find
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useful for managing performance. To be critical of availability as an indicator, its 
outlook is very short-term or even immediate. Poor availability now, is early 
warning of depressed sales over the next few trading hours. However, its power 
as an indicator stems from identifying the preceding links in the chain that drive it 
and directing management attention to maintaining acceptable availability.
Whilst there Is a well supported theme that endorses the use of the adopted 
corporate KPIs within the business, there was a view, well-articulated by one 
store manager in this study, that the reliance on quantitative indicators in the 
corporate system provided a limited view of what goes on at store level. This 
accords with rationale for the development of balanced scorecards (Kaplan and 
Norton, 1992). From this perspective, there was a more qualitative, less tangible 
dimension to the reality of food retailing that was not susceptible to capture by the 
corporate KPIs. This one respondent gave the example of a violent Incident at 
the checkout, which took time to deal with and caused distress amongst the staff 
on duty, effectively distracting them from their normal duties and with implications 
for subsequent performance. The manager’s impatience stemmed from the 
failure of the corporate system to reflect this worldly disruption. Other managers, 
less articulate in criticising the dependence on quantitative indicators, 
nonetheless endorse this view and express frustration. In their view, unplanned 
events such as systems failures, for which they had limited responsibility, would 
still be reflected in quantitative measures of outcomes. Store managers also 
recognised a positive side to this qualitative dimension, such as good 
management practice in customer service, which again was not captured by the 
corporate system.
The senior managers interviewed for this study implied that some margin or 
allowance is built into quantitative measures of performance to cover for the 
realities of store operations, recognising that all stores will experience unplanned 
events from time to time. Some store managers would appear to accept this 
holistic view by showing little or no sense of frustration with the system. For 
others, it appears to be much more sensitive. For example, for this latter 
category, the use of benchmarking comparisons between stores that are 
quantitatively similar in the way they are measured by the system, is extremely
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crude. Less tangible factors such as delivery schedule reliability or stock-room 
layout can have a significant influence on retail operations and can make such 
comparisons difficult.
There is nothing in this study to suggest that the indicators adopted are “systems- 
led" or generated because the system has the capability, as opposed to having 
performance management utility (Wilson, 2000).
Financial KPIs may be historic in nature and have limited direct predictive value, 
but they remain a potential source of useful information to facilitate understanding 
and inform performance management actions. They are headline figures; usually 
aggregates with several elements. The senior managers perceive a danger in 
this as an acceptable KPI reading can be masking a problem within, that is offset 
by other stronger contributions. More positively however, several store manager 
respondents reported the facility within the system to disaggregate KPIs into 
separate components as a first step towards understanding the true nature of an 
issue and doing something about it. In such a situation, the store arrived at a 
particular result and the financial KPIs can be analysed to discover how that 
happened. Financial KPIs may be historic, but they are not without utility in 
proactive performance management.
In summary, the corporate KPIs in this study are dominated by financial 
measures, perceived as appropriate at both store level and by senior managers. 
The development of softer qualitative measures is recognised, but as yet appears 
to have a relatively weak profile in performance management activity. There is a 
recognisable prescribe and monitor regime at store level, similar to elsewhere in 
this retail sector (Grugulis et al, 2010), even if the scale of operations is much 
smaller.
Managers’ Performance Indicators
One of the principal research objectives in this study was to explore where retail 
store managers drew performance information from. Whilst most commercial 
organisations operate formal performance measurement (Franco-Santos and 
Bourne, 2005), this research project has been careful not to assume that the
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corporate system provides the only performance information used by these 
managers. Specifically, the research design adopted here was developed to 
allow the source of performance information used by store managers to emerge 
from the data collected without prejudice from the instrument. Respondents 
could choose to identify the corporate indicators, but equally might select an 
informal one of their own. Given the limitations of the corporate KPIs explored in 
the previous section, it would perhaps be surprising if experienced store 
managers did not draw on their experience and tacit knowledge in specific 
situations to use other sources of information to influence performance 
management decisions. As Pfeffer and Sutton (1999) observe, this is not 
something the corporate system could capture. On this basis, it is perhaps 
surprising that more academic attention has not devoted to managers using their 
own performance indicators.
To start with the views of the senior managers interviewed for this study, both 
expressed the view that effective store managers did not need a corporate 
system to tell them how the store was performing. The CD used the expression 
“retail nous" to describe this quality in a retail operations manager. Both senior 
managers had worked at store level, implied that they themselves possessed this 
faculty and claimed to be able to detect it very quickly by visiting stores and 
interacting with store managers. The Regional Operations Director described 
being able to pick-up signs of a problem from the store atmosphere and then 
following this up by questioning store staff to discover the specific detail of the 
case.
Notably, the interviews with store managers in this study yield strong examples of 
informal performance indicators being used; those other than from the corporate 
system. Bourne et al (2005) in their study, found evidence of managers of 
higher-performing units making use of their own performance information, with 
the company system having a secondary role in confirming what was known 
already, but there is little other previous research that identifies such behaviour. . 
It is not possible from the findings of this study to conclude that the use of 
managers’ own performance indicators is limited to managers in higher-
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performing stores. However, this study would suggest that performance 
information from outside of the corporate system Is used by store managers.
The first category of managers’ Pis can be labelled as relating to retail operations 
specifically. From these, managers draw on their experience and tacit knowledge 
to recognise a performance implication. Most unplanned events create 
distractions or obstructions for what might be regarded as normal processes, 
come into this category but it is wider than just these. So when the system fails 
to log the Electronic Delivery Note, the manager can see straight away that there 
will be a negative effect on inventory management in the coming days. This will 
culminate in an availability problem, followed closely by depressed sales and 
disappointed customers. It is useful to reflect on what the corporate system is 
doing in this situation. The manager is aware of the performance issue well 
before the system flags it up, but is sensitive because when it does appear as a 
performance issue and is followed up by the field manager, it will need 
explaining. In such cases the corporate system has a retrospective monitoring 
role rather than itself offering any predictive insight, but in doing so should still 
encourage timely action from the store manager. This pressure exerted by the 
monitoring role, is reflected in the findings from this study.
Arguably, the more powerful finding in this part of the study is the significance 
afforded to the disposition of the store staff by their manager in this context. As 
might be expected there are varying degrees to which this is articulated by the 
respondents, but it remains a strong theme across the interview scripts. Staff 
disposition is key to getting the job done, and therefore to performance 
outcomes. Essentially, in the perception of store managers, if staff are happy 
then they will be more productive. In turn, availability will improve and customers 
will be happy on two counts; they can find the merchandise they are looking for 
and they will enjoy interacting with the staff. In turn, customers that are happy 
are more likely to be loyal. This will all benefit sales and therefore be reflected in 
the financial performance of the store. Some respondents recognised a bi­
directional force between staff and customers, with a mutual effect. Customers 
enjoy the positive experience of interacting with happy staff, but equally staff 
enjoy dealing with happy customers. Some respondents recognise a cyclical
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effect. This study therefore finds store managers identifying the disposition of 
their staff as crucial to performance outcomes and going on to identify a series of 
causal links along the way. The potential for a virtuous cycle is perceived 
alongside the potential for reverse polarity and a ‘vicious’ circle of unhappy staff 
having a negative influence on customers, and driving them away, along with 
poor financial outcomes. One further causal link in this chain is provided by the 
influence that the manager has over staff disposition. Whilst there are many 
other contributory factors, a number of the respondents recognise their own part 
in promoting and maintaining a happy crew. This calls for self-awareness. The 
store manager’s disposition can “rub-off” on subordinates. Again, respondents 
recognise the potential for both positive and negative forces where this is 
concerned.
That store managers in this study perceive a chain of causal links that culminate 
in financial outcomes of performance, does of course find resonance with existing 
literature. Firstly, Fitzgerald et al (1991) identify “quality of service” as a 
performance dimension of a “determinant” type. Determinant performance 
dimensions combine to deliver financial outcomes; a “result” category of 
performance (Fitzgerald et al, 1991). This simple relationship is supported by the 
store manager perception of causal links emerging from this study. Fitzgerald et 
al (1991), classified services on the basis of customer volume and the degree of 
customisation required for each service encounter. It should be noted that self- 
service, food retailing is close to the “mass service” end of Fitzgerald et al’s 
(1991) spectrum. The service delivery is relatively low involvement as far as the 
customer is concerned. However, the customer interaction that does exist 
provides some opportunity to differentiate the service offering in a context where 
other options are relatively limited.
The store managers in this study appear to recognise much of the logic behind 
the “service profit chain” as developed by Heskett et al (1997). In the language of 
these authors, employee satisfaction will engender customer satisfaction, through 
improved productivity and infectious enthusiasm communicated during the 
service encounter. Customer satisfaction is positively related to customer loyalty 
and repeat patronage. Satisfied, loyal customers will result in improving sales
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and profitability. At the heart of this model, Heskett et al (1997) propose a 
“satisfaction mirror" where both employee and customer benefit from their 
experience of the service encounter, which creates a two-way virtuous cycle.
The customer is encouraged to come again and the employee to serve the next 
customer.
The rationale for each of these causal links emerges from the perceptions of the 
store managers in this study. Least explicit in terms of the breadth of support, are 
the influence of customers on staff and the relationship between customer 
satisfaction and customer loyalty. However, whilst no store manager refers 
explicitly to this academic model, there is recognition for its underlying logic. The 
service profit chain has been challenged elsewhere for empirical support being 
fragmented (Silvestro and Cross, 2000). These authors tested the model at store 
level in UK grocery retailing and did not find support for the link between 
employee satisfaction and store financial performance. The complexity of the 
inferred relationships means that there is a high prospect of failure and 
performance is contingent on 'many environmental and operational variables, 
which cannot all be captured in a model as simplistic as the service profit chain' 
(Silvestro and Cross, 2000). Care should be exercised with the apparent support 
that this study finds for the Heskett et al (1997) model. It offers nothing to test or 
prove the existence of the causal links. However, there is strong support here for 
the belief in its existence by store managers. As a footnote, the Regional 
Operations Director explicitly cites the model in his interview and identifies 
himself as a strong believer in its efficacy.
It is appropriate at this point to pay attention to the temporal dimension. Implied 
in the causal links identified in the preceding discussion, is the notion that 
performance effects take time to materialise. The benefits of a management 
action or decision may take time to work their way through the chain and manifest 
themselves as financial outcomes. This presents an endogeneity issue, 
particularly evident in positivist studies that attempt to capture and measure 
performance outcomes, that may extend across accounting periods (see for 
example, Ittner and Larckner, 1998). In this study, the store manager perspective 
is dominated by a short term trading perspective. As noted, there is an acute
131
awareness of the links between for example, unplanned events through to 
availability and then to sales, but the time-frame is extremely short. There is 
limited insight to longer-term perspectives. Similarly, my sense of the store 
manager view of staff disposition is related heavily to prospects for today’s 
trading. There is little explicit recognition of the need to promote a longer term, 
underlying staff satisfaction to generate stronger ‘stability’; the senior 
management term for low absenteeism. This is perhaps surprising when the 
negative downside of staff absenteeism on operations comes through very 
strongly and some managers recognise their own influence over staff disposition. 
It could be that this finding illustrates the danger of ‘myopia’ (Smith 1993, cited by 
Sobotka and Platts, 2009); a concentration on short-term issues at the expense 
of long-term outcomes. Senior management clearly believes that store managers 
can influence stability, but there is no explicit reflection of this view from the store 
managers themselves. Further, this appears to suggest the corporate use of 
mystery shoppers and the ‘talk back’ staff survey is relatively weak when it comes 
to influencing store manager thinking and behaviour.
The other insight in terms of time that this study generates, stems from situations 
such as new store openings, major refurbishments or format conversions. In 
these particular instances, a longer term perspective on the part of the store 
manager emerges. Performance improvement takes longer to affect than in 
normal day-to-day operations. The insight is limited as these situations are 
infrequent. In a new store context where the opening was in one of several 
phases of building development that included residential properties, the manager 
had to contend with building the customer base and training staff, most of whom 
were unfamiliar with retail operations. Performance eventually came up to and 
beyond the target level, but only slowly over a period of several months. In a 
format conversion, the store performance initially fell well short of target. The 
manager’s investigation led him to identify range and layout to be the problem. 
These merchandising decisions are made centrally and the store manager had to 
negotiate changes with head office decision makers. Performance improved, but 
again this trend extended over several months.
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What managers actually do with performance information
The second principal research objective in this study was to explore the use that 
store managers, responsible for front-line retail operations, made of the 
performance information available to them. As previously noted, part of the 
rationale for corporate KPIs is to have an influence over behaviour in pursuit of 
stronger performance outcomes (Franco and Bourne, 2005). Logic would 
suggest that measurement is not an end in itself. This second research objective 
was seeking insight to how measurements and indicators are used, whether they 
came from the corporate system or the manager’s own source of information. 
Radnor and Barnes (2007) call for research beyond measures adopted, and this 
study is addressing this demand.
Existing research on performance management as opposed to just measurement 
is relatively sparse. Bourne et al (2005) found all unit managers in their study 
using corporate information at a basic level to manage. However, what 
differentiated managers of higher performing units was that they actively drew on 
information from outside of the corporate system including from team meetings 
(but no further detail provided), made light use of facilities to analyse company 
data, used their own simple mental models on a day-to-day basis and promoted 
a "perpetual performance dialogue” (Bourne et al 2005). This does perhaps 
accord with the CC’s CD and his view of the retail “nous” that he would expect 
strong store managers to possess. At store level, this study cannot discriminate 
the higher performing stores or managers, from the remainder. All store 
managers were making use of the corporate system to manage performance. 
Unlike the Bourne et al (2005) findings, several of the respondents were making 
ample use of the facility to drill into the corporate data and analyse. It could be 
that the complexity of the operation in the repair shop (Bourne et al, 2005) was 
much less than in the food retailing context. Reference to the use of the 
manager’s own calculations is identifiable in only a small minority of interviews.
The “perpetual performance dialogue” identified above (Bourne et al, 2005) is 
supported by the findings of Ukko et al (2007) that higher levels of interactivity at 
unit level were associated with better performance. The need for effective
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communication is universally recognised by respondents of all levels in this study. 
The senior managers expect store managers to communicate. They explicitly 
recognise both strong communication skills as a quality of the good manager, 
and lack of communication as a cause of staff dissatisfaction. This view is 
endorsed to varying degrees by many of the store managers. In their perception, 
the job cannot be done without effective communication. The form that 
communication takes is development, training and coaching of individuals, along 
with overt monitoring and clear feedback. There is a clear recognition that team- 
working requires effective communication. A number of managers spoke of their 
promotion of team work. In this regard, performance management appears to 
feature as a significant part of the agenda in regular team meetings, as identified 
in other studies (Bourne et al 2005, Ukko et al 2007, Grugulis, 2010). With 
proper communication, it is possible to achieve a great deal. Without it, staff will 
lack engagement with the performance agenda and resist demands to respond 
and change.
The recent study in a UK food superstore environment by Grugulis et al (2010) 
found that front-line managers, had work tasks and routines that were heavily 
prescribed and monitored, were driven by challenging performance targets, 
enjoyed 'trivial freedoms' outside of centralised controls and yet were expected to 
“enthuse” and inspire those working for them. These researchers identify a 
“leadership" rhetoric permeating the organisations studied, which store managers 
adopted. The ability of the individual manager to “lead” others would take care of 
unplanned events that threatened store performance outcomes. A failure to 
overcome the adversity of the unplanned event at store level, was recognised by 
management including those at store level, as a failure of leadership. In the 
Grugulis et al (2010) study the corporate prescription and monitoring regime 
extended beyond the quantitative measures of retail operations and into the more 
qualitative dimensions, for example by providing team meeting agenda 
templates. Given that this study has been conducted in the same retail sector, 
albeit on a much smaller store scale, it is perhaps not surprising that similar 
findings emerge. The task prescription and surveillance regime is certainly 
recognisable, if limited to the very quantitative perspective of the corporate 
system. As previously noted, it could be that the CC has been relatively slower in
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developing its performance management priorities. The rhetoric within the 
business is built around the word ‘engagement’ with less use of the word 
‘leadership’. There appears to be a broad acceptance at store level of the 
corporate performance management systems in the Grugulis et al (2010) study, 
maybe reflecting the extensive use of rewards linked to performance, whilst in 
this study there is some dissent apparent. Ahrens and Chapman (2007) report 
strong resistance from restaurant managers in the hospitality sector to attempts 
by senior management to prescribe actions that should be taken. In this study, 
the resistance does not emerge as strongly. The situation is more that some 
managers reflect what they perceive as imperfections in the system.
There is a perception amongst store managers that their own profile and 
behaviour has an influence over the staff that work for them. At a very basic level 
there is consensus that the store manager should have shop-floor visibility, and 
not be shut away in an office. This has some very practical constraints. In the 
smallest stores, the manager is obliged to be hands-on and provide input to store 
processes beyond mere supervision. However, given the extended hours that all 
these stores operate, it can be difficult to maintain visibility in the eyes of all staff. 
There is some reflection that managers can become too immersed in the. 
operations processes themselves, to the detriment of a more objective overview 
of the store. Equally, some respondents observed that productivity slows 
dramatically without a visible presence from the store manager. There is a 
balance to strike.
The influence of the store manager is perceived as particularly important in 
seeking to maintain a positive disposition amongst the staff. The store manager 
respondents in this study recognise causal links in a chain extending from happy 
staff through to financial performance outcomes for the store, as explored in the 
previous section. Some managers then go on to identify the potential for their 
own disposition to “rub off’ on the staff. There is explicit recognition of the need 
to remain cheerful and positive, whilst maintaining discipline and getting the job 
done. This supports the findings in the Grugulis et al (2010) study, in which store 
managers were expected to inspire and enthuse staff to achieve targets, often in 
challenging circumstances. Some respondents in this study also saw a potential
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issue in situations where performance was not up to expectations. Pressure 
would be exerted on the store manager from the field team above, but great care 
should be taken not simply to cascade bad news straight down to store staff. 
There was a significant prospect that doing so would just exacerbate the 
problem. Disillusionment amongst staff would increase and this would have 
negative repercussions along the causal links in the chain. This finding would 
appear to endorse 'enabling' rather than ‘coercive’ use of bureaucratic controls, 
identified as options for ‘middle managers’ in the conceptual work of Adler and 
Borys (1996). Empirical research to test this link in similar environments is 
limited. Wouters (2009) found increased commitment from employees under an 
enabling regime, but the link to performance was only implied.
The impact of store manager disposition on staff disposition should perhaps not 
be overstated. It is rather a sensitive matter and some individuals might be 
naturally reticent to reflect on more personal issues. In this study it is only 
articulated by two of the respondents, both of whom had a more out-going 
personality. These individuals elected to provide more personal perspectives that 
extend across all their observations, than others who gave accounts that were 
more focused on the staff and operations that they were responsible for. Given 
that the interview protocol made no attempt to probe or elicit the influence of store 
manager disposition, it could well be that this view whilst appearing nominally to 
be a minority view, could actually enjoy more widespread support.
Another perspective that emerges from a small number of respondents in this 
study, is the need on occasion to be bold and to take a step change in operating 
practice, in order to achieve an improvement in performance. These managers 
noted that in situations where there was an apparent drift in performance, it was 
necessary to plan a significant shift in the operation of the store. This would 
mean taking a risk and then being prepared to follow through and ‘get behind’ the 
plan. A few of the respondents report successes from this type of initiative. In 
the context of the traditional ‘comfy’ co-op previously identified, there would 
perhaps seem little incentive for a store manager to adopt such a strategy. 
Amongst respondents who advocate this approach, there are observations that a 
manager lacking motivation is likely to be risk averse and disinclined to make
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step changes. One manager reported lukewarm support from his field manager, 
which presumably would be a further disincentive to risk-taking. Again, studies 
elsewhere provide limited basis for comparison. Radnor and Barnes (2007) 
speculate that corporate systems can interfere with innovation and dampen 
creativity. Similarly, Sobotka and Platts (2009) cite Smith’s (1993) ‘convergence’ 
and ‘ossification’ risks as the negative effects of performance measurement. 
Convergence is identified as a response to Ridgeway’s (1956) ‘ratchet’ effect, 
where targets are hiked in response to strong performance achievements, a 
disincentive to go beyond acceptable levels. As previously noted, the Grugulis et 
al (2010) study, describes ‘trivial’ freedoms enjoyed by store managers to act 
outside of the prescribe-and-monitor regime policed by the corporate systems in 
UK superstores. This study is in a similar environment in this respect, but whilst 
the scope to act outside of the system prescription may be trivial in comparison to 
other contexts, perhaps it has greater significance in the perception of food retail 
store managers.
This study has provided an insight to store manager perceptions of performance 
measurement and management. Other studies (e.g. Silvestro and Cross, 2000) 
have recognised a potential for a Hawthorne effect to be influencing performance 
management. On this basis, a code was created for use in the qualitative 
analysis of the interview scripts in this study. Despite careful scrutiny, I could not 
identify any relevant material. There is some reference to changes in the 
corporate measures used by the business. The Commercial Director refers to 
rationalising and streamlining corporate Pis that would be fed to store managers, 
in a bid to make their accountabilities more explicit and make performance 
management easier. There is limited reference by store managers to the recent 
introduction of staff surveys, but their significance appears to be weak. This 
study provides a view at a single moment in time. As Silvestro and Cross (2000) 
note, data collection over a more extended period might provide greater insight. 
On the basis of the current study, there is no suggestion of the presence or 
absence of a Hawthorne effect.
This study has provided some insight to the respondents’ perceptions of 
unintended or dysfunctional behaviour. As previously noted, part of the rationale
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for using performance measures is to influence behaviours. There will always be 
the risk of influencing behaviour in a manner not congruent with the business 
strategy and objectives (Radnor, 2008). Some of these negative consequences 
have been discussed above. There is also a risk of “gaming” where behaviours 
are manipulated to generate an alternative outcome and “misrepresentation”, 
which includes fraudulent activity of varying degrees (Smith 1993, cited by 
Sobotka and Platts, 2009). In the view of the Regional Operations Director, it is 
not possible to design out scope and motivation for dysfunctional behaviour, from 
the corporate system. Further, there will always be a minority of maverick 
individuals who will attempt to circumvent the company Pis. However, he did not 
perceive any significant issue of abuse with the current set-up and this view was 
endorsed by the Commercial Director. The Regional Operations Director 
described an incremental approach to developing a balanced scorecard for 
company-wide use. From his previous experience in other contexts, he was wary 
of the potential for dysfunctional behaviour, a view expressed by Kaplan and 
Norton (1996) if scorecard use was linked to rewards.
In terms of unintended behaviours, some caution needs to be exercised with the 
responses of store managers in this study. Whilst some insight emerges from the 
relatively unstructured, CIT front-end of the interviews, much of the data collected 
was in response to a direct question about this aspect of performance 
management. This question was de-personalised by asking whether in the 
opinion of the manager, it was possible that the corporate measurement system 
could generate behaviours that were not intended. However, it has to be 
recognised that there is much scope for bias in a question like this, even 
scheduled at the end of the interview. Individual responses range from a denial 
that it is even possible, through identifying examples of what is possible, through 
to perceptions that it is endemic in other stores. The examples cited were all of 
what might be described as petty misrepresentation, rather than significant fraud. 
An example would be the false manual input of waste information to corrupt the 
system measurement of availability. On this level, such malpractice is almost as 
labour-intensive as making sure the task is completed as intended, a view 
expressed by several of these managers.
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Management Implications
The previous section provided an analysis of findings from this study in the light 
of existing academic literature. From this, there are a number of implications that 
can be identified that would be relevant to practising managers and specifically 
those from the host organisation. These implications will be addressed as three 
distinct groups; corporate measures of performance, issues related to managing 
people and finally workload. The following treatment addresses these issues 
from the perspective of managing performance and as such can be regarded as 
partial. Other factors, not captured by this study may also need to be considered.
The corporate system at store level serves to reinforce the pre-eminence of sales 
as the key performance indicator for retail operations within the CC. There is no 
ambiguity about this in the minds of the store managers. Other financial 
measures for which the store manager is responsible follow closely behind in 
their perception, as the key determinants of store profitability. Financial 
measures, whilst historic in themselves, do serve a purpose in supporting pro­
active performance management. Given appropriate tools, managers can 
disaggregate and analyse financial information to better understand performance 
and make more informed operating decisions. Managers can be further 
supported in pro-active performance management through more help with 
interrogating and analysing financial information. This may be particularly 
appropriate in smaller stores where the manager provides significant input to 
shop-floor processes.
Contemporary availability measures such as those in operation in this study, are 
extremely effective in supporting the management of in-store, replenishment 
processes. Store managers clearly recognise the causal link between this non- 
financial measure and subsequent outcomes in terms of sales. 'Gap' measures 
help to make this link more explicit and in turn encourage store managers to give 
more attention to ‘up-stream’ variables that have causal links with availability.
One qualification would be to ensure that availability in the core range kept under 
surveillance is not at the expense of the non-core stock range that is not 
monitored.
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The remaining non-financial corporate measures that are identified do not appear 
to be so important to the store managers. A minority identify the mystery shopper 
and the staff survey, both of which are conducted infrequently and include 
qualitative components. The senior managers have by implication endorsed the 
adoption of these and other measures, such as membership penetration rates 
and staff stability. However it would appear from the responses from store 
managers that these measures are seen as having a relatively low profile. This 
raises doubts over the effectiveness of these softer measures to influence 
behaviour. This will be linked to a discussion around managing people below. If 
these softer measures are ineffectual at influencing store manager behaviour, 
they are by default further encouraging a very short term view of performance. 
The pursuit of sales and operating efficiency in the short-term unmoderated by 
any balance in the corporate system, may well be detrimental to longer term 
objectives in dimensions such as staff satisfaction, and customer service and 
loyalty.
Some store managers expressed frustration with what they perceived as the 
relatively crude or limited capability of the corporate system. In basic form this 
means a failure of the system to make allowance for factors that are beyond the 
control of the manager. Unplanned events or the actions of other functions such 
as distribution or central marketing have a negative impact on store level 
performance, illustrate this issue. A smaller minority of store manager 
respondents go on to articulate what they perceive as a dependence on 
quantitative measures in the corporate system that communicate a very partial 
view of the reality of operations to field managers and head office, who are 
monitoring store performance from a distance. This would appear to suggest that 
there is scope to improve the corporate measures to better reflect the more 
qualitative dimensions of retail operations. In the meantime, greater sensitivity 
could be exercised in the interpretation and performance management actions of 
field managers. To use one example, this might include more judicious use of 
benchmarking comparisons between stores that appear very similar on a purely 
quantitative basis.
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store managers are clear in recognising the intangible input to retail operations 
contributed by their staff. In this respect, the disposition of staff is extremely 
important. If staff are happy, then getting the job done and achieving 
performance targets should not be a problem. The benefits from having satisfied 
staff are perceived as being short and long term, with an apparent emphasis on 
the former. This is perhaps reinforced by the corporate system which does not 
capture intangible indicators such as staff disposition in the short-term and 
instead relies heavily on quantitative measures, with sales predominant. This 
may be a virtuous dynamic at times when performance is meeting targets. 
Positive feelings can permeate down the management hierarchy in warm 
approval of strong sales, etc. However, as a number of the store managers point 
out, great care needs to be exercised with communicating under-performance 
down through the structure of the organisation. This is a real challenge for the 
store managers, whose own confidence and sense of well-being can suffer in 
these circumstances. Negative feelings can be transferred onto store personnel, 
and can aggravate the existing performance trend. Field managers need to 
understand this relationship and exercise care in their own use of corporate 
performance measures.
Finally, this study has found a common theme amongst store managers that they 
are expected to do too many tasks that they regard as peripheral to the main 
business of running retail operations. Whilst they recognise that the corporate 
performance measurement system provides a necessary focus, and that targets 
are challenging but fair, they are much more resistant to what they see as 
additional demands placed upon them. The information system facilitates swift 
communication between central functions in the business and the store network. 
This allows a range of head office departments to despatch new initiatives very 
quickly into the field. Whilst in isolation these may not be unreasonable, 
collectively they place a considerable burden on store managers, by asking more 
of them and effectively making the existing performance targets more difficult to 
achieve. In particular changes to company trading policies place a considerable 
burden on store managers, who become responsible for the implementation and 
training of all members of staff across the extended hours of operation. This is 
how a sense of injustice manifests itself in this study. It is exacerbated by
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instances of new initiative failure, where the store manager perceives wasted 
effort. To be fair, both senior managers that were interviewed here recognised 
that this is a real issue and one that needs addressing. More attention is needed 
to coordinate the communication of changes and new plans to store level. This 
needs to address volume and the apparent lack of support for new initiatives.
Chapter 5 - Conclusion
Key findings from the literature were presented at the end of Chapter Two, using 
the framework in Figure 1. The same format was adopted to present the key 
findings from this research, in Chapter Four. I will now conclude this Chapter, 
which has analysed the findings in the light of the existing literature, using the 
same convention (drawn from Figure 1). Under each sub-heading, I will reflect 
on the extent to which this study’s findings appear to concur or conflict with 
previous studies and then identify the new insight, as analysed earlier in this 
chapter.
Corporate performance indicators and scorecards.
1. Sales figures enjoy universal recognition as the performance indicator in 
this retail operations environment. Financial Pi’s and particularly sales, 
may in themselves be historic and of limited predictive value, but their use 
as a corporate measure helps attune manager attention to those factors 
that will over time have an impact on financial outcomes (e.g. Availability, 
unplanned events).
2. The apparent effectiveness of availability as a PI, supports the existing 
proposition that there is a role for corporate non-financial measures.
3. Store managers in this study perceived the inability of financial Pi’s to 
adequately capture intangible dimensions as a weakness, in line with 
existing theory.
Managers’ Performance indicators
4. One of the principal objectives of this study was to establish whether retail 
operations managers adopted informal, non-corporate Pi’s. There is little
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existing literature that identifies this and the study does provide some 
insight Visual cues are available, but are seen as fallible. Unplanned 
events attract attention from operations managers, not least because of 
their likely impact on performance.
5. A significant finding of this research has been the managers’ sense of the 
disposition of their staff, as an important guide to performance outcomes. 
Intriguingly, a perception of casual links not dissimilar to those in the 
service profit chain (Heskett, et al 1997) is evident. The service profit 
chain was identified within the literature review, but at that stage, not as a 
key finding. No store manager explicitly recognised Heskett et al’s (1997) 
chain in this study and it would seen unlikely that they would have any 
prior exposure to it. Whilst an academic debate remains as to whether the 
links in the chain truly exist as proposed, it would seem that in the mind of 
these front-line managers, staff disposition is linked ultimately to 
performance outcomes.
Manager perceptions and indications.
6. Previous work has suggested that perceptions and interpretations of 
performance indicators can influence subsequent behaviour of managers, 
either positively or negatively. In this study, a number of respondents 
were clearly under pressure from the experience of performance being 
below target. In this context, some managers noted that there was a 
danger that poor performance figures could negatively influence their own 
personal behaviours. In turn, this could negatively affect the disposition of 
their staff, with an ensuing negative effect on performance (as above).
7. Existing literature suggests that there may be a “Hawthorne” effect to 
consider. This study was not designed to address this, but the CIT 
approach may have yielded relevant perceptions. As far as I can establish, 
this research offers no further insight on this.
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Extenuating factors
8. This study has found that there is a risk of unintended behaviours and 
dysfunctional behaviour as a result of using corporate Pi’s, in line with 
existing research.
Management Behaviours/Decisions
9. Previous research into what operations managers actually do with 
performance information is rather sparse. The findings in this study that 
effective communication and the promotion of teamwork are prerequisites 
for strong performance, are congruent with existing research. There is 
much evidence of reactive responses to unplanned events, along with 
more analytical use of corporate information, both being used as 
techniques to manage performance.
10. Store manager respondents in this study recognise the need to maintain a 
profile with their staff and that their own demeanour can impact on the 
disposition of staff. These factors are perceived as pertinent to managing 
performance.
Outcomes and timeframes
11. This study illustrates the range of potential time intervals between 
manager behaviour/decision interventions and performance outcomes. 
Much of the focus is very short term in nature, e.g. Maintaining availability 
in support of sales of the next few trading hours. At the other extreme, 
there is a recognition that some outcomes are only built slowly over time, 
e.g. Loyalty-building in the service profit chain. As other writers have 
suggested, there is an endogeneity issue to consider in managing 
performance.
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LIMITATIONS
This has been an exploratory study, where it has been argued that existing 
knowledge and understanding of where operations managers actually get 
performance information from and what they then do with it, has been limited.
In such a context a qualitative study of performance management as perceived 
by the store managers in question would seen very appropriate. However, it has 
to be recognised that a study of perceptions will be viewed as being rather 
limited. The bias potential is great, particularly with a topic that is sensitive to the 
enterprise concerned and to the individual respondent. Whilst this research 
design has sought to minimise this factor, it will not have been eradicated. This 
study has explored the topic through the meanings associated with it by front line 
store managers. It offers no proof of the relationships it has found, and will be 
discounted by some on that basis. It has offered some insight to performance 
management In this context and by doing so has fulfilled its exploratory 
justification.
This study has been conducted within a single retail organisation. Such a case 
study approach is very suitable for exploratory research. However, great care 
should be exercised with suggesting that its findings are generalisable beyond 
the context in which the research was conducted. The danger is that the findings 
can be explained by unique contextual factors, not present in the wider world.
For example, in this instance the organisation was a co-operative and for reasons 
previously explored, the dynamics of performance management may be very 
different than for other types of business enterprise.
This study adopted CIT as the principal method for the main study in this 
research. This has some key strengths, but is not without limitations. Notably, 
there is a distinct bias towards the recollection of negative incidents in this study. 
Arguably, the study provides better insight into situations where performance is 
deteriorating. Respondents often struggled to recall positive incidents and some 
of those identified are weaker in terms of credibility. Consequently, insight to 
management during periods of strong performance is not as great.
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The twelve store manager respondents in this study were selected by a field 
manager, as representing the range of format type and size run by the business, 
and being in reasonable proximity to Guildford. I had no further influence over 
the selection. It is likely that stronger candidates were put forward, but I see no 
validity concerns in a study of this type. From a CIT perspective, the study 
should have sufficient incidents such that further collection does not add to the 
categories generated. It is difficult to judge this saturation point and it could be 
argued that fifty incidents are towards the bottom end of acceptability.
The role of the researcher in a qualitative study of this kind is significant and the 
subjectivity that this introduces can be viewed as much a weakness as it is a 
strength, depending on philosophical persuasion. Great care has been exercised 
here with disciplined reflexivity and this is documented in full in the following 
chapter.
FURTHER RESEARCH
The insight provided by this study, invites further investigation. In the first 
instance the research could be usefully extended within the CC context. As has 
been noted, the business is developing its performance management system 
over time. To introduce a longitudinal dimension would add to the depth of this 
study. For example, the forthcoming implementation of a balanced scorecard at 
store level could then be studied. Other perspectives not included in this study 
could be researched. Notably, the perspective of the field managers is a notable 
opportunity to better understand performance management in this organisation. 
Similarly, store staff perspectives could be explored.
I plan to report the key findings of this research to the senior managers in the CC 
and seek to extend a dialogue with them on this basis. Assuming that support 
from the organisation is forthcoming, the study could be extended by exploring 
what differentiates above-average performing stores from the rest, as has been 
attempted elsewhere. It could be possible to set up observational techniques or 
action research approaches, as a means of extending a study based up until this 
point, on perception and recall.
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Developing a stream of research in this field, would definitely benefit from 
replication of this method in other multiple retailer settings and perhaps other 
sectors with a higher customer service element. I have started this process and 
intend to continue, when this project is complete.
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CHAPTER 6: REFLECTION
INTRODUCTION
This thesis is tendered in part-fulfilment of the requirements for the achievement 
of the DBA award from the University of Surrey. I will now reflect on my learning 
experience as a student on the programme in pursuit of the following generic 
aims that graduates will be able to demonstrate:
• The creation and interpretation of new knowledge, through original 
research, or other advanced scholarship, of a quality to satisfy peer 
review, extend the forefront of the discipline, and merit publication;
• A systematic acquisition and understanding of a substantial body of 
knowledge which is at the forefront of an academic discipline or area 
of professional practice;
• The general ability to conceptualise, design and implement a project' 
for the generation of new knowledge, applications or understanding 
at the forefront of the discipline, and to adjust the project design in 
the light of unforeseen problems;
• A detailed understanding of applicable techniques for research and 
advanced academic enquiry.
DBA student handbook and regulations.
University of Surrey. 2010
I will consider first the research project element of the DBA programme which 
incorporates the synthesis and application of learning from the earlier taught 
modules. The thesis has the following more specific learning outcomes:
• To demonstrate through the compilation of a thesis, an original 
contribution to knowledge; through an advanced level of research 
and improved understanding in the practice of management within 
a clearly defined context
• To be better abie to make informed judgements and decisions and 
communicate these effectively.
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DBA student handbook and regulations.
University of Surrey. 2010
This consideration will be followed by a reflection on the taught modules on the 
programme.
REFLEXIVITY
In an interpretivist study such as this, an underlying assumption is the absence of 
a single external reality that can be objectively captured and measured (Remenyi 
et al, 1998). As the researcher, I am integral to the research process, rather than 
a separate entity (Brannick and Coghlan, 2006). The research findings will need 
the interpretation that I provide to extract the full potential of their meaning. 
Assuming that I am well trained, suitably experienced and capable of astute 
observation, then this contribution will be a real strength of the research project 
(Patton, 2002). If I fall down in any of these respects, then I become a weakness 
in the endeavour. Reflexivity is the social scientific concept of exploring and then 
accounting for the relationship between the researcher and their research focus 
(Brannick and Coghlan, 2006). Reflexivity is described by Patton (2002) as “a 
way of emphasising the importance of self-awareness, political/cultural 
consciousness, and ownership of one’s perspective.” Patton (2002) cites the 
Hertz (1997) notion of a ‘conversation’ between experience and current events as 
the means "to undertake an on-going examination of what I know and how I know 
it,” that should persist throughout the research process. Reflexive questions 
should be asked by the researcher, of themselves, of those being studied and of 
the intended recipients of the research (Patton, 2002). Self-awareness is 
therefore an important consideration in an interpretive study, to avoid ‘abdication 
of intellectual responsibility which results in poor research practice’ (Johnson and 
Duberley, 2003). However, it is possible to have too much reflexivity. As 
Brannick and Coghlan (2006) point out, there is a danger in being self-indulgent, 
and in ‘an inability to stop the regress of doubting the doubting and the doubts ... 
because self-consciousness is paralysing.’ An increased fear of making mistakes 
is possible. Brannick and Coghlan (2006) go on to point out that reflexivity on the 
part of the researcher is not neutral. There is a balance to strike in demonstrating
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self-awareness whilst being realistic. Patton (2002) advocates writing in the first 
person to convey self-awareness, but notes that there is more to the expression 
of researcher ‘voice’ than grammar alone.
Testing Implications 
Of Concepts In
Concrete
Experiences
Formation Of 
Abstract Concepts
Observations
And
Figure 5: Kolb’s Experiential Learning Cycle
Kolb’s experiential learning cycle (Figure 5) as cited by Remenyi et al (1998), 
provides a framework for reflection upon the DBA process. My interpretation 
would be that 1 have been inspired by the “concrete experience’’ of working in 
food retail operations and that the DBA project has facilitated a complete iteration 
of the cycle and into a second loop, as I consider the learning outcomes from a 
further “concrete experience” out in the field collecting and analysing data. 
Remenyi et al (1998) argue that it is not a closed loop and I would agree. In my 
own case, concrete experience of conducting research has been very limited.
I will now proceed by providing a brief account of my own answers to the reflexive 
questions posed by Patton (2002) to me as a qualitative inquirer; principally, in 
the context of this study “what do I know?” and “how do I know it?”
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THE PRIOR EXPERIENCE OF THE RESEARCHER
Before embarking on the DBA, my work experience includes two significant 
elements. The first was approximately eleven years of food retail operations 
management experience until 1986 with the Brighton Co-operative Society, which 
no longer exists as a separate entity. This was followed by a move into 
academia, initially with the London Institute until 1994 and latterly with the 
University of Surrey as a lecturer in retail management. These elements of work 
experience, whilst very different, have both informed the role of researcher in this 
project. In addition, I spent approximately ten years from 1994, being actively 
involved In the co-operative movement. This included spells as an elected 
member on firstly the board of directors of the former Brighton Co-operative 
Society and then on local and regional committees of a larger consumer co­
operative, and approximately two years as editor of the Journal of Co-operative 
Studies, a publication seeking to appeal to academic and practitioner interests. 
Again these experiences are likely to have informed my perspective to this study.
My experience with Brighton Co-operative Society started when I left school as a 
trainee manager. I worked in a range of junior positions, in a number of locations 
and progressed to store manager level. My training included periods for full-time 
college courses on a block release basis, back in the days when retailers could 
draw on public funding for this purpose. In 1983,1 commenced a part-time 
degree course at evening classes. By this time support from my employer for 
such endeavour, was very limited.
Whilst the basic trading activity remains very similar, information systems 
innovation has revolutionised food retailing operations in the twenty five years 
since I left my employment with the co-operative movement. My recollections are 
of long hours and low pay in a sector with a poor image, where co-operatives 
were losing out to competition from conforming superstores on the by-pass 
operated by multiple retailers such as Sainsbury (then market leader) and Tesco. 
Store managers were typically male and shop-floor workers predominantly 
female. The absence of information systems meant that inventory management
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was devolved to store managers and that local deal-making was common. Store 
stock levels were relatively high.
My recollection of managers both at store level and in the higher levels, was of 
individuals who had mostly worked their way up through the ranks, having left 
school with little educational qualification. Such people were often scornful and 
suspicious of my plan to pursue higher education at evening classes. Equally, I 
grew frustrated with what I perceived as a limited career path and with a family 
started, little prospect of improvement to a poor work-life balance.
During my time working in food retailing, I became increasingly interested by the 
co-operative model of business organisation, despite its apparent decline. This 
was probably influenced by the distinctly left-of-centre political persuasion present 
in my early conditioning. For example, to this day I can recall my mother’s seven­
digit co-operative dividend number, because it was quoted every time I went 
grocery shopping as a small child. As a young adult, I started attending 
member’s meetings and later stood, initially unsuccessfully, to be elected to the 
board of directors of my former employer. Board directors were lay- 
representatives responsible for hiring executives to run the business and holding 
them to account on policy matters. Once elected, this experience provided a new 
perspective of managing the food retail stores operated by the business, from a 
more strategic level. Performance was monitored by the board on a store-by- 
store basis, based on headline figures. The board did not become involved in the 
day-to-day management of the business, which remained the responsibility of 
hired executives. My recollection of performance measurement is exclusively 
around financial outcomes. However, there was always a member service 
dimension that drove board decisions, even if there were no explicit measures 
available to inform decisions. Whilst the positive side of this meant that the 
business was prepared to invest in new stores and refurbishments, managing 
performance in its existing stores did not enjoy the priority that perhaps it should 
have done or would have been evident in competitor organisations. For example, 
poor performance was effectively tolerated, with unprofitable stores being allowed 
to continue trading because they provided a service to the members. This 
probably contributed to the demise of the Brighton Co-operative Society and
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other smaller co-ops, up and down the country. In summary, I still hold an 
interest and belief in the co-operative model of business enterprise as a viable 
alternative to private enterprise. Whilst the fortunes of co-operatives in UK 
retailing have declined over the last fifty years, mutual organisations still 
contribute substantially to this country’s economy. There is even cause for some 
optimism as trading has improved during the last five years and recent economic 
turbulence across the world has challenged public perception to review the 
sanctity of the private enterprise model.
My academic career to date has been dominated by teaching and teaching- 
related duties. My teaching has been in focused in the vocational area of retail 
operations, informed by my industry experience. I have actively drawn on 
industry links whilst employed by the University. In practice this has included 
taking student groups on visits to retailer-operated distribution centres across the 
south-east, arranging speakers from the retail industry to contribute to teaching 
programmes and acting as tutor to students whilst on retail industry placements.
I have also led major projects with three very different large retailers to develop 
bespoke undergraduate degree programmes in retail management. These 
substantial industry links have given me first hand experience of dealing with 
retail organisations at different levels. Typically, the more junior contacts lack 
formal educational experience and qualification, have a lack of understanding of 
what a university represents and does, and are wary as a result. Some but not 
all of the more senior managers would have a better idea of the university 
perspective. On the bespoke degree projects for example, each had a project 
champion leading from the retailer side. These champions all recognised that the 
University would contribute a wider perspective that the retailer did not have for 
themselves, which was really at the heart of the rationale for the degree 
programme. Other team members did not always share this understanding. This 
provided a useful insight to the challenges to expect as an academic dealing with 
retail industry partners.
My previous experience of academic research is very limited and as such, the 
DBA represents a very powerful professional development experience. 
Specifically, I have some experience of using CIT in a retail setting (Bell et al
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1997, Bell et al, 1999). These studies were designed to explore the customer 
experience of retail service delivery. By comparison to the current study, the 
individual incidents were numerous but short on descriptive detail, and were 
recorded by hand rather than being taped. These studies provided some insight 
to the use of this particular research method. However, my experience of 
conducting and analysing qualitative interviews must be seen as very limited.
THE DBA EXPERIENCE
The University’s DBA programme is targeted at practicing managers who will 
pursue their studies on a part-time basis. I joined the second cohort with six 
other participants, another one of whom was a colleague here in the School at 
that time. The front-end of the programme comprises four taught modules 
arranged in a sequential structure. Each module included an intensive weekend 
of study, followed by self-directed learning and completion of an assessment 
designed to provide evidence that the learning outcomes had been achieved. My 
previous experience of part-time study at undergraduate and postgraduate level 
probably helped me and the structured nature of the programme imposed a 
discipline that was useful. The intensive weekend mode was a new experience 
for me, which I found challenging. There were occasions when I experienced a 
sense of saturation in terms of what I could absorb from such intense delivery. 
However my colleagues responsible for contributing to the DBA teaching used a 
range of techniques to enrich the learning. The class-room experience was 
extremely stimulating. There was a certain intimacy stemming from the relatively 
small size of the group. This facilitated a relaxed interaction amongst students 
and with facilitating colleagues. I suppose there is some peculiarity that stems 
from being a student in a group being taught by my own work colleagues, but I 
would not wish to overstate this. Without exception, my colleagues were 
completely professional and supportive, and I have a very high regard for the 
quality of the teaching that I was exposed to on this programme. Coupled with 
the experience of being part of a diverse and intellectually challenging peer 
group, I would describe my classroom experience as exhilarating. Such 
excitement helped motivate me to complete the self-directed study and gave me 
an appetite for the next taught session.
154
The structured front end of the DBA has been a very effective learning 
experience for me. The taught modules provided a valuable insight and 
understanding to academic research which I previously lacked. As well as 
forming a basis for conducting the research project, I have been able to apply the 
learning in my professional practice, most notably In the supervision of 
postgraduate students conducting their own research projects. I feel that the 
taught programme has helped me develop a more rigorous academic approach 
to my work. However, this is a challenge in itself. For example, one assessment 
was based around a critical analysis of two contrasting journal papers. Whilst this 
was extremely beneficial in developing powers of discrimination and challenging 
my own writing skills, it was extremely time consuming in itself. Subsequently, I 
have sought to apply rigorous assessment to the secondary sources in this 
research project but feel that I took too long over it. As I go beyond the DBA, I 
will seek to be more pragmatic without compromise to my academic integrity.
Completing this research project has less externally imposed structure than 
following the taught element of the DBA. Initially, I struggled to make the 
progress with the project that I would have liked. Despite the design of the 
programme to introduce structure by requiring students to present work-in- 
prog ress at recognisable stages, I fell behind with this. It is human nature to 
rationalise in terms of external factors and I can do this. Principally in my view, 
the programme director role that I was fulfilling became progressively larger over 
the duration of my tenure, effectively excluding the scope to pursue part-time 
study. To a lesser degree, I was allocated supervisors in the first instance who 
lacked expertise in service operations management. Whilst I have no grounds for 
complaint over my treatment by either individual, I do wonder whether this 
contributed to my slow start. Whilst these external factors may be contributory, I 
would also recognise that as personal characteristics maybe 1 lack sufficient 
confidence and are too prone to prevarication and the ‘paralysis' of self- 
consciousness noted by Brannick and Coghlan (2006). It would be my 
anticipation that completing the DBA will help to address these development 
needs.
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To address the situation described above and facilitate completion, I was granted 
a 12-month sabbatical leave period to commence in summer 2009. At the same 
time, I was allocated new supervisors. My lead supervisor has expertise in 
service operations management. During my sabbatical, we have met 
approximately once a month. The meetings have provided invaluable help and 
support. The research project is an individual endeavour of very substantial 
proportion. I have experienced a sense of isolation with it at times and on these 
occasions, my self-confidence has suffered and progress with it. A lack of 
perceived progress can quickly cause frustration and other negative sensations.
I suspect that these are not unusual experiences. .As a relative novice to 
research on this scale, the support of my supervisor has been invaluable.
Completion of the research project in this form was entirely dependent on the co­
operation of industry partners, without whom it would not have been possible. 
Their input in terms of access permission and then willingness on the part of 
individual participants was vital. The apparent completeness of the single case 
presented here might suggest that this was straightforward. In practice it was 
more difficult. Before soliciting industry co-operation, I was quietly confident that 
it would be forthcoming. My previous experience is that help is usually 
forthcoming if you can get to speak to the right person. With hindsight, I should 
have started the process sooner. In the first instance and in consultation with my 
supervisor, I had held back so as to be very informed about what I wanted from 
the retailer before entering any dialogue. In November 2009 I made a request to 
my contact for the organisation in this study. My contact was well-placed to help 
and I was confident on this basis. At the same time I wrote to the senior 
operations directors of the four largest food retailers in the UK. I was aware that 
the pre-Christmas trading period would not be the time to conduct data collection, 
but even the set-up proved too onerous for the retailers in question. My eventual 
partner for this project agreed in February 2010 and data collection had been 
completed within three months. This has been later, relative to the sabbatical 
leave timing, than would have been ideal. Of the other four cold calls that I made, 
only one responded positively. Again this response did not come through until 
February 2010. The retailer provided access to, and an interview with, a senior 
manager who in turn promised access to store managers to mirror this study.
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However, this has since stalled and has necessitated dropping this second 
retailer case from this DBA study. Needless to say, I have invested a great deal 
of time in setting up the access and success has been mixed. This has been 
very stressful at times because time is distinctly finite, even with an apparently 
generous study leave period. 1 would hope to retrieve and pursue the research 
that I started with the second retailer, after the DBA. To reflect on the access 
issues above, my prior optimism now looks a little misplaced. Performance 
management has a certain commercial sensitivity. Why would a retailer want to 
allow an academic access to study this phenomenon? What is in it for them? 
Whilst I can answer these questions, the retailer might take some convincing. 
From this perspective, it is perhaps not surprising that managers’ use of 
performance information is not well researched. Whilst a modest study, I should 
be pleased that this industry partner was prepared to co-operate.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The DBA’s programme aims were reproduced at the beginning of this reflection. 
In my opinion, I have demonstrated these outcomes. It is now my intention to 
extract two or three papers from my performance management study and seek 
publication in suitably ranked academic journals. This will further endorse the 
doctoral level of the work and meet the expectations of the University. I also 
intend to extend the research as described in the previous chapter.
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TRANSCRIPT/CC/WARLINGHAM
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Note: This store is ex-CX, and has been refitted in the CC format
JB. OK, so I don’t mind which way we start. Probably ... let’s start negatively
and ge t... and then have a look at the positive side. If you can for me, try and 
think of an occasion, or situation where e rr... things were, were not going well 
and just tell me a little b it... describe what was going on ...
WL. Yeah, recently e rr... comirig out, coming out of our refit um ... when we 
first launched as a co-op, it was all sort of singing and dancing ... But then like, 
after a few weeks um ... it’s, it’s taken a lot of time. We’ve had to adjust to like 
different order systems. Um ... the way stuff comes. In the OX group um ... stuff 
would be centrally ordered for us and we just monitor that. In the co-op, we have 
to set it up and we have to um ... you know, drive the orders in ourselves. 
Otherwise if we don’t, then the stock doesn’t come In um ... we’ve gone into ... 
where we were competing against, when we were a OX, um ... we were taking
36.000 a week and when we came out of the refit, we were only taking like 29 -
30.000 a week as the Co-op. um ... so that flagged up to me that you know, 
obviously that, the sales weren’t doing very well. On the back of that, um ... we 
had the wastage, which is our reductions and like the stuff that we throw away.
JB. So, the accountable ...?
WL. Yeah, all the accountable waste and all that. We’re set a budget, I think
it’s thirteen ... about thirteen hundred per week and we were hitting like ... when 
we first come out of the refit, it was about five and a half grand, in the first week.
It was then about £4 000 and we were regularly hitting about two and a half 
thousand pounds. So we were targeted e rr... umm ... our target to store, to like
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keep those budgets ... um and over the last few um ... you know, over the last 
few weeks. I mean, what we done, we just had so much stock coming in and like 
um ... it was just like the wrong lines were coming In and it was just basically like 
you know, everything was going wrong ... in terms of sales and waste. Um store 
... it’s a lovely new store. There’s a lot of focus on the store um ... so we had to 
like, get a handle on it quite quick. Sort of start turning it around ...
JB. Right. So can you... so what... moving on from that, can you say a bit 
about how you did tha t...
WL. Yeah. So what we done, the first thing we looked a t, I mean, we looked 
at sales, we looked at the range, we looked at our availability, we were looking at 
the availability. We started challenging a lot more on the actual gaps every day 
err., the co-op run a gaps system where you actually go round and scan the 
gaps, get a report off, and then you check into the book stocks, but it wasn’t 
inaccurate at all, but what we’ve done .. and we started targeting ..um.. like every 
day. We’re doing a gap-walk, every single morning., um .. and identifying if it is in 
stock. Why isn’t i t .. and get it onto the shelf. If not, we’re correcting the book 
stock and bringing the stock in. um ... in terms of sales, we looked at range as 
well. We did ... I called in through um.. Rob Tippett, I had a word with Rob 
Tippett and he got in the regional space-planning manager for me. And we 
walked round the store and we decided that certain departments weren’t working 
for us. Um ... previously we’d have had like a um.. sixteen-foot drinks section, a 
cold drinks section um ... and we’d gone down to about eight foot, with the co-op. 
So, we’ve actually done some merchandising moves, around the whole store err., 
to actually give us that sort of space back again. Err., and its really getting behind 
every sales opportunity we get, you know, picking lines and really going for it. In 
terms of... so sales... we’ve turned out... um.. with our sales, we were like last 
week I think we were., not hitting our budget, but our sales had gone up to about 
thirty-five thousand now, so they’ve gradually gone up to virtually three... in fact, 
the week before we did £36 500, which was err., three and a half grand up on 
last year. So, that showed me that you know, what we were doing on terms of 
sales, was going in the right direction.
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JB. That’s the trend, is it?
WL. Yeah. It’s going up. I mean, last couple of weeks... this week, we are 
slightly down on last week. But we’re still going to do about thirty four... about 
thirty-four, thirty-five. Um ... which is good in terms of what we were doing last 
year. Cos, what it was, the company set us a high budget. Err., no-one’s hitting 
that budget. So, what they are looking at, they’re looking at like-for-like sales on 
last year and we are actually starting to get positive growth, on, on last year’s 
sales
JB. Right. And last year, was it a OX?
WL. It was a OX business unit so... you know, for us to start hitting., like
coming above OX, it shows us that we are going in the right direction. Err... in 
terms of wastage, um.. we did, I done the same thing. I done a lot of work around 
the range., um... got lines cut out. I’ve had like um.. permission to.. I’ve gone up 
to head office and we’ve got like um.. permission to take a lot of shelving out and 
drop the ranges down and change the ranges slightly and err..
JB. Which would otherwise be determined by head office?
WL. Yeah. It would be determined, but we’ve actually., we’ve been able to
go to them and say like you know, this ain’t working for us. Um.. produce for 
arguments sake, we had far too much range um.. and it was costing us a fortune 
um.. so., each week., so, what we’ve done, we’ve..
JB. In waste?
WL. Yeah. In waste. So what we’ve done, We’ve re-ranged the whole 
produce department and I think we gone from like two and a half grand, um.. in 
the last.. the last, say, six weeks ago, to the last four weeks, we’ve actually 
come under our budget. We achieved our budget. 1300. So, we’ve actually gone 
from like, really bad to really poor (?) and like you know, year-on-year we’re 
starting to improve that as well.
(5.40)
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JB. Right. No. That’s a ... that’s a very good example. Ok. Give you the
opportunity... are there... can you think of other occasions, either positive or 
negative.. ?
WL. Yeah. Positive. I mean, during the actual refit um... we were given, I was 
given a package, but the actual refit, the actual launch of the store, we launched 
quite successfully,
JB. Right.
WL. Umm... that went really well. We had very tight window. Um.. shut on the
25^ of um... 25^ November, and re-opened on the 3^  ^December um..
JB. Busy time of year for that.
WL. Yeah. The plans were., the plans for us were, we were going to ... we 
were going to like bring... the first weekend when we shut on the Thursday. 
Friday, we were going to have staff out training, up ‘til the Monday. And then we 
were coming back into store on the Monday, um.. but what happened, err.. 
Addington store relaunched the week .. they were doing a remodel of the 
Addington store, and they launched a week early. So, the stock that we’d taken 
out of the building here, to go to Hamsey Green, you know, had to come back in 
two days before. So, it had to come in on the Sunday. Um.. which meant we 
relied., you know, put under pressure, but what we did, what worked really well 
cos being able to plan... being able to like ... soon as they told us, I was able to 
get hold of staff, get the staff in, then we plan... they all came and helped. And 
we basically... what we did, we came in two days before we should of done, we 
re-ticketed up the whole store err... we got every single plan and then we actually 
got the delivery from Hamsey Green with all our old stock, and we got that out 
before the new ... before the delivery started. Consequently, that helped us 
when we actually., the week of launch, when all the co-op new stock started 
coming in, we was actually ahead of the game and we ended up, opening up with 
.. on the, on the actually opening morning all singing and dancing. It was really 
good.
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JB. Right.
WL. Yeah, so we had you know, but it... to do that, it took a lot of planning.
You know, I had to spend a lot of time....
JB. Right. So, planning is the key to that?
WL. Yeah. For me, it was like me spending time planning and what we were
going to do each day. Also, resourcing my staff. Um.. you know, making the calls 
and getting staff involved.
JB. ... At the right time. Yeah. Yeah. Ok. No that’s good
WL. Yeah. Adversely another time... e rr.... Bad experiences, bad
experiences. A lot would be around ... it was the same’s um... ‘suppose, stock 
results. Be a big one.. um...you know, ‘been in store where we had, we had 
horrendous stock results where um.. this store we I first come here, I think the 
stock result was about 2.5% err... loss and budget was sort of 0.5%, so that 
flagged up to me that obviously we had a problem um...
JB. Was That... would that include the waste?
WL. Yeah that... no, that was., that was unknown loss, yeah it was like, that’s
with the waste taken off. So, the idea with that was for me to sit down and err... 
and obviously when you are in a situation tha t... you know, you are getting a bad 
stock result. You are getting a lot of visits. Different things and it just snowballs. 
Um ... but same thing. We got out of tha t... you know, by breaking it down um.. 
bit by bit by component... looking at the worst departments um.... Investigating 
why that was happening, and we turned it in, I think the next.. you know, after 
about the next stock take we turned like 0.6% loss. So, we actually clawed back a 
lot of that money. Because a lot of it was in processes in store, they weren’t 
working. So, we set-up a lot of new processes like the code checking, um .. 
obviously a lot on security as well. Beefed up security by getting people more 
aware that if they see someone in store, they call someone.
JB. Right
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WL. And that was another time when it went really well
JB. Right. And um... just curious in... what... I mean, clearly the physical
stock check, you get, you then get... there's a delay and you get a report back 
saying...
WL. ... yeah, you get a report saying what you’ve lost over the weeks, so
you’ve got to look then, analyse, which your worst departments are and then start 
you know, working on that. One of my worst departments was cigarettes so, with 
cigarettes now they either don’t get delivered , so it’s making 100% sure they 
were checked off when they came in, or it was staff theft. So, the only way we did 
it... what we did was set-up like stock counts every week, we were counting like 
the top twenty lines and like we used to count those lines, every single week. So, 
that if any of those went missing I knew that I had a problem on that.
JB. Right. So, that was where I was heading. So, before the stock-check, did 
you have the idea that it was going to be a .. bad result, or..?
WL. Err ... not .... Yeah, it was showing. It was coming out saying we had
um.. We had like a tracker that was coming out saying we were going to lose 
this.. X amount of money... but with so many weeks down the line ... and then It 
was a matter of just grabbing hold..
< interview briefly interrupted by a shop query >
WL. But. that was a ...
JB. You had an indication In advance...
WL. Yeah, we had an indication in advance that it was going... so, it was 
basically then going in and setting up systems that we were going to use, to like 
track, you know, to rectify i t .. and we did turn it around.
JB. OK. No, that’s extremely helpful. Two last questions for you.
WL. Yeah.
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JB. The co-op’s got a system ... err, for monitoring how the store., um, you 
know, KPls if you like ..
WL. Yeah
JB. ... that you’re measured by, if you like. Or, the store is measured by. In
you view, is that... is it a fair system?
(10:57)
WL. Um... yeah , I think it is yeah, because they have like err., you know, 
they monitor you on sales. Customer focus is another one um... where they 
come round and do the mystery shop. Um. Yeah I think it is , I think because we 
came from... when we was in OX, we had a similar thing
JB. sure
WL. ... where we had about eight objectives we were being managed on and 
the co-op now are going down to... I think it’s about five... main ones that they’re 
looking at. E rr... availability being one of them, errr.. but yeah, I do think that., 
do agree with that... it’s a pretty fair system, because you’ve always got to have 
something that you’ve got to be able to shoot for
JB. Sure. Yeah, yeah
WL. So,
JB. Um... and one last question. Do you think the err..um.. co-op group’s
system for measuring um.. is it... how do I say this,... um .. is it possible for a
store manager or does it encourage a store manager to behave in a way that 
wasn’t really intended? Do you see what I mean? Not necessarily fraudulent, 
but..
WL. Oh what. Yeah, if he’s ... I mean, what with the fact that..
JB. Well you’re ... clearly you’re being measured by this,this and this...
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WL. Yeah, you’re measured ..
JB. ..is there... do... you know, can a store manager look at It and say well If 
I., if I do this I’ll make that look good, when actually it’s not so good or..?
WL. Yeah, I think they can, yeah. Yeah. I think, I think the problem is we 
yeah... the problem is when they measure .... We used to have it in CX, where 
they’d measure gaps. Now I’ve always believed that you know, when we’ve 
measured the gaps, I rather walk in and have 200 gaps and know that I have 200 
gaps um .. and that, you know,.. that was .. you know... that was... um .. that 
was what I had to aim for. Say., my target was fifty and I had 200, then I’d rather 
walk in. I’d rather know that I had 200 ... um... but a lot of stores .. I know for a 
fact (laughs).. I know it happens and it does... I (?) used to go round and put 
one in their book stocks and all that so it never showed on their report.
JB. Well that’s the sort of thing, yeah...
WL. Yeah, you know, which I don’t think is helpful. I’ve always.. I think... it’s 
a good system providing everyone uses it correctly. I think it is, I mean, you know, 
you are always going to get people that will try and buck that system and like 
there is, you know, there’s loads of things. They used to take it off a report the 
night before, which helped them like identify things and they’d put one in the book 
stocks and all this sort of thing, but at the end of the day, all they were doing was 
masking the gaps. And I know when we first came over., um ...and this is 
something I... something I observed in a lot of the co-op stores that I worked in, 
that.. when we first came over... if they had a visit, they’d take... and they had a 
gap,... they’d take the ticket off and like you know,.. and merchandise out the 
gap. Well, the thing is, that’s fine, providing that ticket goes back. But... and 
basically what it does. It makes a better visit but at the end of the day, you are 
just fooling yourself, cos at the end-of the day you., you know. If that ticket 
doesn’t go back, you are not going to notice the gap... and you always going to 
have a gap,so I tend, we tend, we use these blue tickets, which we got from CX, 
it’s the same. Our bosses bought in and we’ve launched this and I think it’s going 
all the way round the co-op now., co-op now., um
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JB. Right.
WL. Um... And then basically, if you’ve got something that’s out of stock, you 
put that on it, with the day’s date, that you’ve investigated it and then, when it 
comes in, you take the ticket off.
JB. Right.
WL. So, you know .. um .. and I know a few of the co-op managers, they used 
to think that if they hid the gaps then people wouldn’t you know,... they’d walk 
round the store and think oh, store looks marvellous, you know.... Doesn’t work.
JB. Right. But it’s still possible to do that now is it?
WL. Yeah. It is still.. they can still do it, they can .. there are ways around
their system that they can get. With us, I tend to... try and stick to the line., you 
know, if they say I’ve got to do all the gaps by half past eight, I try and get it all 
done by half past eight, just stick to it. But there are a few people, as you go on., 
you know, like um..
JB. Well there is no perfect system is there?
WL. Well I mean, the thing is with the customer, the mystery shopper... the 
mystery shopper one where they do., they do the customer focus audit, you don’t 
know it’s going on and they come round and they do it, and there’s no way you 
can really cheat that. You know, unless you know the person who is doing it. And 
like you know, but you know, in that respect I think it’s quite fair. Um... and I 
think... you know, it all depends on ... they judge you on your sales which is., 
sometimes that’s fine, but then we don’t write the budgets. So, that again (14:47) 
is you know, they put us a whacking great budget and it looks like we are not 
achieving our sales. In fact, we are doing quite well, because we are like..., we 
are actually building sales up you know, on., and on the terms of whoever has 
written the sales up in head office, it doesn't look very good on us, because it 
looks like we are losing it. Then, the whole company at the moment is going 
through that position, where they did... they did expect you like to do this amount 
and they are doing that amount. But, like for like and against some of the
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competition, they are doing rather well so.... that's the message we've been 
given so...
JB. You are not the only one to tell me that.
WL. Yeah. Yeah. I know. They are saying we are having such a wonderful 
year but we are not going to hit where we need to hit so ... you know, but err in 
the main yeah, but like all these things, it's like all systems, there are ways and 
you will get people out there will try,... you know,.... I've known people used to 
go around like, with a gun in one of these... you can check to see whether it is 
gap anyway, and I used to walk around with one of these and an enquiry 
screen... scan it.... so go, all no, it's got stock in it... so they wouldn't put it on 
the gap sheet and they'd be doing it holding two guns while they were doing the 
gap checks. So, I just don't understand why they do it... or people used to.... say 
they get a report off at night and they used to scan it all in and put one in their
book stocks. But I mean, they had to sit there for half an hour doing that. What's
the point of that? I don't know. It's like with everything. All these things they bring 
out you know, like Chip and pin, people get round these things and there are ... 
but in the main, I think it's a very good system
JB. Thank you very much for your time.
WL. Okay
JB. You've been very helpful.
WL. Alright.
JB. I appreciate that you're very busy,...
WL. It's fine
JB. ... but you've been extremely helpful to me.
WL. Yeah.
JB. Pop this off.
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Ends.
204
APPENDIX C: CIT SPECIMEN INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPT PRESENTED BY 
ANALYSIS CODE/CC/WARLINGHAM 
Coding Warlingham 
Financial v Non-financial Pi’s. Role of non-financial measures? 
Codes: FPI
where we were competing against, when we were a CX, um ... we were taking
36.000 a week and when we came out of the refit, we were only taking like 29 -
30.000 a week as the Co-op. um.. so that flagged up to me that you know, 
obviously that, the sales weren’t doing very well. On the back of that, um.. we 
had the wastage, which is our reductions and like the stuff that we throw away.
JB. So, the accountable ... ?
WL. Yeah, all the accountable waste and all that. We’re set a budget, I think 
it’s thirteen., about thirteen hundred per week and we were hitting like ... when 
we first come out of the refit, it was about five and a half grand, in the first week.
It was then about £4 000 and we were regularly hitting about two and a half 
thousand pounds. So we were targeted err... umm .. our target to store, to like 
keep those budgets... um and over the last few um.. you know, over the last few 
weeks.. I mean, what we done, we just had so much stock coming in and like 
um... it was just like the wrong lines were coming in and it was just basically like 
you know, everything was going wrong... in terms of sales and waste. Um 
store., it’s a lovely new store. There’s a lot of focus on the store um ... so we had 
to like, get a handle on it quite quick. Sort of start turning it around...
I think we were., not hitting our budget, but our sales had gone up to about thirty- 
five thousand now, so they’ve gradually gone up to virtually three... in fact, the 
week before we did £36 500, which was err., three and a half grand up on last 
year. So, that showed me that you know, what we were doing on terms of sales, 
was going in the right direction.
JB. That’s the trend, is it?
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WL. Yeah. It’s going up. I mean, last couple of weeks... this week, we are 
slightly down on last week, But we’re still going to do about thirty four... about 
thirty-four, thirty-five. Um ... which is good in terms of what we were doing last 
year. Cos, what it was, the company set us a high budget. Err., no-one’s hitting 
that budget. So, what they are looking at, they’re looking at like-for-like sales on 
last year and we are actually starting to get positive growth, on, on last year’s 
sales
JB. Right. And last year, was it a CX?
WL. It was a CX business unit so... you know, for us to start hitting., like
coming above CX, it shows us that we are going in the right direction. Err... in
terms of wastage, um.. we did, I done the same thing. I done a lot of work around 
the range., um... got lines cut out.
Um.. produce for arguments sake, we had far too much range um.. and it was 
costing us a fortune um.. so., each week., so, what we’ve done, we’ve..
JB. In waste?
WL. Yeah. In waste. So what we’ve done. We’ve re-ranged the whole 
produce department and I think we gone from like two and a half grand, um.. in 
the last.. the last., say, six weeks ago, to the last four weeks, we’ve actually 
come under our budget. We achieved our budget. 1300. So, we’ve actually gone 
from like, really bad to really poor (?) and like you know, year-on-year we’re 
starting to improve that as well.
WL. Yeah. Adversely another time... e rr.... Bad experiences, bad 
experiences. A lot would be around ... it was the same’s um... ‘suppose, stock 
results. Be a big one.. um...you know, ‘been in store where we had, we had 
horrendous stock results where um.. this store we I first come here, I think the 
stock result was about 2.5% err... loss and budget was sort of 0.5%, so that 
flagged up to me that obviously we had a problem um...
JB. Was That... would that include the waste?
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WL. Yeah that... no, that was., that was unknown loss, yeah it was like, that’s 
with the waste taken off. So, the idea with that was for me to sit down and err... 
and obviously when you are in a situation tha t... you know, you are getting a bad 
stock result.
WL. ... yeah, you get a report saying what you’ve lost over the weeks, so 
you’ve got to look then, analyse, which your worst departments are and then start 
you know, working on that.
WL. Err ... not .... Yeah, it was showing. It was coming out saying we had 
um.. We had like a tracker that was coming out saying we were going to lose 
this.. X amount of money... but with so many weeks down the line ... and then it 
was a matter of just grabbing hold..
< interview briefly interrupted by a shop query >
In fact, we are doing quite well, because we are like..., we are actually building 
sales up you know, on., and on the terms of whoever has written the sales up in 
head office, it doesn't look very good on us, because it looks like we are losing it. 
Then, the whole company at the moment is going through that position, where 
they did... they did expect you like to do this amount and they are doing that 
amount. But, like for like and against some of the competition, they are doing 
rather well so.... that's the message we've been given so...
Sales -  against last year, budgets. Trends.
Wastage. Explicit treatment of having too many stock lines with poor turnover. 
Leakage/stock result.
Each of these three elements are key dimensions of performance No explicit 
mention of the wage bill.
NFPI
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Yeah. So what we done, the first thing we looked a t, I mean, we looked at 
sales, we looked at the range, we looked at our availability, we were looking at 
the availability. We started challenging a lot more on the actual gaps every day 
err., the co-op run a gaps system where you actually go round and scan the 
gaps, get a report off, and then you check into the book stocks, but it wasn't 
inaccurate at all, but what we've done .. and we started targeting ..um.. like every 
day. We're doing a gap-walk, every single morning., um .. and identifying if it is in 
stock. Why isn’t i t .. and get it onto the shelf. If not, we’re correcting the book 
stock and bringing the stock in.
WL. ... where we had about eight objectives we were being managed on and 
the co-op now are going down to... I think it’s about five... main ones that they’re 
looking at. E rr... availability being one of them, errr.. but yeah, I do think that, 
do agree with that... it’s a pretty fair system, because you’ve always got to have 
something that you’ve got to be able to shoot for
Customer focus is another one um... where they come round and do the mystery 
shop.
WL. Well I mean, the thing is with the customer, the mystery shopper... the 
mystery shopper one where they do., they do the customer focus audit, you don’t 
know it’s going on and they come round and they do it, and there’s no way you 
can really cheat that.
Availability/gaps. Availability features as very significant in this transcript 
Mystery shopper. Seen as measure with Integrity.
What do managers do with information?
From company 
From other sources 
Code: Act
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So we were targeted err... umm .. our target to store, to like keep those 
budgets... um and over the last few um.. you know, over the last few weeks.. I 
mean, what we done, we just had so much stock coming in and like um... it was 
just like the wrong lines were coming in and it was just basically like you know, 
everything was going wrong... in terms of sales and waste. Um store., it’s a 
lovely new store. There’s a lot of focus on the store um ... so we had to like, get 
a handle on it quite quick. Sort of start turning it around...
JB. Right. So can you., so what... moving on from that, can you say a bit 
about how you did that...
WL. Yeah. So what we done, the first thing we looked a t , I mean, we looked 
at sales, we looked at the range, we looked at our availability, we were looking at 
the availability. We started challenging a lot more on the actual gaps every day 
err., the co-op run a gaps system where you actually go round and scan the 
gaps, get a report off, and then you check into the book stocks, but it wasn’t 
inaccurate at all, but what we’ve done .. and we started targeting ..um.. like every 
day. We’re doing a gap-walk, every single morning., um .. and identifying if it is in 
stock. Why isn’t i t .. and get it onto the shelf. If not, we’re correcting the book 
stock and bringing the stock in. um ... in terms of sales, we looked at range as 
well. We did ... I called in through um.. Rob Tippett, I had a word with Rob 
Tippett and he got in the regional space-planning manager for me. And we 
walked round the store and we decided that certain departments weren’t working 
for us. Um ... previously we’d have had like a um.. sixteen-foot drinks section, a 
cold drinks section um ... and we’d gone down to about eight foot, with the co-op. 
So, we’ve actually done some merchandising moves, around the whole store err., 
to actually give us that sort of space back again. Err., and its really getting behind 
every sales opportunity we get, you know, picking lines and really going for it. In 
terms of... so sales... we’ve turned out... um.. with our sales, we were like last 
week I think we were., not hitting our budget, but our sales had gone up to about 
thirty-five thousand now, so they’ve gradually gone up to virtually three... in fact, 
the week before we did £36 500, which was err., three and a half grand up on 
last year. So, that showed me that you know, what we were doing on terms of 
sales, was going in the right direction.
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... in terms of wastage, um.. we did, I done the same thing. I done a lot of work 
around the range., um... got lines cut out. I’ve had like um.. permission to.. I’ve 
gone up to head office and we’ve got like um.. permission to take a lot of shelving 
out and drop the ranges down and change the ranges slightly and err..
JB. Which would otherwise be determined by head office?
WL. Yeah. It would be determined, but we’ve actually., we’ve been able to
go to them and say like you know, this ain’t working for us. Um.. produce for 
arguments sake, we had far too much range um.. and it was costing us a fortune 
um.. so., each week., so, what we’ve done, we’ve..
JB. In waste?
WL. Yeah. In waste. So what we’ve done. We’ve re-ranged the whole
produce department and I think we gone from like two and a half grand, um.. in 
the last.. the last., say, six weeks ago, to the last four weeks, we’ve actually 
come under our budget. We achieved our budget. 1300. So, we’ve actually gone 
from like, really bad to really poor (?) and like you know, year-on-year we’re 
starting to improve that as well.
WL. Yeah. The plans were., the plans for us were, we were going to ... we
were going to like bring... the first weekend when we shut on the Thursday. 
Friday, we were going to have staff out training, up ‘til the Monday. And then we 
were coming back into store on the Monday, um.. but what happened, err.. 
Addington store relaunched the week .. they were doing a remodel of the 
Addington store, and they launched a week early. So, the stock that we’d taken 
out of the building here, to go to Hamsey Green, you know, had to come back in 
two days before. So, it had to come in on the Sunday. Um.. which meant we 
relied., you know, put under pressure, but what we did, what worked really well 
cos being able to plan... being able to like ... soon as they told us, I was able to 
get hold of staff, get the staff in, then we plan... they all came and helped. And 
we basically... what we did, we came in two days before we should of done, we 
re-ticketed up the whole store err... we got every single plan and then we actually 
got the delivery from Hamsey Green with all our old stock, and we got that out
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before the new ... before the delivery started. Consequently, that helped us 
when we actually., the week of launch, when all the co-op new stock started 
coming in, we was actually ahead of the game and we ended up, opening up with 
.. on the, on the actually opening morning all singing and dancing. It was really 
good.
JB. Right.
WL. Yeah, so we had you know, but it... to do that, it took a lot of planning. 
You know, I had to spend a lot of time....
JB. Right. So, planning is the key to that?
WL. Yeah. For me, it was like me spending time planning and what we were 
going to do each day. Also, resourcing my staff. Um.. you know, making the calls 
and getting staff involved.
So, the idea with that was for me to sit down and err... and obviously when you 
are in a situation tha t... you know, you are getting a bad stock result. You are 
getting a lot of visits. Different things and it just snowballs. Um ... but same thing. 
We got out of that... you know, by breaking it down um.. bit by bit by 
component... looking at the worst departments um.... Investigating why that was 
happening, and we turned it in, I think the next.. you know, after about the next 
stock take we turned like 0.6% loss. So, we actually clawed back a lot of that 
money. Because a lot of it was in processes in store, they weren't working. So, 
we set-up a lot of new processes like the code checking, um .. obviously a lot on 
security as well. Beefed up security by getting people more aware that if they see 
someone in store, they call someone.
JB. Right
WL. And that was another time when it went really well
WL. ... yeah, you get a report saying what you’ve lost over the weeks, so 
you’ve got to look then, analyse, which your worst departments are and then start 
you know, working on that. One of my worst departments was cigarettes so, with
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cigarettes now they either don’t get delivered , so it’s making 100% sure they 
were checked off when they came in, or it was staff theft. So, the only way we did 
it... what we did was set-up like stock counts every week, we were counting like 
the top twenty lines and like we used to count those lines, every single week. So, 
that if any of those went missing I knew that I had a problem on that.
WL. Err ... not .... Yeah, it was showing. It was coming out saying we had 
um.. We had like a tracker that was coming out saying we were going to lose 
this.. X amount of money... but with so many weeks down the line ... and then it 
was a matter of just grabbing hold..
< interview briefly interrupted by a shop query >
WL. But.. that was a ...
JB. You had an indication in advance...
WL. Yeah, we had an indication in advance that it was going... so, it was 
basically then going in and setting up systems that we were going to use, to like 
track, you know, to rectify i t .. and we did turn it around.
This store was post-refit
To address the availability/waste problem; analyse range and availability. Pay 
close attention to individual gaps to establish the causes. Brought in the regional 
space planning manager to look at both the range and space planning. The 
implication is that some of the changes from the old CX layout work to radical. 
Changes were then made to the merchandising to address this. Efforts were 
made to get behind every sales opportunity. To address waste the range was 
analysed. With head office permission, some lines were delisted, to reduce the 
range on offer and some shelving removed.
In the context of the refit process itself, much attention was given to the planning 
and to resourcing staff and getting them involved.
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To address a poor stock result Analyse the result Breakdown to identify source 
of problem. Beef up security. Staff training/awareness. Ensure goods received a 
cheque was effective. Setup weekiy stock checks on 20 top-selling lines and 
track progress.
Instigate/improve processes e.g. code checking.
There is an endogeneity issue to consider? 
Code: T - for time I
I mean, what we done, we just had so much stock coming in and like um... it was 
just like the wrong lines were coming in and it was just basically like you know, 
everything was going wrong... in terms of sales and waste. Um store., it’s a 
lovely new store. There’s a lot of focus on the store um ... so we had to like, get 
a handle on it quite quick. Sort of start turning it around...
JB. Right. So can you., so what... moving on from that, can you say a bit 
about how you did that...
WL. Yeah. So what we done, the first thing we looked a t , I mean, we looked 
at sales, we looked at the range, we looked at our availability, we were looking at 
the availability. We started challenging a lot more on the actual gaps every day 
err., the co-op run a gaps system where you actually go round and scan the 
gaps, get a report off, and then you check into the book stocks, but it wasn’t 
inaccurate at all, but what we’ve done .. and we started targeting ..um.. like every 
day. We’re doing a gap-walk, every single morning., um .. and identifying if it is in 
stock. Why isn’t i t .. and get it onto the shelf. If not, we’re correcting the book 
stock and bringing the stock in. um ... in terms of sales, we looked at range as 
well. We did ... I called in through um.. Rob Tippett, I had a word with Rob 
Tippett and he got in the regional space-planning manager for me. And we 
walked round the store and we decided that certain departments weren’t working 
for us. Um ... previously we’d have had like a um.. sixteen-foot drinks section, a 
cold drinks section um ... and we’d gone down to about eight foot, with the co-op. 
So, we’ve actually done some merchandising moves, around the whole store err..
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to actually give us that sort of space back again. Err., and its really getting behind 
every sales opportunity we get, you know, picking lines and really going for it. In 
terms of... so sales... we’ve turned out... um.. with our sales, we were like last 
week I think we were., not hitting our budget, but our sales had gone up to about 
thirty-five thousand now, so they’ve gradually gone up to virtually three... in fact, 
the week before we did £36 500, which was err., three and a half grand up on 
last year. So, that showed me that you know, what we were doing on terms of 
sales, was going in the right direction.
Um ... previously we’d have had like a um.. sixteen-foot drinks section, a cold 
drinks section um ... and we’d gone down to about eight foot, with the co-op. So, 
we’ve actually done some merchandising moves, around the whole store err., to 
actually give us that sort of space back again. Err., and its really getting behind 
every sales opportunity we get, you know, picking lines and really going for it. In 
terms of... so sales... we’ve turned out... um.. with our sales, we were like last 
week I think we were., not hitting our budget, but our sales had gone up to about 
thirty-five thousand now, so they’ve gradually gone up to virtually three... in fact, 
the week before we did £36 500, which was err., three and a half grand up on 
last year. So, that showed me that you know, what we were doing on terms of 
sales, was going in the right direction.
i’ve had like um.. permission to.. I’ve gone up to head office and we’ve got like 
um.. permission to take a lot of shelving out and drop the ranges down and 
change the ranges slightly and err..
JB. Which would otherwise be determined by head office?
WL. Yeah. It would be determined, but we’ve actually., we’ve been able to 
go to them and say like you know, this ain’t working for us. Um.. produce for 
arguments sake, we had far too much range um.. and it was costing us a fortune 
um.. so., each week., so, what we’ve done, we’ve..
JB. In waste?
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WL. Yeah. In waste. So what we’ve done, We’ve re-ranged the whole 
produce department and I think we gone from like two and a half grand, um.. in 
the last.. the last., say, six weeks ago, to the last four weeks, we’ve actually 
come under our budget. We achieved our budget. 1300. So, we’ve actually gone 
from like, really bad to really poor (?) and like you know, year-on-year we’re 
starting to improve that as well.
So, the idea with that was for me to sit down and err... and obviously when you
are in a situation that... you know, you are getting a bad stock result. You are
getting a lot of visits. Different things and it just snowballs. Um ... but same thing. 
We got out of that... you know, by breaking it down um.. bit by bit by 
component... looking at the worst departments um.... Investigating why that was 
happening, and we turned it in, I think the next.. you know, after about the next 
stock take we turned like 0.6% loss. So, we actually clawed back a lot of that 
money. Because a lot of it was in processes in store, they weren’t working. So, 
we set-up a lot of new processes like the code checking, um .. obviously a lot on 
security as well. Beefed up security by getting people more aware that if they see 
someone in store, they call someone.
JB. Right
WL. And that was another time when it went really well
Evidence that having the wrong range on offer leads to poor sales and high levels 
of waste. Whilst this is true in the very short term, it also has an effect on 
customer perceptions and therefore longer term sales.
Ample evidence that maintaining availability is key to supporting sales.
Waste can be reduced by instigating or improving existing processes and 
procedures, such as code checking
Is there a Hawthorne effect to consider? 
Code: Haw
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No material.
There is very limited evidence of managers adopting their own informal 
performance indicators (MPI's). One study suggests that this practice might 
be associated with the managers of higher performing business units.
Code: MPI
I mean, what we done, we just had so much stock coming in and like um... it was 
just like the wrong lines were coming in and it was just basically like you know, 
everything was going wrong... in terms of sales and waste. Um store., it's a 
lovely new store. There’s a lot of focus on the store um ... so we had to like, get 
a handle on it quite quick. Sort of start turning it around...
JB. Right. So can you., so what... moving on from that, can you say a bit 
about how you did that...
WL. Yeah. So what we done, the first thing we looked a t , I mean, we looked 
at sales, we looked at the range, we looked at our availability, we were looking at 
the availability. We started challenging a lot more on the actual gaps every day 
err., the co-op run a gaps system where you actually go round and scan the 
gaps, get a report off, and then you check into the book stocks, but it wasn’t 
inaccurate at all, but what we’ve done .. and we started targeting ..um.. like every 
day. We’re doing a gap-walk, every single morning., um .. and identifying if it is in 
stock. Why isn’t i t .. and get it onto the shelf. If not, we’re correcting the book 
stock and bringing the stock in. um ... in terms of sales, we looked at range as 
well. We did ... I called in through um.. Rob Tippett, I had a word with Rob 
Tippett and he got in the regional space-planning manager for me. And we 
walked round the store and we decided that certain departments weren’t working 
for us. Um ... previously we’d have had like a um.. sixteen-foot drinks section, a 
cold drinks section um ... and we’d gone down to about eight foot, with the co-op. 
So, we’ve actually done some merchandising moves, around the whole store err., 
to actually give us that sort of space back again. Err., and Its really getting behind 
every sales opportunity we get, you know, picking lines and really going for it. In 
terms of... so sales... we’ve turned out... um.. with our sales, we were like last
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week I think we were., not hitting our budget, but our sales had gone up to about 
thirty-five thousand now, so they’ve gradually gone up to virtually three... in fact, 
the week before we did £36 500, which was err., three and a half grand up on 
last year. So, that showed me that you know, what we were doing on terms of 
sales, was going in the right direction.
Manager could say that the range was not appropriate for the store and that this 
would cause problems in terms of sales and waste.
Manager perceptions and interpretations of performance indicators can 
influence their subsequent behaviour either positively or negatively. Any 
evidence of negative influence? Is the system fair?
Code: Fair
WL. Um... yeah , I think it is yeah, because they have like err., you know, 
they monitor you on sales. Customer focus is another one um... where they 
come round and do the mystery shop. Um. Yeah I think it is , I think because we 
came from... when we was in CX, we had a similar thing
JB. sure
WL. ... where we had about eight objectives we were being managed on and 
the co-op now are going down to... I think it’s about five... main ones that they’re 
looking at. E rr... availability being one of them, errr.. but yeah, I do think that., 
do agree with that... it’s a pretty fair system, because you’ve always got to have 
something that you’ve got to be able to shoot for.
WL. Well I mean, the thing is with the customer, the mystery shopper... the 
mystery shopper one where they do., they do the customer focus audit, you don’t 
know it’s going on and they come round and they do it, and there’s no way you 
can really cheat that. You know, unless you know the person who is doing it. And 
like you know, but you know, in that respect I think it’s quite fair. Um... and I 
think... you know, it all depends on ... they judge you on your sales which is., 
sometimes that’s fine, but then we don’t write the budgets. So, that again (14:47) 
is you know, they put us a whacking great budget and it looks like we are not
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achieving our sales. In fact, we are doing quite well, because we are like..., we 
are actually building sales up you know, on., and on the terms of whoever has 
written the sales up in head office, it doesn't look very good on us, because it 
looks like we are losing it. Then, the whole company at the moment is going 
through that position, where they did... they did expect you like to do this amount 
and they are doing that amount. But, like for like and against some of the 
competition, they are doing rather well so.... that’s the message we've been 
given so...
Target setting is the right thing to do. Availability is a considerable focus on the 
mystery shopper has integrity, as you can't cheat it. The manager feels that the 
sales budget has been increased significantly (perhaps not surprising, given the 
refit). So, whilst the store is trading ahead of last year's figures and comparably 
with the competition, there is an implied unfairness about somebody in head 
office setting a very challenging target, which now seems to reflect badly on the 
store (actual sales being currently lower than the target). However, all stores 
have challenging budgets, and not just this one.
There Is a risk of performance Indicators triggering unintended or 
dysfunctional behaviours. This risk can be exacerbated by a link with 
rewards. 
Code: UB
WL. Yeah, I think they can, yeah. Yeah. I think, I think the problem is we 
yeah... the problem is when they measure .... We used to have it in CX, where 
they’d measure gaps. Now I’ve always believed that you know, when we’ve 
measured the gaps, I rather walk in and have 200 gaps and know that I have 200 
gaps um .. and that, you know,.. that was .. you know... that was... um .. that 
was what I had to aim for. Say., my target was fifty and I had 200, then I’d rather 
walk in. I’d rather know that I had 200 ... um... but a lot of stores .. I know for a 
fact (laughs).. I know it happens and it does... 1 (?) used to go round and put 
one in their book stocks and all that so it never showed on their report.
JB. Well that’s the sort of thing, yeah...
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WL Yeah, you know, which I don’t think is helpful. I’ve always.. I think... it’s 
a good system providing everyone uses it correctly. I think it is, I mean, you know, 
you are always going to get people that will try and buck that system and like 
there is, you know, there’s loads of things. They used to take it off a report the 
night before, which helped them like identify things and they’d put one in the book 
stocks and all this sort of thing, but at the end of the day, all they were doing was 
masking the gaps. And I know when we first came over., um ...and this is 
something I... something I observed in a lot of the co-op stores that I worked in, 
that.. when we first came over... if they had a visit, they’d take... and they had a 
gap,... they’d take the ticket off and like you know,.. and merchandise out the 
gap. Well, the thing is, that’s fine, providing that ticket goes back. But... and 
basically what it does, it makes a better visit but at the end of the day, you are 
just fooling yourself, cos at the end-of the day you., you know, if that ticket 
doesn’t go back, you are not going to notice the gap... and you always going to 
have a gap,so I tend, we tend, we use these blue tickets, which we got from CX, 
it’s the same. Our bosses bought in and we’ve launched this and I think it’s going 
all the way round the co-op now., co-op now., um
JB. Right.
WL. Um... And then basically, if you’ve got something that’s out of stock, you 
put that on it, with the day’s date, that you’ve investigated it and then, when it 
comes in, you take the ticket off.
JB. Right.
WL. So, you know .. um .. and I know a few of the co-op managers, they used 
to think that if they hid the gaps then people wouldn’t you know,... they’d walk 
round the store and think oh, store looks marvellous, you know.... Doesn’t work.
JB. Right. But it’s still possible to do that now is it?
WL. Yeah. It is still.. they can still do it, they can .. there are ways around
their system that they can get. With us, I tend to... try and stick to the line., you 
know, if they say I’ve got to do all the gaps by half past eight, I try and get it all
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done by half past eight, just stick to it. But there are a few people, as you go on., 
you know, like um..
JB. Well there is no perfect system is there?
WL. Well 1 mean, the thing is with the customer, the mystery shopper... the 
mystery shopper one where they do., they do the customer focus audit, you don’t 
know it’s going on and they come round and they do it, and there’s no way you 
can really cheat that. You know, unless you know the person who is doing it. And 
like you know, but you know, in that respect 1 think it’s quite fair.
WL. Yeah. Yeah. I know. They are saying we are having such a wonderful 
year but we are not going to hit where we need to hit so ... you know, but err in 
the main yeah, but like all these things, it's like all systems, there are ways and 
you will get people out there will try,... you know,.... I've known people used to 
go around like, with a gun in one of these... you can check to see whether it is 
gap anyway, and I used to walk around with one of these and an enquiry 
screen... scan it.... so go, all no, it's got stock in it... so they wouldn't put it on 
the gap sheet and they'd be doing it holding two guns while they were doing the 
gap checks. So, I just don't understand why they do it... or people used to.... say 
they get a report off at night and they used to scan it all in and put one in their 
book stocks. But I mean, they had to sit there for half an hour doing that. What's 
the point of that? I don't know. It's like with everything. All these things they bring 
out you know, like Chip and pin, people get round these things and there are ... 
but in the main, I think it's a very good system
This manager believes that not only is it possible to abuse the gaps 
measurement system, but that this abuse is prevalent in other food stores in the 
co-operative group. Believes that this doesn't really achieve anything. Approves 
of the mystery shopper, because the measure is not possible to abuse.
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